Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (Book Edited by David Turton, 2006): A Commentary
By Getachew Mequanent
In anticipation of someone asking why I write commentaries on scholarly works (instead of reviews), let me say that I write such pieces for non-academic audience. Commentaries (a sort of positive dialogue) also allow me to talk freely about practical issues.
The “ethnic question” surfaced on the Ethiopian political arena in the 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when Ethiopian students were articulating Marxism and Leninism as a “revolutionary” ideology. So the ongoing debate on the Ethiopian ethnic-based federalism is not about why EPRDF addressed the ethnic question, but how it has addressed it. There are now several scholarly works on this issue. The book reviewed here, Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective (2006), enables us to understand the opportunities and challenges inherent in the Ethiopian federal system. As the title indicates, we also have an opportunity to learn about the experiences of federalism in other countries. The book is a collection of studies by eight scholars with an excellent introduction by the editor David Turton and a concluding chapter by Christopher Clapham. There is a discussion by Will Kymlicka (Chapter 1) of the experience of what he calls “multinational federations” in Western countries, followed by case studies of Nigeria by Rotimi Suberu (Chapter 2) and India by Jajeev Bhargava (Chapter 3). Merera Gudina looks at the political history of Ethiopia (Chapter 4). Assefa Fiseha assesses the vitality and practical application of the 1995 Ethiopian federal constitution (Chapter 5). Gideon Cohen helps us understand the challenges of applying federal language policy in the country (Chapter 6). Finally, Sarah Vaughan (Chapter 7) and Dereje Feyissa (Chapter 8) present case studies of the experiences of federalism in two Southern Ethiopia regional states, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNPs) and Gambella. I do not claim to have fully summarized and analyzed the contents of this book, however, this commentary provides sufficient material for our purpose here. The main highlights are:
1) Federalism - or in most cases the accommodation of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity - has become a universal trend.
2) The Ethiopian federal constitution has good principles, and according to Will Kymilcka, it even appears extreme by Western standards (e.g., the inclusion of Article 39, which gives ethnic groups a right to secession). In Nigeria and India separation is by all means discouraged; in fact, it is prohibited.
3) EPRDF first created ethnic regions and then designed a federal system that decentralized a highly centralized state to these regions. However, the federation was imposed from above without any “political mobilization” (public debate, consultations, etc).
4) The functions of the Ethiopian federation are supported by the central party structure of EPRDF party. The good thing about this arrangement is that it enables the federal government to direct and monitor the development and implementation of progressive policies and programs in every sector of Ethiopian society. The weakness of this approach is that it has not been facilitating the institutionalization of autonomous federal-regional relationships, thus, potentially undermining the whole purpose of federalism.
5) While the federation has been received with enthusiasm by Ethiopia’s historically exploited and oppressed ethnic groups, neither regional states nor the federal state has been able to provide adequate support in the process of applying federalism on the ground. In SNNPs and Gambella regions, ethnic and linguistic groups have used the federal constitution to claim territorial autonomy, group identities and federal representation. The main problem is that there are no effective mechanisms for mediating conflicts arising from the clash of competing interests.
The Ethiopian Federal Experiment?
In theory, federation has two main features: territorial autonomy and national representation. In practice, it may mean different things in different places. Hence, in this book, we learn that there are multi-national federation in the West, a territorial (ethnic) federation in Nigeria and a linguistic federation in India. How about Ethiopia? As the back cover of this book indicates:
Since 1991, Ethiopia has gone further than any other country in using ethnicity as the fundamental principle of a federal government. And yet this pioneering experiment in ethnic federalism has been largely ignored in the growing literature on democratization and ethnicity in Africa and on the accommodation of ethnic diversity in democratic states.
That Ethiopia has gone further than any other country in crafting a federal system on the basis of ethnicity should not surprise us, as the whole process including the writing of the 1995 constitution was orchestrated and directed by ethnic political elites. But we can debate whether Ethiopia is still experimenting federalism or there has been sufficient experimentation of federalism so that we better start appraising what has and has not worked, and amend or modify the constitution to improve its relevance to evolving societal realities. I will raise this issue throughout this commentary.
In their Working Paper, Artificial States (Centre for Global Development, 2006), Alberto Alesina, William Easterly and Janina Matuszeski argue that the way a nation’s border is drawn could be a decisive factor in shaping its historical experience including political and economic development. Their argument is based on an econometric analysis which uses two measures: 1) “situations in which the same ethnic group is present in two bordering countries”, and 2) “based upon an assumption that if a land border is close to a straight line it is more likely to be drawn artificially i.e., by former colonizers; if it is relatively squiggly it is more likely to represent either geographical features (rivers, mountains etc.) and/or represent divisions carved out in time to separate different people (p. 3)”. I want to make the long story short and consider the second assumption: that nation-states with straight-line (artificial) borders incorporate different ethnic groups and so they are prone to inter-state ware and internal civil wars and ethnic tensions.
I mentioned Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski’s theory here because it could indicate the prevalence of the ethnic question throughout the globe, due to the definition by external forces of the borders of most nations including Ethiopia’s. In fact, Ethiopia had been at war with Somalia and recently with Eritrea. The country also experienced decades of internal civil wars. But the ethnic question still persists. And the lesson we learn from this book is that ethnicity can be managed. Consider Switzerland which, according to Will Kymilcka, consists of three ethnic groups that “stand with their backs to each other’s...: the French Swiss stand facing towards France, the Italians Swiss towards Italy and the German Swiss towards Germany, each focused on their own internal cultural life and the media and culture of the neighbouring country whose language they share (p. 44)”. Switzerland become one of the best countries in the world because it has learned how to manage ethnicity. We can then see why EPRDF leaders continue to argue that Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups would not seek separation as long as their demands for political, cultural, civil and economic rights are met. The studies by Gideon Cohen, Dereje Feyissa and Sarah Vaughan in this book reveal that, despite the inconsistency of the application of the federal constitution and despite occasional inter-and intra-ethnic and communal conflicts (which at times prove deadly), Ethiopia’s ethnic and linguistic communities have used the federal system to empower themselves. Writing on Gambella, Dereje says (p. 227):
The fruits of the integrative revolution are noticeable in a remarkable reorientation in the political identity of the local people, the new process of becoming Ethiopian. This is so because the federal system and the new opportunity structure connect with a local ‘modernist’ project. By this I refer to the aspiration of the people to change their material conditions of life through enhanced access to modern goods and services as well as increased participation in modern education, a vital means to ‘catch up’ with the relatively better-off neighbouring people.
Of course, this is just one side of the story of Ethiopian federalism. Dereje’s account of the political situation in Gambella clearly shows that the Nuers and Anywaas have been making competing claims of political and material entitlements and at times this degenerated into a deadly conflict. But his point about the “integrative revolution” is interesting. Jonathan Crush who edited a volume entitled Power of Development (1995), James Ferguson (in his The Anti-Political Machine, 1994) and many others have argued that “development” would facilitate the rapid integration of agrarian societies into national/state structures. To explain, when national governments open schools, hospitals, commercial centres, police stations, courts, facilities, etc, in regions or remote areas, they are also extending the power of the state and the values, language and culture of mainstream (urban) society to these areas. This is also happening in Ethiopia. Let me illustrate it by taking our childhood experience as an example: we all remember the Emperor’s soldiers sweeping across the countryside to collect taxes. Once they did this, they went back to the cities and we would never see them again until the next tax season - the feudal state wanted only resources. Derg’s military government tried to establish a permanent presence through peasant associations, but soon these organizations became hated as they were increasingly used as an instrument of repression and exploitation. In contrast, the EPRDF government have entered Ethiopian regions with resources (give donor countries a credit) and comprehensive plans to initiate economic, social, institutional and infrastructure development initiatives that have set the “integrative revolution” in motion. In twenty years time, the forces of state-guided modernization will probably have engulfed many of Ethiopia’s ethnic and linguistic communities, so much that we may even begin to talk about the protection of Ethiopia’s cultural diversity.
Kymilcka also tells us that many Western countries such as Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, England and Spain have embraced the idea of multinational federations as a way of accommodating ethnic and cultural diversity. He attributes this trend to three factors; first, the growing immigrant communities have extended the expression of their diverse cultural values to Western societies. And they are demanding the recognition of their cultural rights; second, there are culturally distinct indigenous groups whose populations are growing fast; and finally, there is a “rights’ consciousness” public which supports liberal policies that accommodate minority rights. To be sure, there has been some level of discomfort with immigrant communities in the West following 9/11. For instance, the Dutch (who are the most liberal people in the West) are disenchanted with the idea of a multicultural society. France has already banned wearing headscarfs by Muslim girls in public schools. Just recently, a prominent British politician said that he would like Muslim women to unveil their faces when they came to his office. In Canada, there was a brief public anger when seven Muslim young people were arrested accused of plotting to carry out a terrorist act including the beheading of the Canadian Prime Minister! In spite of this, according to Kymilcka, support for minority rights has not declined not necessarily because the majority (white population) supports the cause, but because minority groups remain highly organized around politics - they lobby and advocate. This is precisely the advantage of liberal democracy, in that, it provides multiple entry points (at local, regional and national levels) into the political process to defend and promote one’s rights. In countries where there are strong separatist movements (the French in Canada, for example), separatist parties have not been able to mobilize enough political support, because people have confidence on the status quo.
Kymilcka is aware of the dynamic of ethnicity in Africa. For instance, with the exception of Ethiopia, where Amharas are seen as a hegemonic group, there are no dominant groups that have imposed their own cultures and languages on nation-states. Many countries have opted to adopt colonial languages (English, French, Spanish and Portuguese) as their official languages. Instead, ongoing ethnic conflicts are caused by clashes among what he calls “community of contenders” which are ethnic interest groups competing against each other to get access to state resources. When national systems fail to mediate these processes - or when certain ethnic groups seize control of the states and reap the benefits - marginalized groups start to fight against the system to the extent of taking up arms to waging civil wars. Kymilcka says that African countries including Ethiopia cannot afford to await the accommodation of ethnic issues.
Kymilcka is a passionate defender of multiculturalism and minority rights in Canada. I became familiar with his work when I was managing research projects in the Department of Canadian Heritage of the Government of Canada. I was delighted to see a chapter by him in this book. Jajeev Bhargava and Rotimi Suberu who present studies on India and Nigeria, respectively, reinforce his argument. The Indian federation consists of regions whose boundaries are drawn along linguistic lines. This, according to Bhargava, has enabled India’s diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups to develop their own policies and program at regional levels, while competing for political space at the national level. True, India still experiences some religious and communal conflicts, but the federal system has succeeded in holding over a billion people together, making the country the largest democracy in the world.
Nigeria is also a country with diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups of which three groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yurba) constitute the majority of the population. As Rotimi Suberu’s account shows, at the time of independence these three ethnic groups began playing ethnic posturing (one ethnic group is better than the other) and competing against each other for political power. This reality, coupled with the Biafra civil war, led successive Nigerian national military and civilian governments to promote federalism. This program of federalism involved “territorial fragmentation” whereby the territory of the three largest and powerful ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yurba) were divided into 21 small states and the remaining ethnic territories into 15 states, a total of 36 states. The federation also organizes regional states into 11 zones according to which powerful national decision-making positions (president, vice president, senate president, commissions, etc) are distributed equally among ethnic groups. The idea behind the creation of smaller states was to make them so small that they would not be able to mobilize political support to pursue a secessionist agenda. Suberu points out that, while questions of autonomy and identity still remain central to Nigerian political discourse, to a large extent regional states have been more concerned with a competition among themselves to share federal oil revenues, instead of developing a separatist political agenda.
As I noted earlier, our issue is not why EPRDF addressed the ethnic question, but how it has addressed it. Let us now turn to this issue. Proclamation No. 1/1995 organizes the Ethiopian federal state around nine ethnically based regional states (Afar, Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, Somali, Benshangul-Gumuz, SNNPs, Gambella and Harari) and two autonomous cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Both federal and regional states have legislative, executive and judiciary powers. The federal government is responsible for formulating and implementing the country’s policies including fiscal and monetary policy, investment, inter-regional and foreign trade, defense, public security and immigration. Regional sates have also powers on matters falling under their jurisdictions. Hence, for example, the constitution of the Amhara Regional State (Proclamation No. 2/1995) defines a wide range of areas of responsibility including preparing plans, administering land and natural resources, levying taxes, administering civil service and maintaining public security.
Assefa Fiseha tells us that the Ethiopian federal constitution is full of good principles. The issue is how it is being applied on the ground. EPRDF directs regional states on how they should plan and implement policies and programs set by the federal government. Assefa recognizes that federal intervention in regional states can be necessary to ensure effective fiscal management and accountability. For example, in Nigeria, as Rotimi Suberu shows, regional politicians have so much independence that they spent the money transferred by the federal government the way they want. This trend has created a culture of fiscal mismanagement and corruption. In contrast, EPRDF uses democratic centralism to impose political and fiscal discipline on regional politicians including orchestrating a process which removes them from power if they are found to be incompetent. The problem, according to Assefa, is that this level of federal intervention undermines regional autonomy and so it creates dependency on EPRDF party structures to make crucial decisions that require immediate actions. The result is that the organs of regional states have become reactive, instead of being proactive, to dealing with societal issues. This has been evident in the failure by state agencies to take necessary measures to prevent ethnic and communal conflicts in some part of the country. More importantly, if EPRDF is removed from power, and in the absence of institutionalized federal-regional relationships, the whole federal system could come down crumbling, creating serious political and institutional crises. David Turton thus writes, “Ethiopia’s experiment in ethnic federalism is at a greatest risk of failure, not because it is too ethnic, but because it is not sufficiently federal (p. 29)”.
When Turon says that the Ethiopian federation “is not sufficiently federal”, he mean that at present regions are limited in the exercise of their autonomy and that this may lead to the accumulation of regional grievances which can one day explode to create political and institutional crises.
The control of the functions of regional states through democratic centralism has also been identified by the other authors in this book as one of the distinctive features of Ethiopian federalism. Yet, as I pointed out earlier, federalism means different things in different places. In Ethiopia, where both federal and regional states are developing, their relationships can be framed differently. In his Subsidiarity: A Key Concept for Regional Development Policy (New Regional Development Paradigms, 2001), Walter Stohr argues that centre-regional relationships can be more effective and productive if they embody the principle of subsidiarity, whereby the strengths in the capacities of both national and regional bodies supplement and complement one another to create synergies that overcome challenges at different levels of decision-making. In the same volume, Decentralization and Local Autonomy: Regional Planning in Ethiopia, Fraser Taylor and I analysed the Ethiopian federal system and concluded that, while there were opportunities for federal-regional “subsidiarity”, decision-making processes had remained top-down and organizational resources were concentrated at the centre. But we also asserted (p. 143):
The performance of decentralization policies can be improved if there is an effort to explore different options that help to determine what can and what cannot be decentralized (emphasize added). The notion of devolution, delegation, and deconcentration tend to imply that political elites and the leaders of civil society should divide everything equally (the power, institutions, and resources). Then, we find that there is inadequate local capacity to administer the functions of institutions, to direct the state’s resources towards productive investment, and to exercise power effectively in ways that promote local autonomy. Instead, decentralization policies can be transformed from a blueprint text to a flexible and adaptable strategy that enables both government and society to be involved in the process of learning and experience accumulation.
Compared to rampant corruption in Nigeria and the slow pace of social changes in India (for example, difficulty of changing land tenure systems), EPRDF’s democratic centralism ensures that there is a uniform implementation of legislative frameworks and policies across Ethiopia to promote positive changes. With this noted, it is important that the federal government develops a feasible national strategy that provides a framework for the eventual scaling down of its intervention in regional affairs. The directive and facilitative roles of the “developmental state” can be justified if there are gaps in regional capacities.
The case studies by Sarah Vaughan and Dereje Feyissa on the SNNPs and Gambella, respectively, and by Gideon Cohen on language issues provide us with an opportunity to learn and appreciate the cultural and linguistic diversity of Ethiopian society. There is a wealth of information in these studies that I cannot capture all the main points in this short commentary. I particularly found the language issue more complex and challenging. As Cohen argues, the promotion of different languages in Ethiopia is a manifestation of the commitment of EPRDF elites to addressing questions of language and cultural identity and bringing about real benefits to the common people, such as early childhood education (using mother tongue languages) and removal of institutional barriers (e.g., using local languages to provide public services). To be sure, the application of the federal language policy at regional (state) levels and in major urban centres appears to have gone smoothly. Hence, for example, Oromo, Somalia and Tigray states use Afaan Oromo, Somali and Tigrigna, respectively, as their official languages. Amhara, Afar, SNNPs and Gambella states use Amharic as an official language. Harar and Dire Dawa use Amharic, Afaan Oromo, Aderi, Arabic and English. Gambella (the city), Asosa (Benshangul-Gumuz), Mekele, Awasa and other major urban centres use Amharic in schools. But enter the countryside in Southern Ethiopia and all this gets messy. To begin with, federal authorities had little understanding of the complexity of Southern societies. Equipped with the theoretical principles of a federal constitution, they began curving out administrative areas, mainly zones, along ethnic and linguistic line. But too often villagers live scattered across the countryside or, in one example on the Oromia-Somalia border, communities speak a language that is a fusion of Afaan Oromo and Somali. According to Cohen, ‘Whatever border is drawn... some member of the other group would be left on the “wrong side” (p. 174)’. Then, there were serious issues concerning the selection of working languages in those areas (e.g., how would one choose a working language if there are two or three linguistic groups in a single zone?). Groups whose languages were not selected were disenfranchised and so they demanded their own territories in order to develop and use their own languages. Finally, there were local elites who were busy articulating ethnicity as a way of getting a better access to “opportunity structures” (e.g., government jobs and political power). In the words of Vaughan (p. 201):
Under ethnic federalism, ethnic zones have enjoyed relatively high inputs of capital and recurrent government expenditure, and this is a fact that is widely known by those local elites who have masterminded claims for separate recognition. The more new claims are successful, the more a belief in the benefits of recognition as a separate unit on the basis of ethnicity has caught fire amongst new communities.
All this set in motion what Cohen calls a “constant process of redefinition” of boundaries of zones, Woredas and even Kebeles.
In Gambella, the majority Nuers and minority Anywaas have continued to advance historical arguments and counter-arguments of originality (who is a real native of Gambella) in a bid to dominate the regional state. EPRDF also appears to have adapted a political approach, whereby the Anywaas first became the favourite ethnic group, and when they fell out of favour, EPRDF began escorting the Nuers. My understanding of Dereje’s account suggests that the federal government has not been able to create political stability in this region.
Some of the authors in this book point out that the way the federal system was designed and applied (the top-down process) was a reflection of the authoritarian political culture of Northern elites. That is right, EPRDF elites little understood the complexities of Southern societies before imposing a federal system that lumped many ethnic and linguistic groups together into subnational units. Nonetheless, as Christopher Clapham rightly points out, the current problems are also “problems of success”. Ethiopian ethnic and linguistic groups have used the federal constitution to claim territorial autonomy, group identities and federal representation. But expectations have not been meet. I would argue that a large part of this could be attributed to lack of adequate institutional capacity and other structural constraints. At present there is a debate as to why countries in democratic transitions are less stable than those that are under authoritarian rules. Four decades ago, Samuel Huntington (in his Political Development and Political Decay, World Politics, 1965) wrote that democratic participation could create problems if nation-states lack capacities to accommodate demands from different groups in society. Although some has criticized him for downplaying the role of democracy in nation-building processes, today many would pay close attention to his argument. In fact, these days donor agencies including the World Bank pay serious attention to the issue of state capacity.
To continue with the political behaviour of Ethiopian elites, Merera Gudina appears to have got frustrated with the continuing lack of coherence of visions among Ethiopia’s political elites. Consider, he says, the hegemonic aspiration of Tigrean elites; the “nostalgia of the past” of Amhara elites; the separatist political agenda of Oromo elites; and above all, the culture of playing “zero-sum political game” which has given rise for the emergence of different political factions espousing competing claims of history, legitimacy and national goals. He appeals to Ethiopian elites to do “a serious soul-searching and rethinking of alternative futures, which can only be achieved through a pragmatic politics of give and take (p. 128)”. They should put national interests above their own (ethnic) interests and work towards fostering the institutionaliztion of democratic norms and practices in Ethiopian society. We completely agree with Merera. But I would also argue that regional diversity in Ethiopian politics is a healthy thing. For example, today there are regional elites who are concerned with poverty issues vs central elites who advocate national unity. I have lived in Canada long enough to observe that regional elites always compete for power. The current minority conservative government is dominated by elites from Western Canada, but strong democratic culture and national institutions ensure that there is a consensus on the conduct of the nation’s business. The problem in Ethiopia is that political discourse has been shaped by the culture of Addis Ababa elites who come out well organized to monopolize political space. Some of those Amhara elites referred to by Merera are in fact greedy and politically manipulative urban elites who are less committed to articulating the interest and aspiration of the poor masses.
Observations and Issues
Ethnic issues are universal. Many governments including those in the Western world have chosen to address ethnic issues. Therefore, Ethiopian politicians must work together to strengthen Ethiopia’s young democracy and federalism. They must learn how to use democracy to create a negotiated political order.
I am always convinced that Article 39 of the 1995 Ethiopian federal constitution - that “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”- has negatively affected the Ethiopian national psychology, especially after the traumatic experience of the Eritrean separation. To address this issue, and as part of the democratization process of the Ethiopian political system, it may be time to open a public debate as to whether this Article should be amended or removed from the federal constitution.
We are not sure about the outcome of continued redrawing of the boundaries of zones, Woredas or even Kebeles in Southern Ethiopia to accommodate demands for territorial recognition by competing ethnic and linguistic groups. Federal authorities must exercise responsibility to ensure that this practice has pubic administration logic. How can one ensure fiscal efficiency? It is also clear that claims of territorial recognition do not involve democratic political mobilization; they are engineered by ethnic elites who consider ethnicity as an entitlement for power and material privileges. Federalism must be implemented in the interest of the common people.
Gideon Cohen points to the need for the promotion of awareness of linguistic diversity in Ethiopian society. While Ethiopians aspire to learn English, French and other foreign languages, they develop little interest in learning Afaan Oromo, Tigrigna, Gurague and other home languages. As the opportunity structures of the Ethiopian economy are increasingly decentralized to different regions of Ethiopia, people will benefit from having multi- or tri-lingual language capacities. Ethiopia needs a national language policy that includes the promotion of linguist diversity as well as the creation of opportunities for learning Ethiopia’s diverse languages.
Other than the 1991 national conference that was hastily organized by EPRDF, there had not been political mobilization during the formulation of the Ethiopian federal constitution. The creation of a new political order such as federalism would have required years of political dialogue and negotiation to achieve a national consensus. In India, for example, the debate about federalism started in the 1920s, two decades before the country’s independence. In contrast, when EPRDF leaders rose to power, they found constitutional and political vacuum, which enabled them to formulate and impose a new federal system. Thus, as part of the democratization process, the Ethiopian government should develop and implement public education programs to raise awareness of the current federal system. The federation can be seen differently in different part of the country and modern media (radio and TV) can be used to facilitate the exchange of different views and experiences. This helps to develop a consensus on key national issue (e.g., amending or modifying the constitution).
The federal government needs to address the plights of highlanders in Southern Ethiopia. For example, Dereje Feyissa says that in Gambella they are not allowed to run for political office. More importantly, the “indigenization” of the civil service in different regions of Ethiopia has resulted in the demoralization of highlander bureaucrats. I am not overlooking the moral and political dilemma here. That is, while the federation must empower local people to manage their own affairs, the same policy can also encourage discrimination against those who are not natives to the areas. The practice of hiring civil servants on the basis of “ethnic entitlement” will also result in public sector incompetence, which may create a bottleneck in the development process. The federal government should undertake a thorough review of the functions of regional states to make sure that the indigenization policy is addressing the needs of the Ethiopian people. The effective performance of the federation will be measured by the quality of delivery of public services to ordinary Ethiopians, not by the increasing number of natives entering regional public services.
In their Optimism and Poverty in Africa: Adaptation or a Means for Survival? (http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/graham/20061005) Carol Graham and Matthew Hoover say that poor people in Africa are more optimistic and happy, compared to those in other regions where optimism and happiness are correlated with education and wealth. This is true. Ethiopians are optimistic about their future. In my part, I wrote a piece predicting that Ethiopia would be a middle-income country in 20 years time. Two critics responded by stating that this was ridiculous and even accused me of supporting EPRDF’s political agenda. Here, let me also say that I am optimistic about the future of Ethiopian federalism. I see a progressive society in Ethiopia. And what makes a society progressive is the spirit and determination of the people. It is unfortunate that many Ethiopians who live abroad do not realize this situation, because the Diaspora media gives them highly politicized information that over-exaggerates the extent of problems in the country, implying that the Ethiopian society is a dying society.
I had said it before and I will say it again: we must support those who are engaged in hand-on work to uplift our relatives out of poverty. I am not concerned about EPRDF. This is a resource-rich party with strong leadership and organizational discipline. I am talking about opposition parties, civil society organizations, pubic and private sector agencies and the efforts of ordinary citizens. These are the alternative democratic forces. I am actually increasingly terrified by what is happening within the Diaspora CUD camps (among other things, factional fighting, totalitarianism, allegation of corruption and intimidation and harassment of critics), because I cannot stop imagining what will happen to our relatives if this group influences the political process in Ethiopia. We must support the building of homegrown opposition parties that are capable of holding EPRDF accountable and also governing effectively if they come to power.
In her Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (2003), Marina Ottaway argues that in many developing and transitional (former Soviet Union) countries, “transitional democracy” has been a political mockery. Why? Because, self-interested middle class people and former communists got elected and so governments have delivered little benefits to the poor people. Politics aside, I think we should realize that Ethiopia has an advantage by having ruling elites who are progressive, hard working and whose values are deeply rooted in rural society. What we need to do is reach out to them to influence their policies and practices. We support politicians and non-state actors who are currently working with EPRDF leaders to improve governance and the economic welfare of the Ethiopian people.
Getachew Mequanent
Ottawa, Canada
November 2006