The House International Relations Committee recently agreed to seek consideration of H.R. 5680, the Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights Advancement Act, by unanimous consent under Suspension of the Rules. While including some useful findings and policy statements on the complex contemporary political history of Ethiopia, the bill has serious potential for jeopardizing the on-going strategic partnership between the United States and Ethiopia. The problems range from simple crafting deficiencies to straight factual errors and inaccuracies, as well as glaring tendentiousness. Most importantly, the bill will prohibit security assistance to Ethiopia at a time when the volatility in Somalia and instability in the broader Horn of Africa region demand robust security cooperation between Ethiopia and the United States. Here, briefly, are some of the conspicuous problems with the proposed bill. (More detail comments are attached herewith.)

Introduction: A brief history of the Smith/Payne Bill

The Smith/Payne bill has been in deliberation for about ten months. At the root of its genesis is the persistent lobbying on the part of a slice of the Ethiopian Diaspora organized by the extremists in the Ethiopian opposition who have persistently and flatly rejected all forms of political engagement. Chairman Chris Smith presented the first draft of the bill to the House International Relations Subcommittee on Global Human Rights, Africa and International operations on March 28, 2006. Subsequent to the markup hearing, Congressman Donald Payne offered a substitute bill. The Substitute bill offered a number of amendments intended to give some balance to the bill. Congressman's Payne substitute bill was rejected. Instead the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations marked up Congressman Smith's bill along strict partisan line. Subsequent to its mark up by the Subcommittee, Congressman Payne and Congressman Smith came together to negotiate their position on certain issues to produce a bipartisan bill, the Ethiopian Freedom, democracy and Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006 (H.R. 5680). This negotiated text incorporates some important elements from Payne’s substitute bill. Despite some minimal changes, the negotiated bill (HR 5680) still contains inaccurate statements as well as additional stringent certification requirements. As stated above, the House International Relations Committee agreed to seek consideration of H.R. 5680 by unanimous consent under Suspension of the Rules. The following provides a brief summary of some of the major problems in the revised Smith/Payne bill.

1. Blatant Factual Errors

The findings in the bill contain barefaced factual errors that can be readily verified. For example, in Section 3 of the bill, "Findings", Article 4 states, "However, trained local groups were barred from observing the election". In fact, a restriction on local election observer groups was first imposed by the National Election Board, but was subsequently lifted by the Federal Supreme Court. Consequently, local groups such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, which appealed the decision of the National Election Board, did in fact observe the elections.

2. Glaring Tendentiousness and Partiality

The findings in the bill not only contain egregious errors and inaccuracies but are largely drawn from claims of one side—the opposition—and do not even acknowledge the efforts of the government to advance the democratization process and ensure respect for the rule of law. The following are incontrovertible public facts that are omitted in the findings:

1. One of the main opposition parties—the CUD—repeatedly rejected the results of the National Electoral Board, including the final and official results.
2. On September 15 the Carter Center concluded, “[T]he majority of the constituency results based on the May 15 polling and tabulation are credible and reflect competitive conditions.” According to the U.S. Department of State, “[t]hese elections stand out as a milestone in creating a new, more competitive multiparty political system in one of Africa’s largest and most important countries.”
3. The CUD refused to appeal the results through the courts and made public statements rejecting the authority of the National Electoral Board and the courts.
4. The U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Addis Ababa led an initiative that resulted in an agreement between the majority party and the two main opposition parties to pursue their political objectives through the parliamentary process.
5. The three parties issued a joint public statement to this effect.
6. The next day the CUD publicly renounced the joint statement.
7. The CUD leadership insisted on new terms of the agreement and reiterated its threat to boycott the federal parliament and the Addis Ababa city council.
8. The majority party called upon the CUD to honor the existing agreement and refrain from any illegal actions.
9. The international mediators called for the CUD to honor the agreement and pursue their political objectives through the parliamentary process.
10. Some members of the U.S. Congress called upon the opposition parties to join the parliament.
11. The CUD called for public protests that led to violence.
12. The federal prosecutor charged those individuals including eleven elected opposition representatives for inciting violence and attempting to overthrow the government by extra-legal and extra-constitutional means.
13. Boycotting the parliament is not a crime under the Ethiopian legal system. The vast majority of the elected opposition representatives to the federal parliament and the city council who boycotted their seats remain free.
14. Eighty-seven percent (150 out of 172) of the elected opposition representatives have joined the federal parliament. Ninety-six percent of all elected representatives have joined the federal parliament.
15. The U.S. embassy led the initiative to encourage the elected city council members to take their seats.
16. The Parliament extended the registration period for city council members three times to assemble a council quorum.
17. The initiative succeeded only in convincing 67 of the necessary 70 needed for a quorum to register and take over the city council.
18. A caretaker government was appointed for a one-year term.
19. It is a technical administration with not one appointee coming from the majority EPRDF party.

Any bill of this nature should aspire to objectivity and impartiality with regard to facts and analysis/interpretation. Much of what we have in H.R. 5680 can be characterized as a travesty of objective and impartial narrations of the relevant facts. The following examples illustrate this.

Example 1: The bill characterizes the June and November street violence that caused the death and injury of many civilians and police officers as follows: ".pro-opposition groups went to the streets of the capital to protest government actions in handling the election results of May 2005". No one denies that it was uncivil civil disobedience. It was clearly a riot. The U.S. State Department, for example, characterized the situation as "a campaign of civil disobedience that quickly degenerated into violence". Hence, it is willfully incorrect to say that it was a simple protest.

Example 2: Section 3 (10) of the bill states that, "These measures (the detention and criminal charges) were deliberately taken to stifle and criminalize opposition party activity in the country. ". [Emphasis added] This statement is absolutely egregious in its heavy-handed ascription of diabolical motives on the part of the Ethiopian Government while the facts stated in (1) above under “Findings” clearly show the opposite. Evidence is now being presented in the courts and it will be up to the courts to decide based on the merits of the evidence.

Example 3: Section 3(7) of the bill, for example, states, "opposition parties also won the city council in Addis Ababa, giving them control over the capital." This is followed by, "In early may 2006, the Government of Ethiopia appointed a caretaker government in the capital". There is no mention of the process whereby the U.S. ambassador, in cooperation with a number of European ambassadors, led an initiative to encourage the elected city council members to take their seats and fulfill their responsibilities not only to those who elected them but to all the residents of Addis Ababa. There is no mention of the death threat calls against the elected representatives of the city council as well as the U.S. Charge d'affaires in Ethiopia.

The Parliament extended the registration period for city council members three times to assemble a council quorum. However, the UEDP (an opposition party), with the single largest bloc of seats (63 of 138), had succeeded only in convincing 67 of the necessary 70 needed for a quorum to register. It was only when the elected city council failed to reach a quorum that a caretaker government was appointed. This caretaker government has been appointed for a one-year term. It is a technical administration with not one appointee coming from the majority EPRDF party.

3. Restricting Security Assistance

The bill’s restriction on security assistance does not take into account current U.S. national security objectives and the ongoing U.S.-Ethiopia partnership regarding Somalia and the Horn of Africa. It is also impractical to require that peacekeeping or counter-terrorism assistance not be used for any other security-related purpose, which presumably includes border security.

The security assistance that are affected by the restriction include International Military Education and Training Programs, Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, modest programs for de-mining, communications equipment, ammunition safety, drug interdiction and counter drug activities, vehicle spares and professional military training at U.S. military schools. These programs not only improve the Ethiopian military’s efficiency and professionalism, but also promote mutual understanding and cooperation with the U.S. military.

Note that the security cooperation between Ethiopia and the U.S. are aimed at influencing the development of military institutions and their role in democratic societies; equipping military leaders with the professional development required to lead and maintain effective military forces under democratic civil control; enhancing the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to peace support and humanitarian relief situation on the continent; and improving defense capabilities with a view to supporting U.S. and Ethiopia common security goals. Any attempt to suspend security cooperation (even though the assistance for peace keeping and counter terrorism are excepted) would not only defeat the interlocking strategy of the U.S. over Ethiopia but also their common security and defense objectives. One also should not underestimate its impact on eroding the prevailing sense of trust, which is the solid foundation for the overall security cooperation between Ethiopia and the United States.

Recent events in Somalia, where Sheikh Hassan Dahir Awys, a supporter of al-Queda, was appointed leader of the Union of Islamic Courts, underscores the critical importance of a well-trained, well-equipped Ethiopian Defense Force. Any such attempt to weaken Ethiopia’s ability to (1) counteract Somalia’s homegrown terrorists, and (2) prevent Somalia from allowing outside terrorist organizations to use its “ungoverned space” as a base is a threat to the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the United States.

4. Threat of Foreign Aid Restrictions

In Section 5, (b) (2), the bill states that non-essential U.S. assistance shall not be made available to the Government of Ethiopia if the Government of Ethiopia acts to obstruct United States technical assistance to advance human rights, democracy, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, economic development and economic freedom in Ethiopia. This threat willfully ignores the Ethiopian Government’s own quantifiably verifiable progress in all of these areas. This paragraph would deny “nonessential United States assistance” based on general findings with no indication of who would make such findings. Almost any action by the government of Ethiopia, whether or not it is warranted, could be construed as “acting to obstruct” these activities. Moreover, the definition of “nonessential United States assistance” would cover much of the assistance allowed for in subsequent sections of the bill, including peacekeeping and counter-terrorism assistance. Ironically, cutting off nonessential assistance would suspend the newly authorized and ongoing human rights promotion, democracy building, and agriculture assistance programs