Embarrassed again?
Further notes on the Trial
Donald Levine
October 11, 2006
Almost duped once
In 1992 I joined dozens of Ethiopia's friends to monitor
the "first democratic election" in the history of Ethiopia. Never mind that democratic elections for Parliament had been held in 1957; in
1963; and in 1967. (In 1967, incidentally, one Ato Zenawi of Adwa and others
were disputing the ballot counts in their local election.)
No matter. Full of good will, we Americans and Europeans
had come to celebrate a new era of political democracy following the Derg
dictatorship. We were excited that the new regime wanted to demonstrate
commitment to an open political process and a pluralistic democracy, and
honored to be part of it. My fellow monitors included a Congressman Donald
Payne of new Jersey and Professor Edmond Keller of UCLA. My monitoring
companion was first political officer at the Russian Embassy-a pairing
unthinkable only a few year before
On arrival I told the taxi driver that I had come to
support Ethiopia's new experiment in democracy. All he said was: "Wushet
Demokrasee." His phrase became a logo for what my companions and I
experienced during our brief tour. We found opposition candidates and parties
hamstrung by restrictions. Opposition candidates in Amhara districts were
reportedly harassed. I was there when the Government kept journalists from
covering a new conference of an independent candidate. Together with the
American Human Rights officer at the time, I visited a prison where several
would-be OLF candidates had been locked up for no apparent good reason. I was
there when Profesor Keller was ordered to leave the country within 24 hours
simply because as an election observer he had visited an OLF rally. I went to
Aliu Amba where the TPLF had installed a cadre from Tigray who insisted on
running as an Argobba Liberation Front candidate instead of an authentic
Argobba local. "You don't know how to be liberated," the cadre said,
"we have come to teach you." My Russian companion said to me, "I
know that man. He is a Russian commissar from 1920."
It was upsetting to be brought for an open democratic
process when little of the sort was being shown. We felt we had been
manipulated, as some habeshas do who think they can fool outsiders at will;
after all, ferinjotch wustun aygebatchewm, aydelem? Our report embarrassed the
Government. From then I became a critic of the Leninist character of the EPRDF
regime.
Meles Zenawi's Reformist Credentials
By 2004, Ethiopia's political scene appeared to be
changing. To be sure, throughout that year, large numbers of Oromos were booted
to the Dedessa prison simply for expressing the innocent disagreements about
government policy. To be sure, judges continued to work under the thumbs of a
centrally-controlled judicial system. But something new was in the air.
I caught a glimpse of that when I, known as a critic of
the regime, was invited to receive an honorary doctorate Addis Ababa University
in July 2004. And during my visit to Ethiopia earlier this year and since, I
learned that EPRDF officials went to some lengths to open up the media to
competing political parties. I learned that in 2004, Reporters Without Borders
had removed the name of PM Meles Zenawi from their list of enemies of a free
press for the first time. And recently I learned, from a reliable report on the
campaign in rural Shoa, that as the election campaign wore on and opposition
candidates appeared to be growing in strength, the Government initially
insisted on keeping the process open and not interfering with the local
electoral process in any way. That was an amazing change, which I attribute to
the sense of confidence and security experienced by the EPRDF elite following
the purges of General Siye Abraha and his allies in 2001; heightened
appreciation of Ethiopian nationhood following the war with Eritrea; successes
in growth of infrastructure; improved handling of famines; and growing respect
form the international community.
I have cited these liberalizing developments when talking
with opposition activists who could not believe that EPRDF ever had any
interest in a pluralistic democracy and so should be overthrown by any means
possible. One of my critics, confronted by my reference to Meles's
liberalization, finally acknowledged that. He wrote:
I think everybody was banking on the reformist
credentials of Meles. It is difficult to argue that there was no change after
the split. There is no doubt that the years between the split and 2005 were the
best years of the EPRDF. In fact I am of the opinion that had the reforms
started earlier, the EPRDF would have done much better at the polls. As it
turned out the reforms were too little too late.
Despite these visible reforms, the hatred against EPRDF
generated by the policies and actions of their first decade created such
intense antagonism that some of the opposition simply could not trust the new
openings that EPRDF created. Sensing that CUD elements might be ambivalent
about participating whole-heartedly in the constitutionally mandated political
process, and fearing that growing popular support for CUD might actually turn
them out of office and overturn the major EPRDF reforms in which they believed so
strongly, EPRDF leaders engineered an abrupt turn-around in the middle of
April.
Ambivalent Regression to an Older Script
A month before the election, party cadres started
receiving different signals. Across the country they were told to direct Government
resources to pressure the populace to vote for EPRDF. For example, systematic
house visits were paid by armed cadres who told peasants that they had better
vote for EPRDF or suffer serious consequences. The Government was gearing up
for a different sort of denouement than planned, thinking they had to do
whatever it took to secure their hold on power (an attitude not unknown to
Americans from the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004). Not wanting
outsiders to see what was going on, the Government abruptly expelled three
American NGOs that had come to monitor the elections.
Much of what transpired subsequently-imposing martial law
on election night; premature announcement of EPRDF victory; shootings of
demonstrators in June, harassment and property confiscation of CUD party
members; arrest of thousands of young males and transporting them to distant
hardship prisons-is well known. (Much is still not known, including how and why
security forces entered college dormitories in Addis Ababa and Bahr Dar
provocatively during the night of June 5, and the extent to which opposition
property was confiscated and government critics were silenced.) Following the
June 6 massacre, the world recoiled in horror, much as in November 1974 when
Mengistu's agents carried out their bloody massacre.
But then, the regime hurried to pick up the pieces and
move on. They convinced themselves if not others that had they not reacted with
such violence, mob action would have led to destructive civil actions. They
proceeded with initiatives to reform the rules of parliament, re-examine the
National Election Board, and draft new legislation regarding the press. They
urged the opposition candidates who had won to take over the administration of
Addis Ababa and to take their seats in Parliament and to continue their
struggle for democratization and economic progress within the constitutionally
mandated system. They carried out negotiations day by day with CUD leaders in
an effort to avoid further violence and move the country forward. PM Meles said
he was looking forward to working with Mayor-elect Berhanu Nega.
And then, due to circumstances about which everyone
disagrees, the CUD leaders made a controversial decision not to accept their
huge electoral victory and build on it. That decision, many CUD supporters
believe, was not in anyone's best interest. When they broke off talks and
refused to enter Parliament, the regime regressed once more to reimpose a veil
of terror. Security forces reportedly drove around the city and randomly
assassinated innocent civilians in cold blood. They seized and incarcerated
rejectionist CUD victors, civil society leaders, and independent journalists.
An independent commission has now reported that 193 civilians were murdered,
often in horridly brutal ways. All those detained, plus several Ethiopians
living abroad, were charged with crimes punishable by death, including the
illogical, unfounded, insulting, and self-defeating charge of genocide. With
that, Ethiopia plunged from being a country full of democratic promise and then
a polity tragically riven with destructive conflict to being the laughing stock
of the international community.
Almost Duped Twice or What?
Officials and informal leaders from all the donor
countries tried repeatedly to encourage the Prime Minister to reconsider those
charges. He adamantly refused to budge, and sought to transform his offensive
tactics into defense of an autonomous judicial system. He assured all concerned
that the defendants would receive a fair and speedy trial, and that this would
enhance respect for Ethiopia's legal system.
Given the PM's uncompromising attachment to this line of
argument, it appeared futile to continue pushing for a politically negotiated
release of the prisoners. I sought to direct attention instead to other,
consensually supported openings for progressive development. One of these was
to see if the trial proceeded in a way that demonstrated his announced
commitment to a judicial system bound by high standards of legal procedure. My
hope for that process lay behind the exchanges subsequently carried out in
Addis Fortune and on the eineps web site. To quote my conclusion:
We must respect the forms of a systematic, independent,
speedy completion of their trial "as a step toward advancing the role of
an independent judiciary." I chose those words deliberately in order to
encourage the Government to move forward toward a system in which a judiciary
functions autonomously... If legitimate procedures are not respected by the Government,
I expect that domestic and international observers will get the word out
quickly, and I shall be among the first to voice disapproval... But if the
trial is reasonably fair, then its success could be joined with other steps
being taken toward reform of the judicial system, the last in the series of
four efforts at democratic institution-building.
When the trial adjourned after dragging on for many
months, I made an interim assessment based on careful analysis of daily
records, and concluded that the trial could be considered neither speedy nor
fair:
No ordinary court case, the trial against selected
opponents of the EPRDF regime has divided the Ethiopian body politic as has no
other issue since the time of Emperor Susneyos. One would expect the Ethiopian
judicial system to go to great lengths to demonstrate its integrity both to
Ethiopian citizens and to international observers. Its failure to do so
reflects, at the very least, a lack of capacity to mount a fair and speedy
trial...
Of all flaws in this trial, I consider the most
dysfunctional to be . . . the prosecution's repeated failure to link evidence
with specific defendants or charges. Lack of adequate differentiation has
[marked] these proceedings from the outset. While the Government appears, at
best, to possess hard evidence incriminating one or two individuals of one or
two categories of action that are possibly illegal, it has included several
dozens of individuals under a broad range of criminal accusations. It is this
feature of the proceedings that opened up to ridicule what could and should
have been a serious juridical process.
During this period of recess, it would behoove the
Ministry of Justice to re-assess those charges more carefully and demonstrate
to the world the high level of legal competence that Ethiopians manifest at
their best. That would lend greater speed and fairness to the final sessions of
this trial and thereby enable Ethiopians to get back to working together to
make their beloved land a better place. If such action were to be matched by a
willingness of defendants to avail themselves of counsel, that desired outcome
would be facilitated even more.
On Thursday, October 5, the trial resumed. One might have
thought that the Ministry of Justice would have done something to redress the
shortcomings of the first phase. Yet the first day of the resumed trial was
abysmal. Lead judge Adil Ahmed Abdullahi and lead prosecutor Shemelis Kemal
were simply not present. The trial began an hour and 15 minutes late. Absent a
quorum to rule on the admissibility of evidence, the proceedings were quickly
adjourned and postponed for eight days. The senior judge and the main
prosecutor were not even present. Nothing was accomplished; the trial was
delayed yet another week.
And so, are we back to square one? Was the notion of
putting the prisoners on trial to parade an evolving legal process simply
another sort of make-believe to dupe the ferenjis? Or can that ill-conceived
theater still be repaired? If not, let us hope that this time the donors will
waste no time in confronting the regime with their marked displeasure. And let
us hope that another war with Somalia will not becloud the issue of justice and
good governance in Ethiopia. It is especially in time of war that a nation
needs to be unified. Besides, andnet kala, agarun yakeberal.