The Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict
Key Points
By David Shinn
December 27, 2006
The following is my abbreviated assessment of the current fighting between Ethiopian military forces and militias of the Somali Islamic Courts. I approach the topic from the standpoint of US interests, not those of either Ethiopia or Somalia. I define US interests as achieving political and economic stability in East Africa and the Horn, minimizing or eliminating humanitarian disasters, and successfully countering terrorism.
1. Ethiopia has legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis Somalia, not the least of which is a 1,000 mile long border. There is a history of previous hostility, the legacy of Mogadishu’s Greater Somalia policy that laid claim to about one-quarter of the land area (the Haud and the Ogaden inhabited by Somali-speaking peoples) of Ethiopia, and the fact that at least one senior leader of the Islamic Courts recently stated his intention to revive irredentist claims in Ethiopia. Another senior leader of the Islamic Courts disavowed any such claim.
2. There is also the legacy of terrorist attacks against Ethiopia in the mid and late-1990s emanating from al-Ittihad al-Islami, now a defunct organization in Somalia. Several of its leaders, however, hold senior positions in the Islamic Court structure. In addition, there is credible evidence that three non-Somalis involved in the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam took refuge in Somalia and may still be there.
3. The Ethiopian military is far more powerful than the militias of the Islamic Courts, which can not at this writing pose a serious military threat to the Ethiopian homeland, including the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region. The Ethiopian military has the capacity to defeat handily the Islamic Court militias inside Somalia in conventional engagements.
4. The more than thirty Islamic Courts are neither unified nor homogeneous except that they agree on their desire to create an Islamic state governed by some form of Sharia. They also appear unified in their opposition to Ethiopia. Different Courts seem to have different interpretations of the way they would implement Sharia. Some seem to prefer a benign version while others have taken extreme positions. It is important to remember that even Muslims in Ethiopia, which is almost fifty percent Muslim, observe elements of Sharia in civil issues.
5. Prior to the intervention in Somalia of Ethiopian fighting forces, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) held Baidoa and some surrounding territory, but little else. The Islamic Courts held about fifty percent of the former Somali Republic. Puntland and Somaliland were the two largest components not under their control. The UN, African Union and even the Arab League recognized the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia.
6. Clan structure is critical to Somali political dynamics. To simplify, there are five major clans that then break down into sub-clans, sub-sub-clans, etc. Most, but certainly not all, support for the Islamic Courts comes from the Hawiye clan and especially its Habr Gedir sub-clan. Even within this sub-clan, the Ayr sub-sub-clan is most important.
7. The Islamic Courts achieved power quickly due to their ability to defeat discredited warlords in Mogadishu and establish for the first time in almost two decades relative peace and security. Most Somalis were fed up with sporadic conflict between clans and various political rivals for power. The Courts also instituted welcome social services. On the other hand, the extreme positions (e.g. declaring that anyone who did not pray fives times a day was subject to beheading) of one or more of the Courts alienated many Somalis. The effort by the Islamic Courts to ban the mild narcotic, Khat, which has been widely used by Somalis for many decades, was especially unpopular. (Khat is an illegal drug in North America and highly destructive to family life.)
8. This brings us to the most recent Ethiopian military intervention. Ethiopia stated that the intervention will be brief and not involve an effort to enter the capital of Mogadishu. Ethiopia reportedly intends to damage significantly the fighting capacity of the Islamic Court militias, forcing them to return to the negotiating table on an equal basis with the TFG.
9. The Ethiopian strategy, from the standpoint of ETHIOPIAN interests, is appropriate. But can it work? I have serious doubts.
10. If Ethiopia completes its military campaign quickly and then withdraws all of its forces, the area it has taken from the Islamic Courts will presumably be turned over to the TFG and former warlords. Can they successfully withstand attacks from the Islamic Courts? This is highly doubtful. Will the TFG and the former warlords remain united? This, too, is questionable.
11. And if Ethiopia concludes that it must remain for an extended period of time in order to insure the success of the TFG and former warlords, how will Ethiopian forces fare? I seriously doubt that Ethiopia wants to get bogged down in a long, drawn out guerrilla campaign with Islamic Court militias deep inside Somalia and far from Ethiopian supply centers. This would not be in the interest of stability in the Horn of Africa or in the interest of the US.
12. It is important to emphasize that other foreign players are deeply involved in the fighting in Somalia. According to numerous press reports, significant numbers of jihadi fighters from the Middle East and South Asia have arrived to support the Islamic Courts. The UN-sponsored Monitoring Group on Somalia reported in October that there were 2,000 Eritrean troops in Somalia in support of the Islamic Courts. (Eritrea denies that it has troops in Somalia; the denial is not credible.)
13. From my perspective, and I believe from the standpoint of the best interests of the US, all foreign forces should leave Somalia—Ethiopian troops, Eritrean troops, and non-Somali jihadis. Little positive will be accomplished, however, if only one or two of these components depart and one or two stay.
14. It is equally important that the Islamic Courts and the TFG return to the negotiating table where they must sit down in the spirit of compromise and agree to a power sharing arrangement. This will be difficult, but it is not impossible. The talks will probably result in an Islamic state, but Somalia is virtually entirely Muslim and it would not be the first Islamic State. Islam in Somalia also has a long tradition of moderation. A government comprised of representatives of the secular TFG and religiously-focused Islamic Courts provides at least the possibility of a government that can establish security and be accepted by the majority of Somalis. As long as foreign parties play a major role in Somalia, there is virtually no possibility of long-term peace. At best there will be a short-term imposed peace and even this is probably wishful thinking.
15. Foreign forces will probably not leave Somalia unless they face considerable international pressure. This will require the friends of the TFG and Ethiopia such as the US and the European Union to put pressure on Ethiopia to leave. The Arab League collectively and its individual members must do the same with the Islamic Courts so that the foreign jihadis leave Somalia. Friends of Eritrea such as Italy must ensure that the Eritrean troops leave. Any other non-Somali groups, such as Ethiopian dissident organizations that oppose the current government in Addis Ababa, must also leave if they are present in Somalia.
16. There is obviously no guarantee that this scenario will work. It is fraught with challenges. As I look at the problem, however, it has at least as good a chance of success and will result in less loss of life than the alternatives. It will also minimize the return to Somalia of a humanitarian disaster. Finally, it is the approach that comes closest to achieving US interests in the region as it might permit the return of stability and open the door to serious discussions with Somali authorities concerning past links to terrorism.