Documents on Somalia
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The council of Minister of IGAD met at its 24th Ordinary Session held on 17th - 18th March 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. It was attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda, Honourable Sam Kutesa, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uganda, Hon. Amama Mbabazi, the Minister of East Africa and Regional cooperation of the Republic of Kenya, Hon. John Koech, the Minister of Agriculture of the Republic of Djibouti, H.E. Dini Abdallah Bilillis, the Minister of Agriculture of the State of Eritrea, H.E. Arefaine Berhe, the Minister of Planning and International cooperation of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Abdirizak Osman Hassan, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, Hon. Augustine Nshimye, the State Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, H.E. Dr. Tekeda alemu, the State Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, H.E. Ibrahim Sh. Ali, the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Dr. Mutrif siddig represented the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan, the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Dr. Attalla H.Bashir, and the African Union Special Envoy on Somalia, Amb. Mohamed Foum.
Recalling the communiqué issued by the IGAD Heads of State and Government on 31\textsuperscript{st} January 2005, in Abuja (Nigeria) which inter-alia "authorized IGAD to deploy a Peace Support Mission in Somalia, to provide security support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD Peace process, and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security, including training of the Police and the Army."

Reaffirming its commitment to execute the decision contained in the Communiqué of IGAD Summit of 31\textsuperscript{st} January, 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria.

Further recalling the Decision by the 4\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU that endorsed the IGAD Summit Communiqué.

The Council,

1. **Received and Considered** the report of the IGAD Ministers of Defence meeting which took place in Entebbe on the 14\textsuperscript{th} March 2005 and while adopting the same underlined the following:

   a. That in phase 1, the initial deployment of troops shall be undertaken by countries of IGAD which are ready to do so now namely, Uganda and Sudan.

   b. The remaining countries of IGAD will be involved in phase I by assisting in the provision of logistics, equipment, emergency assistance and training of the Somalia Army and the Police.

   c. That Phase II deployment will be undertaken by the remaining IGAD countries pending deployment of the African Union Force.
d. The Council decided to amend Articles 6A and 7 of the Agreement Establishing IGAD in accordance the provisions of Article 19 to allow the deployment of IGAD Peace Support Mission.

2. **Directs** the Executive Secretary of IGAD to immediately take the necessary measures in the implementation of the deployment plan based on the proposed time line.

3. **Further** directs the IGAD Secretariat in coordination with the Special Envoys/Ambassadors to Somalia and the IGAD Permanent Representatives to the AU to work closely with the Commission of African Union for the operationalisation of the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia.

4. **Deplores** the shameful and unbecoming conduct of those members of Somalia Transitional Federal Parliament who engaged in acts of violent and caused commission, injury and damage to property during its session held on 17th March, 2005 at the Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi.

5. **Decides that in concurrence** with previous decisions at the level of the Summit and other IGAD Policy Organ meetings, Somali Leaders or any other individual or groups who undermine the outcome of the IGAD Peace Process on Somalia shall be subjected to the due process of law for any acts or omissions aimed at undermining the Peace process. Also the Council affirms their determination to impose sanctions against those who shall be deemed to act inappropriately against the peace process. Further, the Council calls upon the international community to cooperate with IGAD countries in this endeavour.
6. **While Urging** the TFG to actively continue the process of reconciliation and dialogue to build and strengthen cohesion among the people of Somalia the Council reaffirms its determination to assist the TFG in its endeavours to bring peace and stability to Somalia.

7. **Welcomes** the Decision of the MInisters of Foreign Affairs of the League of Arab States to participate in the peace Support Mission in Somalia and assist IGAD and AU in this regard.

8. **Reaffirms** its unswerving resolve to maintain the unity of the IGAD sub-region as well as to combat in unison any attempt aimed at driving a wage between the people of Somalia and member States of IGAD and underlined that it will remain focused and will not allow external interference.

*Done in Nairobi on the 18th March, 2005*
Statement of the IGAD Council of Ministers of foreign Affairs 18th
March 2005, Nairobi, Kenya

The council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of IGAD at its 24th Session considered the situation in Somalia and having learnt the problem created by some members of the Federal Transitional Parliament of Somalia during their session held on 17th March, 2005 at the Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi (Kenya) called upon the parliamentarians and the people of Somalia to unite and stressed that they have no better friends than their neighbors and in this regard the future of Somalia and that of the other countries of IGAD is intrinsically bound together. (This was instigated by the warlords who would eventually be thrown out of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union).

The activities of some parties within the International Community to drive a wage between IGAD Member States and the People of Somali were a source of concern to the council of Ministers during this session. Moreover, the activities of some NGOs conducting research and advocacy work in our sub-region have also contributed to creating confusion and unhealthy state of mind. In this respect, the position and advice the International Crisis Group (ICG) has been giving to the international community has resulted in damages to the region and to the peace process in Somalia. While condemning the activities of these groups, Council called upon the Somali people to be vigilant.

This council noted that this session was confronted with enormous challenges while trying to carry out the instructions given to it by the Heads of State and Government, at the Summit held on 30th January, 2005, in Abuja, Nigeria, with respect to discussing and coming up with a deployment plan on the basis of the
recommendations of the Chiefs of Defense Staff and Defense Ministers at their meeting held from 7th to 14th March, 2005 in Entebbe (Uganda).

The Member States of IGAD reiterated their commitment to maintain their unity and to do whatever is necessary for the successful relocation of TFG. Council drew satisfaction from the fact that despite all the provocations to derail the work of Council, member Countries, without exception stood together and were able to carry out the mandates given to them by the Heads of State of IGAD as well as those by the AU.

_Nairobi 18 March, 2005_
Conflict Situation Analysis of Somalia

58. The Ministers noted the following:

a. Somalia has been without a functioning central authority since 1991 and this political and security vacuum has deprived her of membership of COMESA.

b. In view however of her previous membership of PTA, the predecessor organization to COMESA, it is important that developments in that country are monitored annually in order to enable member states of COMESA assess the impact of the political turmoil on the stability of the COMESA sub-region and the programmes of regional integration COMESA is pursuing;

c. Following the peace agreement reached in January 2004, a Somali Transitional Parliament (STP) was constituted in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi and Ahmed Abdullahi Yusuf was sworn into office as the new President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) relocated from Kenya to Somali at the beginning of 2005; it could not establish itself in Mogadishu, Somalia's historic capital city because of fighting among armed factions not party to the peace agreement. It was for this reason that the TFG provisionally established itself in Baidoa, a relatively calmer settlement and it was not able to assert its rule outside Baidoa and, was crippled by infighting. It has been further challenged by the Union of Islamic Courts, which seized
Mogadishu from warlords in June, and rapidly expanded its territory to much of central and southern Somalia;

d. In response to this deteriorating political and security situation, the African Union (AU) in September 2006 adopted a plan authored by the inter-Governmental authority on Development (IGAD) to deploy a regional peace-support mission in Somali, despite strong opposition from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which controls the capital, Mogadishu, and much of south and central Somalia. The IGAD plan envisages the deployment of the peace support mission, IGASOM by the end of September 2006;

e. According to IGAD, about 8000 troops will form the peace-support mission. It will be deployed to support the Somali interim government and help to stabilize the country by implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. IGASOM will provide security to the Transitional Federal Institution (TFIs), contribute to institutional capacity building and create conditions for promoting dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia;

f. While the overall impact of the latest development in Mogadishu is yet to be fully assessed, the prevailing situation highlights now more than before the need for concreted support to the TFG to enable it assert its authority and lead efforts to reestablish peace and security, including the fight against terrorism. This is all the more necessary as the TFIs are now working closely together and are concentrating on the key aspects of national reconciliation process. Current realities on the ground with respect to the positions of the various political factions in the country should be taken into consideration in facilitating the peace process;
g. Recent peace talks were held in Khartoum under the auspices of the Arab League between the TFG and UIC.

**Decisions**

59. The Meeting invited the Authority to consider the following:

a. support bona fide dialogue of all political actors and stakeholders in Somalia towards the attainment of a comprehensive peace and security agreement;

b. Urge the people of Somalia to give peace a chance so that they can rejoin COMESA in order to contribute to the attainment of sustainable economic development for their country and region as a whole through the COMESA Economic Integration Agenda;

c. Support the decision to have co-chairmanship of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arab League to facilitate the Somali Peace dialogue; and

d. Support the AU Peace and Security Council's appeal to the UN Security council to provide exemption on the arms embargo to allow IGASOM to move in and create a conducive environment for the dialogue on the comprehensive peace and security agreement.
Six months ago, the Bush administration launched a new policy in war-torn Somalia, putting the State Department in charge after secret CIA efforts failed to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from seizing power in Mogadishu. It hoped that diplomacy would draw the Islamists into partnership with more palatable, U.S.-backed Somali leaders.

Today, that goal seems more distant than ever. Since coming to power in June, the Islamists have expanded their hold on the south. A largely powerless, U.S.-backed rump government remains divided and isolated in the southern town of Baidoa. U.S.-sponsored talks, and a separate Arab League effort, seem to be going nowhere.

Al-Qaeda, long hovering in the shadows, has established itself as a presence in the Somali capital, say U.S. officials, who see a growing risk that Somalia will become a new haven for terrorists to launch attacks beyond its borders.

Meanwhile, a major war - promoted and greeted approvingly by Osama bin Laden - looms between Somalia and Ethiopia, threatening a regional conflagration likely to draw more foreign extremists into the Horn of Africa.
Among administration officials, Congress, U.S allies and other interested and fearful parties, there is a rising sense that Somalia is spinning rapidly out of control. But even as events there have focused Washington's attention, they have led to a wave of finger-pointing and a felling that there are few good ideas and little time for turning the situation around.

A wide range of interviews and commentary last week provided assessments that differed only in their degree of bleakness and apportionment of blame.

"The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by ... East Africa al-Qaeda cell individuals," Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer said of Mogadishu's new rulers.

Early hopes of a power-sharing deal with secular politicians have dissipated as Courts Chairman Hassan Dahir Aweys - put on the U.S. Terrorist list in 2001 as the head of a militant group accused of having links to al-Qaeda in the 1990s - and Aden Ayrow, who heads the Courts' military arm, have increased their power.

Moderates remain within the Courts, a coalition of local Islamist groups and militias that drove CIA - supported warlords out of Mogadishu, Frazer said. But "they are not emerging as they could get their heads taken off, literally."

The Islamists have ignored U.S. insistence that they turn over three al-Qaeda operatives - the core of what is called the East African cell - who the administration says took refuge in Somalia after terrorist attacks in Africa, including the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
In a taped statement released July, Bin Laden officially called on Somalis to begin preparing from regional war. He recalled the 1994 withdrawal of U.S military forces after a warlord attack killed 18 U.S. troops, saying, "This time, victory will be far easier."

U.S. intelligence officials described the statement at the time as part of bin Laden's failing claim to the leadership of a worldwide Islamic movement, despite the dispersion of the al-Qaeda network by the U.S. terrorism fight. Now they are not so certain.

Still, the intelligence community is not prepared to fully endorse Frazer's conclusions about the level of al-Qaeda's control of the Courts. "I don't think there are hard and fast views," John D.Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, told Washington Post editors and reporters Thursday. Somalia "has come back on the radar screen only fairly recently," and the question is whether the Islamist government "is the next Taliban," he said. "I don't think I've seen a good answer."

But a U.S. counterterrorism official, while reluctant to dispute Negroponte's assessment, cited intelligence reporting that "people with links to al-Qaeda are assisting with training and weapons. It goes beyond just urging jihadists to take up arms."

"If the situation heats up," said the official, who was not authorized to discuss the issue on the record, "it could draw in more jihadists from abroad." Al-Qaeda, he said, "has a limited safe haven in Somalia, but given the current situation there's a concern that it could grow, including that it could be used as a springboard for launching terrorist operations outside Somalia."
"There are not a lot of good options right now," he said.

Events in Somali could provide an immediate spark for a wider war in the Horn of Africa; the roots of such a conflict would be tangled in complicated, long-standing regional animosities. The United Nations reported last month that Ethiopia has sent thousands of troops to help prop up the two-year-old transitional government in Baidoa. The same report said Eritrea, whose 1970s war with Ethiopia is still smoldering over an unsettled border dispute, has deployed thousands of troops to train and fight alongside the Islamists. Arab neighbors and sympathizers are also reportedly providing funds.

Ethiopia, a Christian-dominated nation, also fought a war with Somalia in the 1970s, over the ethnic Somali and largely Muslim Ethiopian province of Ogaden.

Last week, Somali Islamists threatened a "major attack" if the Ethiopians do not withdraw by Tuesday. Ethiopia has said, in essence, bring it on.

Somalia descended into chaos after U.S. and U.N. troops withdrew in 1994, with warring clans competing for power and the rest of the world turning away. When the Islamist push began several years ago, the Bush administration started paying attention - and funding locally unpopular warlords to gather intelligence and gird for battle.

"By making a bad bet on the warlords to do our bidding," incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph R.Biden Jr. (D-Del.) charged last week, "the administration has managed to strengthen the Courts, weaken our position and leave no good options. This is one of the least-known but most dangerous developments in the world, and the administration lacks a credible strategy to deal with it."
The incoming chairman of the panel's Africa subcommittee, Sen. Russell D. Feingold (D-Wis.), who returned from talks with regional governments and U.S. military personnel in Africa last week, called the situation "dire" and said he will hold hearings in January.

Feingold complained to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice this summer that the administration lacked a "comprehensive strategy" and had not devoted high-level attention to the matter. It was an indirect critique of Frazer, left largely in charge of the issue, that is echoed by some U.S. allies and nongovernmental organizations in the region, who say she lacks the authority and skill to forge a diplomatic solution.

One senior European diplomat whose government closely consults with the Bush administration on Somalia concluded that "not much time has been given to this at the senior level." He said that he was told at the State Department that 75 percent of Rice's efforts were being spent on the Middle East and that he asked: "what does that leave for the rest of the world?" His government, he said, has urged the administration to work harder on uniting the Baidoa authority before sending it into negotiation with the Islamists.

John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group, who worked on Africa issues in the Clinton National Security Council and State Department, called the current administration's policy "idiotic." Tacit U.S. support for Ethiopia's military incursion has "incalculably strengthened" the Courts' appeal to Somali nationalism and "made our counterterrorism agenda nearly impossible to implement," he said.

A visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, this month by Gen. John P. Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command, sent the wrong signal to Somalis whose
concern about Islamist power has been overshadowed by anti-Ethiopia fervor, Prendergast said. U.S. officials said Abizaid urged Ethiopian restraint.

The administration is not taking the criticism lying down. Even before the Courts' takeover of Mogadishu in June, Rice devoted "a good, long, two-hour session" to the subject and asked for "better options," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. The result was the formation of a "Somalia Contact Group" that has held talks among representatives of the courts, the Baidoa government, other regional actors and U.S. representatives.

Early this month, the United States sponsored a U.N. Security Council resolution backing an all-African peacekeeping force - excluding Ethiopia, Eritrea and other frontline states - although no nation has made a commitment to send troops and funding is uncertain.

"Is the situation what we want it to be?" McCormack said. "No" But Rice "thinks we are doing the right things, and she hopes it will eventually bear fruit."

"I think this town wants to villainize someone for a hard problem," Frazer said in an interview. "So you are looking for the failure of something ... a policy, an individual, U.S. interests. I think that is so unsophisticated, because what we have is a major challenge with not a lot of leverage at this moment in time ... Instead of recognizing the complexity of the situation, there is the tendency to say, "Well, they are just wrong.' Some of that is frustration. Some of that is politics. And some of that is straight ignorance of the facts themselves."

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Somalia: Don't Cross the Mogadishu Line

Nairobi/Brussels, 9 February 2005: The decision by African regional organisations to send troops to Somalia risks destabilising Somalia's fragile transitional institutions and jeopardising the peace process.

At an emergency session of the African Union Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa last week, the Horn of Africa inter-governmental organisation IGAD received the green light to send 7,500 troops in response to a request from Somalia's interim President to help him return to the country and disarm its warring factions.

The Somali transitional government is deeply internally divided over the issue, and the parliament has not yet approved any foreign military deployment. Various Somali leaders and groups have threatened to oppose such an intervention by force.

"By forcing the issue at this critical stage, IGAD's members risk crossing the 'Mogadishu Line' where peacekeepers become party to a conflict -- as they did during the U.S.-led intervention of the early 1990s," said Matt Bryden, Director of Crisis Group's Horn of Africa Project.

Two years of peace talks have produced the first Somali government in fifteen years with a realistic chance of restoring peace, security and order to the country. A broadly representative parliament has been formed and an interim president
elected in October last year. Most major faction leaders have signed on to the initiative and received posts in the new cabinet. Progress has been made in negotiations for the demilitarisation of Mogadishu and its environs. Although the transitional government is still based in Nairobi, Kenya, donor governments are cautiously beginning to pledge start-up funds for reconstruction programs.

Somalia's peace process will certainly need the support of some foreign troops: a modest peacekeeping force from the African Union (AU), possibly in collaboration with the Arab League, should now be deployed to assist in monitoring ceasefire arrangements, supervising the process of disarmament and demobilisation, protecting infrastructure and institutions, and training the new Somali armed forces.

Unconvinced by the Somali President's initial demand for 20,000 African troops, and stretched by peacekeeping commitments elsewhere, the AU has so far been dragging its feet, leaving IGAD to step into the breach. But Somalia's neighbours -- Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya -- should be excluded from a Somali peacekeeping force. All seek to project their own strategic interests in Somalia and have backed rival factions during the conflict.

"Having Somalia's neighbours lead and constitute such a force, especially Ethiopia, would be unnecessarily inflammatory and could jeopardise the entire peace process," said Suliman Baldo, Director of Crisis Group's Africa Program.

Instead, the AU and Arab League should jointly take responsibility for mustering international backing for a broad-based peace support operation in Somalia. Donor governments should encourage such an initiative, and offer to cover the
costs of the Somali government's relocation to Mogadishu, while making it clear that they will not meet the costs of an IGAD deployment. And no foreign troops should set foot in Somalia unless the transitional Parliament first endorses the plan.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) + 32(0) 485 555 946
Jennifer Leonard (Washington) + 1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
http://www.crisisgroup.org
22. The council of Ministers deliberated on the implementation of the Resolution of the IGAD Heads of State and Government of 31st January 2005 on peace and security in Somalia. In this connection, Hon. Amama Mbabazi, the Ministers of Defense of Uganda presented the report of the meeting of the Ministers of Defense held in Entebbe, Uganda on 14th March 2005, which provided a concrete deployment plan for the IGAD Peace-support Mission in Somalia. The Minister said that the aim of the IGAD Peace Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) will be to provide support to the Transitional Federal Government in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security.

23. The Minister informed Council that this deployment plan was developed by Military Experts, refined by the Chiefs of Defense Staff and adopted by the Ministers of Defense. He further informed Council on the assumptions under which the deployment is based particularly the need for transit seats of the TFG (Baidoa and Jowher) in preparation for its final relocation to the Capital city, Mogadishu. The Minster also presented the plan of operation, which will be, implemented in phases, also specifying the tasks, force size and troop contributions. The
Minister further presented the logistical support and the budget for the operation.

24. The Hon. Minister brought to the attention of Council that the Agreement establishing IGAD does not provide authority for IGAD to undertake a peace Support Mission in a member state. In addition, the Minister brought to the attention of the Council the need to seek authority from the United Nations Security Council for the mission based on the requirements of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Furthermore, he pointed out that the IGAD Secretariat lacks manpower capacity to handle a Peace Support Operation. In conclusion the Minister requested Council to take appropriate measure to address these constraints.

25. After hearing the presentation on the report of the Ministers of defense, Council discussed the problems and possible solutions regarding the deployment of Peace Support Mission (IGASOM) to Somalia. The Council noted the lack of the necessary financial and political support from the international community. The Council also noted the need for securing authority from the UN Security Council for deployment and waiver of the arms embargo on Somalia.

26. It was brought to the attention of Council that a country that had already taken a negative stand on the issue circulated a non-paper objecting the deployment of an IGAD Peace support Mission to Somalia during the session. In this regard, the Council expressed its serious concern and dismay on the adverse effect of actions against the regional effort to assist the Transitional Government to relocate to Somalia. It rejected any attempt that goes against the expressed interest of the member states at the highest level. In this regard, Council reiterated the resolve of the
members states to remain united as IGAD in the implementation of the Abuja Communiqué that committed the support of the countries of the region to the TFG of Somalia.

27. The Council deliberated on the matter extensively and agreed on the following:

- It endorsed, with amendments, the report of the Ministers of Defense of the IGAD member states that took place in Entebbe, Uganda on 14 March 2005.
- It reiterated the implementation of the decisions of the IGAD Heads of State and Government on the deployment of the IGAD Peace Support Mission.
- To seek authority from the UN Security Council through AU.
- To amend the Agreement Establishing IGAD.
- To get a waiver from the UN on the Somalia Arms Embargo.
- That IGASOM will be a temporary project of IGAD Secretariat until the AU takes over the responsibility of deployment.

28. A proposal for the amendment of the Agreement Establishing IGAD was submitted to Council by Kenya to fulfill the legal requirements of the deployment of the Peace Support Mission to Somalia. Council endorsed the proposal.

29. The Council agreed that the deployment of forces be implemented in phases. It was further agreed that those countries ready to deploy should do so as soon as the necessary preparation are completed. The Frontline States are requested to provide backup including logistics and training of the Somali forces. Council was informed that Sudan and Uganda shall move their troops to Somali in phase one. Following an
assessment on the ground, the Frontline States will deploy pending the deployment of the AU.

30. The Council called upon the AU and the international community to provide the necessary material, political and financial assistance for the deployment of IGASOM. The Council also requested the Commission of the AU and IGAD secretariat to immediately start working together with the involvement of the Special Envoys to Somalia and the IGAD member states' Ambassadors resident in Addis Ababa in the implementation of the Council decisions and the deployment plan as recommended by IGAD Ministers of Defense.

31. The Council supported the appeal made by the Head of Delegation of Somalia for financial, material and technical assistance to enable the relocation of the TFG and its institutions.
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), meeting at its 24th meeting, on 7 February 2005, adopted the following communiqué:

**A. On the implementation of the assembly decision on SOMALIA**

Council,

1. Takes note of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.65(IV) adopted by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, held in Abuja, Nigeria, from 30 to 31 January 2005;

2. Welcomes the commitment of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda to provide troops and/or equipment for the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission to provide security support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia;

3. Authorizes IGAD to deploy a Peace Support Mission in Somalia to provide security support to the TFG, in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process, and assist with the reestablishment of peace and security, including the training of the police and the army;
4. Requests the Commission, in collaboration with the IGAD Secretariat, to provide support and assistance towards the deployment of the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia;

5. Calls upon the AU Member States, the European Union, the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the international community at large to provide support for the IGAD Peace Support Mission to be deployed in Somalia, pending the deployment of an AU Peace Support Mission;

6. Requests the Commission of the African Union to expeditiously provide the relevant details for the envisaged deployment of an AU Peace Support Mission in Somalia, as requested by the PSC at its 22nd Meeting, held on 5 January 2005.

B. On the Situation in Togo

Council,

1. Firmly condemns the manner through which the de facto Togolese authorities organised the succession in Togo, following the death of Gnassingbé Eyadéma, which constitutes a blatant and unacceptable violation of the Togolese Constitution, as well as the AU Declaration of July 2000 on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the principles enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. Council also firmly condemns the revision of the Togolese Constitution made by the de facto authorities, in violation of the relevant provisions of the Togolese Constitution;
2. *Urges* the de facto Togolese authorities to strictly respect the provisions of the Togolese Constitution and demands that the Togolese Armed Forces refrain from any interference in the political life of the country and comply with the relevant provisions of the Togolese Constitution;

3. *Welcomes* the statements made by the AU Chairman and the Chairperson of the Commission, as well as the initiatives taken by ECOWAS, to ensure respect of constitutional legality and prevent any development which could negatively affect peace and stability in Togo;

4. *Encourages* the Chairperson of the Commission to maintain close contact with ECOWAS and all other concerned actors to ensure a coherent and firm response to the unconstitutional change which occurred in Togo;

5. *Affirms* its determination, in conformity with article 7(g) of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC and the July 2000 Declaration, to impose the sanctions envisaged in case of unconstitutional changes, should the de facto authorities fail to ensure the rapid restoration of constitutional legality;

6. *Invites* the United Nations, the European Union, the AU bilateral partners and the international community as a whole to strongly support the AU position on the prevailing situation in Togo;

Decides to remain actively seized of the situation in Togo and requests the Chairperson of the Commission to submit a detailed report on the development of the situation and efforts to restore constitutional legality.
COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE IGAD HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON SOMALIA

The IGAD Heads of State and Government of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia met under the Chairmanship of the President of Uganda, H.E. Mr. Yuweri Kaguta Museveni, Current Chairman of IGAD on 31 January 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria on the sidelines of the 4th Ordinary Session of the AU Summit and held discussions on Somalia.

The IGAD Heads of State and Government decided the following:

i) That there is an urgent need to provide security support to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to ensure its relocation to Somalia and guarantee sustenance of the outcome of IGAD Peace Process;

ii) Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda are committed to participate in the Peace Support Mission by providing troops and /or equipment;

iii) Instructed IGAD Secretariat, in collaboration with the AU, to establish a Fund to cover expenses for the deployment of the Peace Support Mission;
iv) Instructed their Ministers of Defense and Chiefs of Staff to meet urgently and decide, in collaboration with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to discuss and agree on the details and modalities of the deployment of the force;

v) Mandated the Current Chairman of IGAD to engage with the countries of the region, AU Member States and the International Community to secure troops, financial and technical support for the deployment of the Peace Support Mission;

vi) Requested AU Member States to give them the mandate for the deployment of a Peace Support Mission to Somalia and expressed their hope that ultimately the mandate will be endorsed by the United Nations.

*Abuja, Nigeria, 31 January 2005*
DECISION ON SOMALIA

The Assembly:

1. **NOTES WITH SATISFACTION** the achievements made in the Somalia peace and reconciliation process under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and **CONGRATULATES** the people and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFG) of Somalia for the success so far achieved;

2. **WELCOMES** the decision adopted by the 22nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) held on 5 January 2005, in which the PSC accepted, in principle, the deployment of an AU Peace Support Mission in Somalia, based on its previous decisions and the recommendations of the Nairobi Experts Meeting held on 15-16 December 2004, to support the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions, and requested the Commission to submit to it recommendations on the mandate, size, structure, tasks and funding requirements for such a Mission;

3. **STRESSES** the need for the AU and the larger international community to provide speedy and sustained support to the Transitional Federal Institutions to prevent the unraveling of the tremendous achievements made in the reconciliation process in Somalia as a result of two years of collaborative endeavour by the countries of the region, the AU and the international community at large;
4. **REQUESTS** the Commission to expedite the preparation of the recommendations requested by the PSC to facilitate the speedy deployment of an AU Peace Support Mission, as part of the efforts to create propitious security conditions and to normalize the situation in order to assist in the effective functioning of the Transitional Federal Institutions, the relocation of which, in Somalia, constitutes an important component of the ongoing efforts to restore lasting peace and stability in that country;

5. **WELCOMES** the Abuja Communiqué of the IGAD Heads of State and Government of 31 January 2005 and **NOTES WITH APPRECIATION** the commitment of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda to provide troops and/or equipment for the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission to provide security support to the TFG of Somalia in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia and guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process. **REQUESTS** the PSC to mandate IGAD to deploy such Peace Support Mission (PSM) pending the deployment of the envisaged AU PSM and **REQUESTS FURTHER** the Commission to provide support and assistance.

6. **CALLS** for the convening, as soon as possible, of an International Pledging Conference for the post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia within the context of the already established mechanism. In this respect, the Assembly **REQUESTS** the Commission to take all measures required to contribute to the mobilization of the international community in support of peace-building efforts in Somalia;

7. **CALLS UPON** AU Member States, particularly the IGAD Member States, to continue to do their utmost to consolidate the process of normalization and stabilization in Somalia.