Eritrea misses the gains of diplomacy

Mulugeta Alemu

24 January 2008

Chatham House, UK’s leading foreign policy think thank, held a seminar on the challenges and future of Eritrea’s foreign policy in December 2007. The summary of the workshop was published on 17 January 2007. Intriguingly enough, the report shies away from revealing the details of the discussion and the composition of the participants. However, the questions raised during this unusually formatted seminar (it was a closed meeting) are straightforward and deserve the attention of anyone interested in Eritrea. To what extent is Eritrea’s diplomatic isolationism fashioned by its past? What made Eritrea’s relationships with its neighbors so problematic and could this be changed? What kind of regional and international alliances would help Eritrea secure its wider national interests? Was there potential for Eritrea to be a strategic partner with the West? The report proffers little indication that these queries were sufficiently tackled. But some of the conclusions drawn are instructive.

Eritrea’s foreign policy is marked by a unique isolationism. The country shows little or no interest in multilateral international and regional organizations. It has already suspended its membership in IGAD. It routinely and foolishly denounces the U.S and other members of the international community for their ‘unfair’ stance on its boundary quarrel with Ethiopia. The government of Eritrea is so distrustful of the international system that it has effectively institutionalised isolationism. Rather than taking advantage of time-tested diplomacy, it heavily relies on informal networks and meddling in neighboring countries as a strategy of promoting its interest. Whereas its seat in UN and AU diplomatic conferences is often vacant, Eritrea is a master of ceremony in congregation of rebel groups across the Horn. Once great architects of independence struggle and guerilla fighting, Eritrea’s ‘youth of the independence struggle’ have become clumsy in adapting to inter-state diplomacy and statecraft.

Eritrea’s history of anti-Ethiopian struggle and the widespread belief that its independence is archived ‘against all odds and without any outside support’ is perhaps the chief backgrounder to this unorthodoxy. Eritrea continues to be imagined as a victim of neglect of the international community. Eritrea’s leadership often reacts to its own incompetence in attracting international attention by playing the pariah, which in turn depletes its capital for external legitimacy. The country’s degenerating legitimacy, both internal and external, pushes further the country to the edge.

Isolationism has overshadowed Eritrea’s future. Its ramification to the peace and stability of the region is high. Eritrea’s lack of interest in diplomacy has severely weakened its institutions and forced it to miss rare opportunities. Its unwillingness to talk about its problem including over its border problem with Ethiopia diminished the possibilities which would have followed dialogue and discussion. Rather than maximizing the benefits from Horn of Africa’s strategic status quo, Eritrea ill-advisedly struggle to reverse it thereby creating a fictional strategic schism with Ethiopia.

Various issues considered, the report presents a rather accurate assessment of the state of play in Eritrea and the sub-region. But it has some glaring shortcomings. The Horn of Africa countries have large diasporic communities. So has Eritrea. Eritrean communities abroad played and continue to play important roles both in the domestic affairs of their country and the promotion of its foreign policy interest. Currently the Eritrean government is reinvigorating Hizbi Mekete, informal networks of diaspora community to solicit mainly economic support. The nature and the dynamic of these networks is ignored in these discussions. The report also wrongly credits Eritrea for playing a ‘positive regional role.’ The reference to Eritrea’s role in the Sudan is bizarre. Horn of Africa’s smallest country, Djibouti, plays a far craftier and positive role in the sub-regions crisis than Eritrea whose influence in Sudan and Somalia exclusively originates from arms it ships to the various rebel groups. The most serious flaw of the report, however, is the fact that it has ignored to discuss Eritrea’s predicament in light of Ethiopia’s foreign policy. If Chatham House’s discussion group really considered Ethiopia’s foreign policy and practice both prior to and after the 1998-2000, it would have found that Eritrea’s massive blunder in its short history as a nation is its decision to antagonize the greatest ally for its independence and continued survival─ the Ethiopian government. Only statesmanship and diplomatic dexterity can restore that. Sadly as the report clearly shows, these assets are dangerously in short supply in Eritrea.