Ethiopia-Eritrea Crisis:
The Fresh US Diplomacy,
Scenarios and Policy Considerations
(ByAHH)
Introduction
Right after the onset of 2006, the United States rolled up its sleeves to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis. Desirous of averting a possible war, the US, through its Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, unveiled its unanticipated initiative to the UN Security Council on the 10th of January 2006. Confident of its diplomatic influence, the US then immediately dispatched to the region a high-level mission led by Ms. Jendayi Fraser, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. According to the BBC, the US delegation was “a team of diplomats and military officials.”[1]
At the start, it was not all clear whether or not the US had been mandated by the United Nations Security Council to spearhead the diplomatic effort. However, the issue was made clear later when the Security Council “put off deciding the fate” of UNMEE to give the US “another month” to find a solution to the crisis.[2]
Clearly, a repeat of the costly 1998-2000 war has been what the UN and the major powers in the Security Council want to prevent. Particularly the US recognizes that the stalemate has to be somehow broken, although it is not so easy for it to resolve the crisis without disappointing at least one of its allies in the war against terror. True, Ethiopia and Eritrea are not equally important US partners. Yet, both of the warring countries are associates of the US. Whether the US could turn its important relations with these disputant countries into a win-win outcome remains a speculation worthy of enthusiastic follow up and rational analysis.
The intent of this paper is to highlight the imagined scenarios of the conflict, examine their possible outcomes and put forward some wider issues for policy consideration.
According to Ambassador Bolton, the aim of the US mediation mission is “how to begin the implementation of the border demarcation process.”[3] Asked by the press as to what she hopes to “accomplish” in her trip to the region, Secretary Jendayi Frazer on her part explained as follows: “I'm basically going with General Fulford, our U.S. representative, to work Ethiopia-Eritrea to get the boundary demarcated and to help defuse the tension between the two countries.”[4] Definitely, defusing the tension is a necessary condition, but absolutely not a sufficient condition for demarcating the border. In fact, taking the border demarcation as a stand-alone goal is even an oversimplification of the multi-layer problems.
From Secretary Jendayi’s press briefing, it was apparent that the US did not have any finished products to supply to its African partners. It was clear that she only wanted to “educate” herself through fact-finding tours. At least at that stage, the mission offered little diplomatic blueprint for peace. For a clearer view, here is an excerpt from her response to the media on 13 January 2006 as posted in the US Department of State website:
…But again, the purpose of my trip is really to educate myself to have a better understanding of the border, to see it, to understand what it means to the people who are living on both sides of that border. It's more of an education trip for me than anything else.
It is therefore observable that the first stage of the diplomatic mission aimed to do or achieve the following: a) visit the contested border areas and have a first-hand impression of the concerns of the two countries; b) gather as much information as possible from discussions with government officials, opposition leaders, civil societies, diplomats, UN agencies, especially UNMEE officials, etc c) “educate” itself about the situation to bridge any information gaps and become confidently conversant with the situation. (Before it could become authoritatively judgmental, the mission’s knowledge of the situation on the ground has to be at par with that of the warring parties.); and d) declare US government’s commitment to bring the dispute to a swift conclusion.
After Ms. Jendayi’s first trip to the region, the US had to set out its list of activities, most important of which was arranging a “meeting of the witnesses” of the Algeries agreement.[5] As planned, the meeting was held on 22 February 2006 in New York. After the meeting, the witnesses called Eritrea and Ethiopia to “refrain from threat or use of force” and to ensure the free movement of the peacekeepers.[6]
Although getting the witnesses together could send a strong message to the warring countries, considering the reigning adversarial attitude, face-to-face communication of the political leaders of the two governments does not seem to be easily attainable in the foreseeable future. So far only the religious leaders and, more regularly, the military coordinators of the two countries have sat together to discuss mutual concerns. Of course, the recent meeting in London was a notable break from the traditional stillness, although it was a technical rendezvous rather than a more substantive political one. At any rate, the absence of a voluntary dialogue between the primary parties necessitated Ms. Jendayi’s “shuttle diplomacy.”[7] Bridging the diplomatic or communication gap and thereby resuscitating the hope for dialogue is at the center of the fresh diplomacy.
Evidently, the fresh US diplomatic effort is prompted primarily by Eritrea’s constant threat to restart war. As is known, Eritrea has consistently threatened to wage war on its neighbor unless the border is demarcated pursuant to the EEBC ruling. Its desperation to see the EEBC decision implemented sooner rather than later has been obvious. As far as Eritrea is concerned, the international community is responsible for failing to implement the decision.[8] By threatening to go to war, thus, it wants to remind the world that its patience is exhausted. Notably, Eritrea’s Finance Minister, Berhane Abrehe, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2005, made his government’s position unequivocal:
…I wish to categorically inform the assembly that Eritrea is determined, and has the right to defend and preserve its territorial integrity by any means possible.[9]
More importantly, Eritrea’s president has reaffirmed that war is “inevitable.”[10] Apparently, the US had taken these threats seriously and is perhaps worried that Eritrea’s anger could eventually, if not quickly, boil to war. Despite Eritrea’s raised voice, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister reassures that the situation remains unchanged:
There is a risk of war in an environment where the leadership of Eritrea has never stopped beating the war drums. What I am saying is that the likelihood of such a war has not increased in the past few weeks.[11]
In his report to the Ethiopian parliament in December 2005, moreover, he expressed his confidence that although Eritrea’s wish to attack Ethiopia is still vigorous, it is effectively deterred by the favorable “balance of power.”[12] The balance of power may well be understood, but certainly threat of war is not something new. In this regard, analysis of the post-war conduct of the two countries furnishes some pattern.
Over the last six years Eritrea has persistently employed a “bulling strategy” - a strategy that “relies almost exclusively on severe threats and punishments until and unless the bargainer’s demands are accepted.”[13] Contrary to the spirit of the cessation of hostilities agreement, its government-owned media has been tied up more in disfeaturing Ethiopia than refashioning Eritrea’s disfeatured image. It has been incessantly sending inflammatory messages. Worse, it has been busy outsourcing terrorism to various Ethiopian separatist groups the same way it is now supplying arms to Darfur fighters in the Sudan.[14] Most directly, Eritrea is linked to the three bomb attacks that shocked the Ethiopian capital in early March 2006. Its track record, moreover, reveals that this teen-age country has been thoroughly provocative. By initiating wars against at least three of its four neighbors, it wasted most of its post-independence age in war or state of war.
While the Eritrean government is often domestically accused of being hostile, aggressive and confrontational with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian government is criticized at home for not being tough on Eritrea. Such contrasting criticisms punctuated the post-war developments, which were characterized by the respective internal infighting, dissents, factions and political splits in the ruling parties of the countries. Generally, the approach the Ethiopian government pursued can be regarded as “conciliatory.”[15] In this regard, two evidences stand out. Firstly, its Five-Point Peace Plan, which calls for a “peaceful” resolution of the conflict through “dialogue” and “give-and-take,” is a forceful example of Ethiopia’s conciliatory policy. Secondly, it stayed away from a tit-for-tat retorting. Its public media has been almost tight-lipped on the issue, so much so that, at one point, the crisis appeared unimportant or even non-existent. By not talking much about the conflict, Ethiopia was in a way trying to diffuse the aura of instability that otherwise would have backfired and particularly impacted its economic progress.
No doubt that Ethiopia’s Peace Plan was an audacious undertaking. By offering the Plan just before the election of May 2005, the ruling party even risked its domestic political power. However, not all Ethiopians interpret the move positively. At least opposition groups view it as a strategy designed to un-chock Eritrea out of its internal political and economic crisis. Others simply believe the Eritrean government deserves a comprehensive military punishment, and not any conciliatory approaches whatsoever. Yet, it is good to note that those who prefer political and diplomatic solutions to military measures pursue conciliatory approaches. In this regard, political analyst James Ray has to say the following:
Coercive strategies may help states gain diplomatic victories (and avoid humiliating defeats), especially if the states employing them seek a change in the status quo, but history also suggests that they carry a higher risk of war than do reciprocating strategies. Those more conciliatory strategies have produced substantially more peaceful outcomes in international disputes.[16]
Whether Eritrea’s renewed and intensified threat is a false alarm is a matter of open speculation. No one knows for certain if at all Eritrea is seriously determined to restart war. What is certain is that Eritrea forewarns the world about a looming war, whereas Ethiopia preaches peace. As always, incidentally, the bad news has been a feast for the media. And without doubt Eritrea has succeeded in stealing the international spotlight. Apart from being discussed in the UN Security Council, as a result, the crisis has recently gained widespread international media coverage.
By over elevating the profile of the crisis to an imprudent extreme, Eritrea also did its foe a great favor. Much to the chagrin of Eritrea, the noise alerted the US to come up with a new diplomatic scheme to resolve the complex problem. One recalls that Ethiopia had failed to impress upon the US by the Five-Point Peace Plan it tabled, prematurely perhaps, in November 2004. Now, thanks to Eritrea’s frustration, Ethiopia has - in a roundabout way – welcomed the US aboard the dialogue-first-demarcation-next wagon, which is the spirit of the Plan. No one knows if this has been the undeclared policy of the US for quite some time now, but Eritrea’s uproarious cry has perhaps awakened the US to involuntarily eject its hitherto under-the-table policy.
In any case, that policy was made public after Ms. Jendayi’s recent and “productive trip” to the region. In her interview with VOA TV, she highlighted that the Algeries agreement provides opportunities for “dialogue.” Here is what she had to say:
…The Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission has made a decision on the delimitation. It has to now do the demarcation, and the important point is to get that demarcation started. In order to demarcate, you have to have a dialogue between the two parties because the Algeries Agreement basically says that the demarcation has to be done according to what is ‘just and reasonable.’ And I think, the ‘just and reasonable’ is how does it affect the communities that live on the border. For example, if the delimitation line separates a person’s house from their farm, one has to adjust the line or compensate the farmers. That is the ‘just and reasonable’ aspect and that requires some dialogue.[17]
As was indicated above, this is a different approach in US policy. Formerly, the US had been insistent that the EEBC decision remains “final and binding.” One of the reasons why the US had declined to welcome Ethiopia’s Five-Point Peace Plan was apparently because it had inaccurately believed that the EEBC decision prohibits bargaining. Now, that seems a thing of the past. America’s support to the “just and reasonable” feature of the EEBC ruling is a huge diplomatic triumph for Ethiopia. It completely undermined Eritrea’s long-standing contention that dialogue for adjustment is contrary to the “final and binding” nature of the EEBC decision. In fact, Ethiopia now reinforces its case by citing the Nigeria-Cameroon precedent, which allowed dialogue after the countries failed to abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice. Coincidentally, all this happened when the Ethiopia Eritrea Compensation Commission determined that in fact Eritrea started the 1998 war. According to analysts, this adds to Ethiopia a “new piece diplomatic leverage.”[18]
Eritrea’s unceasing war cry had also other unsolicited byproducts. Among other things, it fast diverted world attention by effectively eclipsing Ethiopia’s much-talked-about domestic political controversy. It is presumed that slowing down Ethiopia’s investment pace could be another derivative of Eritrea’s clamor. According to UNCTAD, Ethiopia received $545 million worth of foreign direct investment in 2004, whereas the corresponding figure for Eritrea was $30 million.[19] Since Ethiopia has technically imposed economic sanctions on Eritrea, the move might have been intended to revengefully pollute Ethiopia’s business and investment climate. However, little evidence reflects its particular impact on the economy.
In an apparent move to unlawfully relocate its soldiers in the buffer zone, or to simply showcase it frustration, Eritrea has restricted UNMEE’s movement in the TSZ. According to news sources, a UN official is quoted as saying that UNMEE was told in the last week of October 2005 to “confine its land and vehicle movements to the main road.” UNMEE had to “vacate 18 of its 40 posts” in the Eritrean side of the border.[20] In early October 2005, Eritrea also decided to ban UNMEE’s helicopter flights, significantly reducing its overall monitoring capabilities. It, furthermore, expelled UNMEE’s 180 Western peacekeepers, including those from the US, Canada, Russia, Britain and France.[21]
Currently, the UN seems to have a loose control of the touchy situation on the ground. In spite of the UN’s threatening resolution (UNSC Resolution 1640), the peacekeeping mission is still hobbled by Eritrea’s repeated restrictions. Distressed by the situation, Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his address to the Security Council, had offered alternatives on how to run the peacekeeping mission. Abandonment of the mission and complete withdrawal of UNMEE was one of the six alternatives he presented to the Council. This is suggestive of nothing but the high degree of trouble UNMEE endures in its peacekeeping operations.[22] Eritrea’s mounting pressure on UNMEE was, thus, a key factor in prompting the diplomatic route.
Even though it may not be so strongly correlated with the fresh diplomacy, the cumulative pecuniary cost of the peacekeeping operation could also be a concern. The budget for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 stands at $186 million.[23] In 2004, the figure was $198 million.[24] The Mission has been in operation for the last five years at an annual cost of roughly $200m. It is possible, therefore, that the US and the UN might be weary of the burdensome costs of the protracted operation, although the budget is lower than that of other major peacekeeping operations around the world. In any case, the renewed diplomatic efforts of resolving the crisis are churned out from one or more of the aforementioned difficulties.
Ethiopia’s possible acceptance of the decision that apportions Badme town and parts of Irob to Eritrea would be a huge step in the wrong direction. Permitting the international community to slice up the communities living along the border would, at a minimum, disenchant many Ethiopians. This assertion gains particular prominence when one takes into account the views reflected in the public consultations undertaken in 2003 to assess public opinion on whether to accept (reject) the EEBC ruling. During the community discussions, the Ethiopian people unequivocally advised their government that it is not at all in their interest to accept the decision of the EEBC. Apparently, it was after these public discussions that the Ethiopian government had formally rejected the judgment of the EEBC as “totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible.”[25]
Therefore, erosion of this already signed-and-sealed subject is beyond the jurisdiction of the government. Any effort by the incumbent government to undermine or disregard the public consensus would lock it between the rock and a hard place. Primarily, the people around the border - who have been the backbone of EPRDF’s political muscle - would be the first to go up against the agreement, exposing the ruling party to the opposition-agitated center. The government’s move may also refuel the persistent claim that the ruling party has been, to put it mildly, over sympathetic to Eritrea. As is known, Eritrea’s independence has left Ethiopia landlocked. For many Ethiopians, ceding the ports of Assab and Massawa, if not Eritrea itself, has been already too much. Adding Badme to the catalogue could be unbearable.
This scenario may not as such invite an instantaneous war between the two countries, but relinquishing Badme and parts of Irob would make Ethiopia’s future very precarious. Regrettably, the political forces in Ethiopia have achieved little in carving out an amicable mechanism for a matured political game. Since the relationship among the major political actors in the country has been dysfunctional at best and adversarial at worse, the border issue would add more fuel to the traditional fire. This would mean that before going to war against Eritrea, Ethiopians would have to settle the possible fight amongst themselves. Imaginably, the nature of the fight could be anywhere between a ferocious political battle and destructive violence. If the ruling party loses the domestic battle, any outcome is possible. Opposition parties may tirelessly, if not greedily, exploit the opportunity to seize power.
As the internal antagonism gets further polarized, and opposition against the ruling party gains momentum, externally euphoric Eritrea on her part could step up its so-far-unsuccessful efforts to disintegrate its adversary. These combined efforts would produce a politically instable, ethnically divided and administratively unregulated Ethiopia. Obviously, such a country is a dreamland for terrorists and their sponsors. Trans-border terrorists would then enjoy the freedom of movement in the physical space that might stretch from Somalia to Ethiopia. As those terrorists do not have more important enemies than the US and its European allies, the murky state of affairs would ultimately affect not only the region but also US interests.
Even if the demarcation of the border goes ahead without the full consent of the Ethiopian people, the all too important normalization of people-to-people relations would not easily come about. Besides, Eritrea would not sleep in peace by incorporating a land, which its larger opponent deeply believes is an integral part of its territory. The Eritrean government might be happy to win Badme, but the Eritrean people cannot live in peace. Sooner or later constant state of fear and sense of instability will set in. Eritrea’s temporary victory could be Ethiopia’s profound grief, which might in the end challenge Eritrea’s very existence. Ultimately, angered Ethiopians - who might deem that their country has been unfairly treated by EEBC and again by US diplomacy - would seek all possible means to get back their lost land. Recall the seven-decade long determination and unanimity the Ethiopians have displayed in retrieving the Aksum obelisk looted by fascist Mussolini. It is a remarkable lesson history and the world ill afford to forget or ignore. Therefore, this arrangement represents the worst-case scenario. Theoretically, it may appear doable, but realistically it is extremely unlikely.
If Eritrea yields to US pressure and agrees to negotiate with Ethiopia, it will be an enormous success for all parties involved; it would be a huge success for peace. By opening up opportunities for a “give-and-take” agreement, it would send a powerful message to the Ethiopian people that Eritrea is truly committed to a peaceful coexistence with its neighbor. Scrapping a claim to a land that has never been part of its territory would tell its southern neighbor that genuine and lasting reconciliation is within reach. By inviting give-and-take negotiations, Ethiopia had long implied its readiness to exchange the land that actually was not part of its territory before the conflict.
This scenario will not only be an enormous relief for the region at large but also a breakthrough for US diplomacy, which might have been cautious not to set new precedents by accommodating compelling realities. Perhaps less importantly, it may help the US to un-clutter its foreign policy focus. Without being distracted by the crisis, that is, the US can fully concentrate on other more pressing issues and regions like Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
It doesn’t follow, though, that the scenario is utterly innocuous. Sensibly, Eritrea, too, would have to pay certain political costs should it drop its claim to Badme and parts of Irob. In the short-run, the government’s inconsistent principles could become a target of intense and incisive political questioning. Up until recently, many unassuming Eritreans had believed that Ethiopia, rather than their government, has been the source of their predicament. Others were either too loyal to realize or too intimidated to criticize their government for sparking off the war in 1998. Since the remaining independent authorities have reconfirmed that the entire crisis was in deed “Made in Eritrea,” it would be time for Eritreans to fully hold their government liable for the lost lives of their loved ones during the war for Badme, which they were untruthfully told was theirs. Dressed up in the current crisis, as a result, the overall misery and deep-seated public frustration could be expressed through unorganized dissent and sporadic public disobedience. Of course, given the government’s autocratic nature, the impact may not be that widespread and immediate.
On balance, the severity of the risk Hypothesis B involves and the degree of possible damage it may cause in Eritrea is far less than what Hypothesis A may possibly spawn in Ethiopia. This is fundamentally because there is no national consensus in Eritrea that claims Badme as its own. In fact, according to Africa Confidential, “most Eritrean opposition parties” oppose the idea of affixing a new Eritrean identity to “Badme or northern Irob” localities.[26] This could be a reflection of the stifled general attitude of the peace-loving Eritrean society. As any rational society is unlikely to indignantly revolt for not winning a land that it recognizes had never been a part of its territory, in no way would Eritrea sustain greater damages than Ethiopia for just accepting this scenario.
Regardless of the degree of the danger it involves, nonetheless, hypothesis B is a realistic approach that serves the long-term interest of the Eritrean people. This scenario’s most significant merit resides in not only its ability to avoid a possible war that Eritrea, given its current capabilities and the balance of power, is unlikely to win but also its prospect to lead to a comprehensive reconciliation of the brotherly peoples of the two countries. As a course of action, therefore, this option is the best-case scenario that guarantees a win-win situation for everyone involved.
But the devil in the details is too stubborn to allow this to happen. Firstly, Eritrea is unlikely to forfeit a victory that it has achieved in the battle of the courtrooms. Secondly, Badme’s enormous face-saving significance is Isaias Afewerki’s Holy Grail he wants his country to preserve as long as he is alive. Thirdly, Eritrea recognizes very well that the issue of Badme is a political landmine meant to blow Ethiopia and its government apart. As is known, Eritrea has lost other territories to Ethiopia as a result of the EEBC ruling. However, it has never bothered about losing those territories, which Ethiopia is willing to hand back through negotiation. Strangely enough, what Eritrea wants to die for is not its own territories. As it appears, perhaps Eritrea would even be less sad to lose the entire Barka region than miss Badme. This is primarily because it recognizes how potent the Badme effect or Irob effect could be in Ethiopia. Certainly, Badme’s potential political impact on Ethiopia is colossal.
Aware of this prospect, Eritrea aspires to set Badme as a fulcrum to pole vault over the border, divide the Ethiopian people and eventually destabilize the country. If it can successfully defend that Badme be given to it as per the EEBC decision, Eritrea, without going to war with Ethiopia, can achieve two lofty objectives it failed to achieve through war: Badme and weakened Ethiopia. Since it is the only viable means for Eritrea to finish off its archenemy, it is very unlikely that Eritrea would compromise on Badme. Eritrea’s consistently uncompromising position and refusal to negotiate is reflective of this overly ambitious aim. For the government of Eritrea, the issue of Badme “involves no debatable matter.” What it requires is nothing but the immediate “enforcement” of the ruling.[27] In other words, Eritrea does not want any negotiations. What it wants is a swift demarcation of the border. As far as Eritrea is concerned, a compromised deal is, thus, implausible.
What is more, Eritrea would fiercely battle to stop any discernible effort, including that of the US, which it might deem detrimental to the integrity of the ruling. That is why Eritrea has already - very undiplomatically - refused to even see the US diplomatic delegation. Ambassador Jendayi Frazer “…canceled her trip to Eritrea because the Horn of Africa nation blocked her visit.”[28] It even condemned the very idea of the US mediation effort. For Eritrea, the new diplomatic move is an “intriguing proposal” and an “evil attempt” designed to “ignore and discard” the EEBC ruling.[29] Simply, Eritrea does not want to see any “‘diplomatic’ sojourn.’”[30]
The US delegation perfectly understands what messages Eritrea is trying to send to it. In this regard Ms. Frazer has noted, “…And you know, I think what they are trying to say is the Boundary Commission has made a ruling and that ruling stands and that they would not want me to come and try to change the ruling.” [31] Unlike Eritrea, the Ethiopian government welcomed the US diplomatic kick-off. In his press briefing to local journalists in January this year, the Ethiopian Prime Minister elaborated the discussion he had with the US delegation and described the US government’s initiative as a “big and positive step.” [32] He also hailed the US initiative in his report to the Ethiopian parliament on February 2, 2006.[33]
In sum, this may not be an ideal situation, but certainly it is the least-cost scenario for both Ethiopia and Eritrea. If US diplomacy can fully exploit this scenario, there could be better hopes for a peaceful breakthrough. Definitely, the chances of success for this scenario, too, are gloomy, but the idea is worthy of intense diplomatic drilling.
Among many factors, inflexibility of the negotiating parties, inapt diplomatic skills, and failure to understand the underlying causes of the problem could render the US mediation futile. Largely, the quality of the proposal Ms. Fraser and her team would come up with will determine the outcome of her diplomacy. Once diplomacy fails to attain its goals, however, the US and UN may resort to any form of coercion. Military action, economic sanction, diplomatic and arms embargo could be contemplated as possible strategies to enforce compliance with US diplomacy. Alternatively, they may allow the stalemate to just roll over indefinitely. Worse, as Eritrea’s patience would presumably be worn out sooner rather than later, war may restart the moment the residual hope for a diplomatic exit is exhausted.
The impact of the conflict between the two countries can have some basic effects on long-term US interests in the region. But obviously neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea poses any threat to US interests. Rather, both nations are US allies and they don’t deserve a military punishment from a country they went to great lengths to support in its war against terror.
Of course, some of the post-election behaviors of the Ethiopian government may not be acceptable to the US. Imprisonment of opposition leaders and killings of the rioters caused some degree of US concern. But still for the US, Ethiopia is one of the most important friends in Africa. There is no doubt that the US is more daunted by the trend in Eritrea than it is discouraged by the situation in Ethiopia. In fact, the depth and breadth of the current Ethio-US relations make US-Eritrea relations look anesthetized. Freedom of expression, rule of law, democracy, election, and free press are terra incognita in Eritrea. The country doesn’t even have a working constitution. Its general political system is more reminiscent of the Hermit Kingdom than it is aligned with the values of US foreign policy. The fact that Eritrea is removed from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) preferential duty-free privileges is a notable US disapproval of Eritrea’s behavior. Although more than 37 countries have fulfilled the eligibility criteria, Eritrea was one of the very few countries to be removed early from the list of beneficiaries for failing to meet US standards, which include such issues as political pluralism, human rights, and rule of law.[34]
In fact, Eritrea’s relation with the US has deteriorated over recent years. Rightly so, some doubt if Eritrea is still regarded as a US friend. The expulsion of the USAID from the country and the imprisonment of a US embassy staff in the capital, Asmara, the expulsion of American peacekeepers, among other things, signaled the sinking relations of the two countries. More telling could be Eritrea’s intensified attacks on US foreign policy in Africa and beyond.[35] Lately, for example, the Ministry of Information of the State of Eritrea criticized the US policy that “appoints” big “anchor” states in Africa, and sharply accused the US for not acknowledging Hamas as the new leadership of the Palestine people. Eritrea’s rebuttal to the annual US human rights report overstepped even common diplomatic decency to vilify the US. Despite all these, however, Eritrea is not yet classified as the “most wanted” enemy of the US. Therefore, military coercion on either of these countries is untimely, misplaced and unjustified.
Economic sanctions might be considered, but the drawback of this strategy is that it would affect Ethiopia more than it would Eritrea. Of course, their import-export trade is basic in nature and limited in scale. In 2004, for example, Ethiopia’s value of total exports was $563 million as compared to Eritrea’s $39 million. The countries also imported goods and services worth $2.1 billion and $335 million respectively.[36] Since Eritrea’s international trade activity is more insignificant than that of Ethiopia, the impact of an economic embargo could be felt more painfully in Ethiopia than it would be in its tiny neighbor.
At any rate, the US and the UN may decide to specifically punish the party they deem is an obstacle to peace. So far as the US is concerned, there is no foul play from Ethiopia. Peaceful negotiation is what Ethiopia has been demanding, and the US has endorsed the validity of this position. Thus, it is unmerited for the US to impose economic sanctions on Ethiopia. In terms of the evolving issues of the conflict, on the contrary, agreement has eluded Eritrea and the US. Eritrea has also collided with the UN on more occasions than one. Apart from restricting the peacekeeping operation, it went as far as questioning the personal integrity of the UN Secretary-General. “Indeed, the actions you have taken seem intended at derailing the legal process,” the Eritrean president reportedly wrote in his letter of 17 January 2006 sent to Kofi Annan.[37]
If Eritrea continues to reject options for a peaceful settlement of the problem, and further antagonizes its relations with those powerful global actors, it could be regarded as the undisputed obstacle to peace. This would leave the US and the UN with no better option than imposing economic sanctions exclusively on disruptive Eritrea. Then, as usual, the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving political goals will, of course, capture the limelight.
To begin with, it is presumed that the countries have been sufficiently equipped in the last five years because the threat of war has never been minimized. Given the distrust and mistrust that surrounds the two countries, it is improbable that the countries have not pre-positioned enough military hardware and supplies. Furthermore, any sanction would hit landlocked Ethiopia harder. Although complete enforcement of the embargo may not be easy in the leaky region of the Horn of Africa, seeking passage of its armaments through a third country would be hard for Ethiopia. It may require the blessing of warlords in places like unmanageable Somalia. The point is Ethiopia will have to make some concessions to the groups operating in the region in order to ensure the free and timely passage of military equipment. Besides, Eritrea’s long shoreline makes it easier for it to smuggle in arms.
Therefore, imposition of an armed embargo neither helps stop a possible war nor weakens the short-term military capabilities of the two countries. In stead, it complicates the problem by keeping the countries at the mercy of hostile elements in the region. This, in turn, can embolden the status and leverage of the terrorists operating in the region.
Certainly, this scenario reduces the hovering cloud of war, but it can never resolve the problem. Rather, it would reschedule and prolong the crisis. In addition, its economic, political, and military repercussions are enormous. According to some estimates, there are “at least 200,000 (soldiers) on each side of the border.”[38] The cumulative financial and economic costs of engaging such sizable armies for too long is unaffordable for very poor countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea, whose per capita income is way below USD 200.[39] Extended spending in defense may well mean that the countries’ inability to feed their citizens would further deepen. Also, maintenance of the morale of their soldiers entrenched in one of the harshest environments is not easy. The continuous engagement of the armies in constant alert can also be tough. Most hard-hitting would be the psychological impact of the unending state of war on the daily lives of the peoples of the two countries. As was indicated above, the piling up cost of the peacekeeping operation could become a cause for concern, particularly to the major sponsors of the peacekeeping mission.
Despite the costs associated with this option, nevertheless, keeping the situation in abeyance is merited for its ability to avoid war. Saving the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers, at least temporarily, is something everyone has to pray for. Though this may seem wishful, if not superstitious, it is possible that the distance in time may allow a viable solution to emerge.
But it would be surprising if at all the no-war situation is not closer to war than to peace. Importantly, many ripe factors can easily aggravate the combustive situation. Foremost, the extended deadlock could at some point challenge Eritrea’s pride. The big question is, “How long would Eritrea inertly live with a fifth of its territory under the peacekeeping operation?” Although it has to do more with Eritrea’s behavior than the scenario in issue, the question analysts have to answer is, “How long would Ethiopia tolerate the steady threat and comprehensive provocation from Eritrea?” Moreover, for some valid reasons, either of the countries can prematurely declare the Algiers Agreement null and void. And if they wish, both countries have very good excuses to do so without contravening international law. In this regard, Ray spots the “loophole” in the law:
…One long-standing principle of international law inserts a kind of implicit escape clause into every treaty signed by sovereign nation-states. Referred to as clausula rebus sic stantibus, this principle stipulates that treaties are binding only “so long as things stand as they are” (Brierly, 1963 p.335). In other words, if the circumstances as they stood at the time of the signing of the treaty change in some vital way, as determined by one of the signatories to that agreement, the treaty is no longer considered binding.”[40]
From Ethiopia’s standpoint, Eritrea’s refusal to be fully monitored by UNMEE, repeated infringement into the buffer zone, the continuous effort to disrupt Ethiopia’s stability, and the constant threat and provocation could represent the “circumstances” that have changed the agreement in a “vital way.” Though much to its disadvantage, Eritrea too can revoke the agreement by contending that Ethiopia’s acceptance of the treaty “in principle,” rather than in whole, disregards the binding treaty. Undoubtedly, either idea can eventually take the overall situation back to square one.
It is often heard that imprecise intelligence and miscalculation by either country could lead to speculative gambling. “Imagine a chess game in which the observer could see only a screen upon which moves in the game were projected, with no information about how the pieces came to be moved,” writes Graham Allison, drawing similarity between foreign policy and the “moves and sequences” in the game of chess.[41] In a financial context, a web-based writer advises stock market investors not to lose sight of the ground rules: “Avoid getting swept up in the dominant market sentiment of the day, which can be driven by a mentality of fear and/or greed, and stick to the basic fundamentals of investing.”[42] Analogically, this applies to “gambler” nation-states, too. In times of war and peace, statesmen take chances without being sure of the outcome of their decisions, which - like in any gambling - are a function of “fear and greed.”
Linking the above discussion to the Ethio-Eritrea case, if fear of being destroyed and replaced by one of the countries outweighs the greed to conquer and prevail, the possibility for a compromised deal will be increased. That is, a possible supremacy of fear over greed would provide a chance for peace. Conversely, if greed reigns over fear, war could be imminent. In the end, only the equilibrium between the forces of fear and greed can sustain the no-peace, no-war situation.
But the situation, to a much greater degree, hinges more on the rationality (or lack of it) of the chief actors than on the actual balance of power. Even though both sides may accurately draw near-reality scenarios and precisely understand the balance of power, the exceedingly hostile attitudes and the temptation to attack - equivalent to the philosophies that ride suicide bombers - can easily overtake reason and further ruin the no-war situation. If the leaders are driven by the “sentiment of the day,” they are likely to slip away from their very rational principles. Since not all political leaders are always “value-maximizing” rational actors, the current cliff-hanging status quo - by default or by design - can easily slip to war.[43]
Sadly, war seems the most likely outcome of the conflict. The disturbing news coming from the region reinforces this assertion. Again, the overall situation is about competing strategies, conflicting goals, and irreconcilable demands. The growing tension, the movement of troops, and the war of words indicate the direction of the inclement whirlwind. According to UNMEE, the "situation in the TSZ and adjacent areas remains tense.”[44] Besides re-registering its former fighters, Eritrea has been busy conscripting additional soldiers.
Moreover, either of the governments might be engrossed by the potential attributes of war to impose one’s will over the other. Fatigued by the never-ending domestic accusation of being too sympathetic to Eritrea, the Ethiopian government might actively seize the opportunity to demonstrate that it is not less patriotic defendant of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity than its predecessors. Further, growing public resentment against the Eritrean government amplifies the problem. Today, not so few people in Ethiopia suppose that a renewed war would enable their country to end the constant threat from Eritrea. They wish their government could soon finish the unfinished job of the 1998-2000 war. In hindsight, it is generally viewed that victorious Ethiopia in the first place should not have sat on an equal footing with the defeated nation-state for the unfavorable treaty. In other words, Ethiopia must have forced Eritrea to accept its terms. Public opinion upholds that the possible resumption of war would create the best of circumstances to somehow abrogate the Algeries Peace Agreement - believed to be the mother of all problems – and eventually right the regrettable wrong. But, as was indicated above, Ethiopia does not necessarily have to start war to just nullify the agreement.
For the Eritrean government, there is no more opportune time than now to attack Ethiopia. In the eyes of the Eritrean government, post-election Ethiopia is irreparably divided along ethnic and political lines. Unlike in the past, Eritrea thinks, Ethiopians are not interested to go to war with Eritrea. Eritrea’s dangerous desire to snatch Badme for even a single sunny day is not something that has to be ruled out or underestimated. Above all, Eritrea’s aspiration to rewrite history in which its army is portrayed as an “invincible” military machine and is president is eulogized as a war winning hero, or to be exact, no war-losing idol, is immense.
Given the current circumstances, therefore, war can be seen as a more potent remedy than diplomacy to break the impasse. Needless to say, the costs of the war could be extremely high. However, any diplomatic failure would be an incentive to overrate the remedial values of a possible war by undervaluing the enormous human and other costs. That is, war could be taken as a possible exit from the extended stalemate through which the terms of the dispute could be determined according to the winner’s demands and authority. However, predicting the outcome of the possible war is far from easy.
The concept of “God’s preference for larger battalions” generally posits that wars between nations of unequal military sizes are likely to be concluded in favor of the larger of the opponents.[45] The idea is military commanders in warring countries may deeply pray to emerge triumphant, but God often sides with the larger of the opposing battalions. Historically, this has been proven to a convincing degree. Countries with larger armies emerged victorious in seventy per cent of the thirty between-nation wars in the world between 1816 and 1965. It is only in nine of these wars that the smaller countries “upset” their more powerful opponents.[46] If one buys this assumption, God would “favor” more powerful Ethiopia to prevail over smaller Eritrea.
But is Eritrea really smaller? Internal analysis of Eritrea’s military capabilities reveals that it is a highly militarized state. With its military expenditure exceeding 13 per cent of GDP, Eritrea has an army of as much as ten percent of its population.[47] In 2004, the number of its soldiers was one hundred thousand higher than that of its larger adversary, whose defense expenditure was estimated to be 4.6 per cent of GDP.[48] According to Reuters news agency, Eritrea has an “estimated 300,000 professional and conscripted soldiers” from an “estimated 3.6 million population.”[49] In that light, one cannot at all say Eritrea is in fact smaller and hence the underdog.
Of course, power is not measured solely by number of soldiers. Ethiopia’s economic power, supply of additional recruits, and airpower supremacy stand out as decisive factors in this particular war game. In a military sense, moreover, Eritrean soldiers will have to expose themselves to an Ethiopian air and ground assaults should they make the initial moves to kick off a war and take on the Ethiopians, who will have the protection of their defensive positions. Importantly, politics teaches us that the “level of resolve” or “balance of resolve”- the commitment to prevail - may be more related to outcomes than is the “balance of power.” [50] Eritrea’s level of resolve may well be lower because the Eritrean army has already been humiliated and demoralized by the previous war, and, to a great extent, it is composed of forcefully conscripted soldiers.[51] This is not, of course, to rule out Eritrea’s ability to inflict a considerable damage on Ethiopia.
In any case, if war is re-ignited, no one knows for certain when, where and how it will end. One can only surmise. From what the Ethiopian prime minister had hinted in November 2005, one can tell that his army is determined to end the threat from Eritrea once and for all: “We have had one round of war with Eritrea. If we have another round of war, we will try to make sure that we will not have a third round.”[52] This could mean that the Ethiopian forces would go to overpower Eritrea, replacing its government or even occupying the country the same way the US did to Afghanistan or Iraq. By defeating Eritrea again, Ethiopia could force Eritrea to accept its terms. If this goes well, it will not only break the current deadlock but also erase any residual doubts on Ethiopia’s military supremacy in the region.
The biggest challenge for victorious Ethiopia would be how to manage post-war Eritrea. Dealing with insurgency, humanitarian crisis, and reconstruction, among many other superpower-type responsibilities, is too heavy a burden for a very poor country that has its own problems to nurse. It will also be difficult for Ethiopia to deal with international pressure, especially from the UN and the US. Since Eritrea is somehow grafted to the Arab League, it is difficult to speculate how Eritrea’s traditional Arab supporters like Libya, Qatar and Egypt, among others, may possibly react. Of course, if Ethiopia fails to quickly restore peace and stability to defeated Eritrea, the scene can easily turn into a chaotic ground. But this largely rests on how much or less Eritreans would “rally-round-the-flag.”[53]
Appreciation of the following variables is extremely important for those who seek diplomatic solutions to the conflict. The interplay of the variables and understanding of the context determines the quality of the diplomatic process in the arduous search for peace.
It is important to recognize that grudges take centuries to heal in that part of the world. This is even more so when one considers the magnitude of the spilled blood and the wound the war has left behind. Besides, compromise is not something that is often applied as a conflict resolution mechanism. Simply, it is not an East African way. People believe that there is only one truth, and truth is absolute. The antique Zoroastrian notion that one idea is “wholly good” and the other is “utterly evil” still persists.[54]
Complete understanding of the countries’ Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in the decision making process is central.[55] However, in the absence of such clear and defined procedures, it is critical for the mediators to comprehend how the key policy makers decide, what factors influence their decisions regarding this particular issue.
The Ethiopian government has entertained frequent accusations that it has been mild or compassionate when it comes to Eritrea. It is even blamed for being pro-Eritrea. Of course, public opinion is neither always “wise” nor often “moody.”[56] But regardless of how moody or wise it might be, public opinion infringes upon the rationality of the policy makers. In reality, even though certain decisions or compromises the Ethiopian government would have to make might appear helpful for the peace process with Eritrea, the effort would neither be welcomed by many, if not most, Ethiopians nor be interpreted positively. Certainly, for every gram of compromise with Eritrea, the Ethiopian government will have to pay tones of political price domestically. It is therefore prudent for the mediation mission not to underestimate the domestic pressure on the government. However, the Eritrean government does not face such difficulties. Perhaps that is one of the advantages of a repressive system. Obviously, the “basic unit of analysis’” in Eritrea is the president.[57] Understanding his behavior suffices to understand the country’s complete SOPs.
Recognition of the significance of Badme town, which has become the trademark of the conflict, is fundamental. The war started in there and the arbitration is stuck in there. It is not that the town per se is more important than the remaining pockets of dispute, but rather because of its symbolic political significance. After occupying the town at the start of the war in 1998, it is to be recalled, the Eritrean president had sworn, “Leaving Badme means the sun would never rise again.” Two years later, he failed to keep this promise alive, and his army was forcefully ejected out of Badme. Then, his words came back to jam him. In some cultures this could be a regrettable mismatch of words and deeds. But in high-context cultures like Ethiopia and Eritrea, it is completely dishonorable. In the eyes of the Ethiopian people, on the other hand, Badme is perversely given by the EEBC to save the humiliated face of Eritrea’s president. Indeed, Badme is only a shining part of the subdued whole. Yet, it is imperative to recognize that it is at the epicenter of the intense clash between Ethiopia’s national pride and the personal pride of Eritrea’s leader.
At any rate, it is extremely important to revisit the problems and reexamine how the EEBC decision would affect the people living in and around the border. At least Ethiopia maintains that the proposed border cuts through villages, families, homes, and even churches and cemeteries, which are of significant religious values in the societies. Uncharacteristically, both disputant parties seem to have recognized very well and agreed on this particular point. Accentuating this point, Secretary Jendayi had to recount this: “...Often, when I've had consultations with officials both in Eritrea and Ethiopia, they said, ‘Have you actually seen the boundary? You know, do you know what you're talking about?’”[58] No one is sure if this includes or means listening to the wishes and hopes of the people in the border. After all, what would be more ‘just and reasonable’ than addressing the plight of the concerned communities?
Of course, in mid January 2006, the US delegation had indicated the inappropriateness of the “reopening of negotiations on the subject.”[59] As diplomats, understandably, they have concerns that transcend the issue at hand. They might fear reopening the negotiation avenue would set an undesired precedent. According to political writer Ray, governments and their diplomats “are especially concerned about the impact of settling present issues on future issues because precedents and status quo have an almost sacred place in international relations.”[60]
Precedent aside, the interdependence of the two countries is even a more sacred consideration the US has to keep in mind. Eritrea needs Ethiopia and Ethiopia needs Eritrea. They are as much interlocked by their common territory as they are interlaced by their indivisible culture, language and history. It is extremely important to build on these interconnections rather than divide them along alien technicalities. The US should seek for a permanent solution that would bring about a sustainable peace. Any incongruous mechanics that does not go beyond the exigencies of the current stand-off of the two armies is likely to fail before it takes off. The root causes of the problem rather than its manifestations should be addressed in a comprehensive manner.
It is all too well known that sometimes “diplomats play a lot of silly games when they negotiate.” During the Korean War, for example, the “relative height of flags” on the negotiating table was negotiated in length. “Diplomats wrangled for weeks” during the Vietnam war “over the shape of the negotiating table.”[61] During the final years of Mengistu, the Dergue and the TPLF negotiators fiercely debated in Rome on whether to convene their meetings on Sundays. This is not to say, though, that US diplomats would stoop to such a low level, nor to imply that they would allow such negotiations between the parties involved. But the risk is that they might be narrowly and overly focused on the border demarcation to the extent that they can be distracted from the fundamental problems underlying the dispute. For now at least, Ms. Jendayi wisely reassures that the problem is “beyond Badme.”[62]
From the point of view of Ethiopia, giving the contested territories over to Eritrea is a road map to disaster. Accepting the EEBC’s ruling in its current form is a classic recipe to annoy Ethiopians and destabilize the country. It is a far more risky business than even going to war with Eritrea. Predictably, the ruling party and the government would have to face political tension, dissent, uprising and general instability as likely consequences. Since the Ethiopian people have unanimously chosen not to compromise on Badme, the Ethiopian government has little latitude to adjust this general consensus. Although Ethiopia might relatively safely offer the territories that had not been administered by it before the 1998-2000 war, giving away the land that its people believe have been integral parts of its sovereign state is perilous. Not only is the scenario dangerous to Ethiopia but also puts Eritrea’s future at risk. In short, the scenario produces a lose-lose situation.
In that light, the probability that the Ethiopian policy makers would accept such a deal – a deal that is completely unacceptable to the Ethiopian people – is exceedingly remote. Of course, Ethiopia encourages the US to include land-for-land exchange in the diplomatic package. This, however, concerns only territories that actually belonged to Eritrea before the war. But certainly Ethiopia is not ready for a land-for-peace arrangement.
From the Eritrean government’s angle, accepting diplomatic pressure, and thereby accommodating Ethiopia’s concerns, is a violation of the “final and binding” verdict of the EEBC. For Eritrea, this may not only mean a humiliating defeat but also clouds its only hope to effectively destabilize its opponent and consequently evict the ruling party in Ethiopia out of power.
Inescapably, the Eritrean government, too, is likely to face some formidable domestic challenges. For rational Eritreans, broadly speaking, invading Ethiopia was uncalled for. And tens of thousands of Eritreans perished for a goal that was neither desired in the first place nor militarily achieved. If the Eritrean government rescinds its territorial claim now, it would be hard for them to comprehend their government’s moves. Backtracking at a time when the goal seems about to be realized through a legal means could be inexplicable. Again, this could mean an added blow to the credibility of the Eritrean government. Otherwise, it is hard to envision any other abrupt, violent and more serious consequences.
But the sum total of the consequences Eritrea would have to face is disproportionately lower than what Ethiopia has to expect for making land concessions. Even if a stretch of imagination could foresee more damaging repercussions of Eritrea’s possible compliance to the land-for-land gesture, the country won’t be hit as deleteriously as Ethiopia would when and if the latter withdraws the claim of the undecided territories. This is essentially because the Eritrean people would not as much protest if the contested territories were given to Ethiopia, as the Ethiopians would probably turn against their government. After all, if one has to draw an accurate line of the conflict, the overall conflict is neither between the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia nor between their governments or leaders. It is essentially between the Eritrean president and the Ethiopian people. Moreover, unlike EEBC, the Eritrean people know what exactly belongs to them. Aside from the back up from the then-vocal-now-silent Eritrean diaspora, there has never been an Eritrean national unanimity whatsoever on this issue. But if there is a veiled one that exceeds sheer indifference, it must lean more toward approving Ethiopia’s rightful claim than endorsing Eritrea’s ostensible demands. Therefore, it is grossly ridiculous to insinuate that just not winning other peoples’ territories would be the proximate cause of the Eritrean people’s possible embitterment.
Right or wrong, Ethiopia has already made its choice sufficiently clear. It has advocated for a peaceful resolution of the conflict through negotiation and give-and-take. It even has unilaterally committed, at least verbally, not to respond in kind unless invaded full scale by Eritrea. Eritrea’s definitive choice is not yet clear, and the ball is rolling in Eritrea’s court. Eritrea has either to agree to negotiate and subsequently adjust the border, or try to forcefully seize the territories the EEBC awarded to it. Alternatively, it has to decide to live with the no-peace, no-war situation indefinitely.
Apparently, the conflict between the forces of fear and greed is fierce. The constant threat to start war, attack and prevail suggests that fear of being destroyed and replaced is overshadowed by the “sentiment of the day.” Eritrea’s greed markedly overrides its fear. Its desire to “take,” rather than give-and-take, and its impatience to demarcate rather than negotiate perfectly mirror its inner greed. This is quite a contrast to Ethiopia’s adherence to the Biblical “Thou shall not covet your neighbor’s house” philosophy.
Considering Eritrea’s tendencies, therefore, going to war is more probable than negotiating for peace. The possibility of war may appear to be dwarfed by Eritrea’s weaker capabilities or the balance of power, to be precise, but the balance of power is unlikely to continue to keep Eritrea in check. After all, Eritrea, over the course of the conflict, has demonstrated that it is not a responsible actor that evaluates the costs and benefits of its actions. Even after the onset of the war, it squandered many opportunities for peace. In fact, the supposition that Eritrea could be deterred by the balance of power accidentally assumes that Eritrea is a rational actor. If Eritrea had little moral ground to attack Ethiopia by contravening international law in 1998, one can easily stretch the case, why and how would it desist from re-igniting another war now when it has a better excuse to do so?
As was indicated above, all the options at Eritrea’s disposal might seem sour. But seeking a peaceful resolution to the intricate problem seems to have no substitute, albeit not so sweet. This option thrives in the comfort of far-sighted statesmen - sober enough to analyze the fundamental consequences, and wise enough to maximize the welfare of their societies. War is not at all an alternative to peace. Another round of war would only further raise the region’s high ‘water table’ of blood. Therefore, the Eritrean government should be convinced to at least calmly evaluate the possible outcomes and consequences of the future war, which will be hugely seminal. The Eritrean leadership should be reminded time and again that no inoculation other than human wisdom prevents the impending human tragedy. This should be at the center of the diplomatic goal. Convinced or pressured, Eritrea should accept to negotiate if one would have to measure the success of Ms. Jendayi’s diplomacy. Pushing Ethiopia to extremes produces nothing but destruction in both countries and beyond.
When war broke out in 1998, the US and Rwanda had tred to mediate the two countries for a peaceful resolution of their conflict. Unfortunately, US diplomacy led by former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, did not succeed in persuading Eritrea to evacuate its forces from the occupied Ethiopian territories. The US could not convince Eritrea to undo aggression, and restore the status quo ante, which Ethiopia had strongly demanded. If war breaks out again now, it would be the second unsuccessful US attempt to avert war in the course of the conflict. Would the US let it happen again? We will have to wait and see. But, if war follows again, it will have to do more with Eritrea’s downright belligerence rather than thoughtlessness in US diplomacy. [Ends]
Please send comments to half_ah05@yahoo.com
[1] BBC News, January 10, 2006, www. bbcnews.com
[2] Wadhams, Nick, “Security Council Delays Ethiopia Decision.” http://news.yahoo.com Yahoo!news, 8 Feb. 2006
[3] “US delegation to try resolving Eritrea-Ethiopia Dispute.” VOAnews.com, 9 Jan . 2005
[4] Department of State Press Release 13 January 2006, www.state.gov
[5] Wadhams, Nick, “Security Council Delays Ethiopia Decision.” Associated Press 8 Feb. 2006
[6] “Ethiopia-Eritrea:Statement by the Witnesses to the Algeries Agreement.” www.reliefweb, 23 Feb. 2006,
[7] Brahm, Eric, and Heidi Burgess, “Shuttle Diplomacy” www.beyondintractability.org, November 2003
[9]Ibid
[10] Interview with Eri-TV
[11] Mageria, David, “Ethiopia: Likelihood of war not “increased.” 9 Nov. 2005 Reuters
[12]Zenawi, Meles, “The Prime Minister’s report to the Ethiopian Parliament.” 13 Dec. 2005
[13] Ray, James. “Global Politics.” p 146
[14]Harris, Ed, “Eritrea Denies Smuggling Arms to Darfur Rebels.” Reuters, 9 Feb. 2006
[15] Ray, p 146
[16] Ibid, p 149
[17] VOA TV, Straight Talk Africa, 1 Feb. 2006
[18] Hull, Bryson, “Interview-Ethiopia says details still needed on border problem.” Reuters February 1, 2006.
[19] www.unctad.org, “Key data from WIR Annex Tables.” 29Sept. 2005
[20] Relief Web, www.reliefweb.com 17 Oct. 2005
[21] IRIN News, “Chronology 2005.”
[22] SUDAN Tribune - Anan outlines six options on Ethiopia-Eritrea border January 3, 2006
[23] www.unmee.com
[24] “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia-Eritrea.” 16 Dec. 2004
[25] Zenawi, Meles, Letter to the UNSC, 19 Sept. 2003.
[26] www.africa-confidential.com, Vol. 44, number 18 12 Sept. 2003
[27] www.shabait.com, “Enforcement of the law: The sole and direct solution.” 21 Jan 2006
[28] VOAnews.com, 19 Jan. 2006
[29] www.shabait.com , “A Misguided Policy That Is Undermining American Image.” 27 Jan. 27, 2006
[30] www.Shaibit.com , “Enforcement of law: The sole and direct solution.” 21 Jan. 2006
[31] www.state.gov, Press release, Department of State, 13 Jan. 2006
[32] Radiofana.com, 28 Jan. 2006
[33] Walta information Center, Radio Fana, 2 Feb. 2006
[34] www.agoa.gov/eligibility
[35] www.Shabait.com, “Shifting Principles to suit One’s Self Interest.” 7 Feb. 2006
[36] US Department of State, Background Notes, www.state.gov
[37] Afrolnews.com, 7 Nov. 2005