January 22,
2007
Issaias Afeworki’s Presidency over
Matters of a Region in Crisis - Alex Birhanu
Background
For the most part important
pieces of information and their analyses in this article are exclusively pertinent
to looking at Issaias Afeworki’s presidency over internal and external affairs.
Hence In what follows this article provides a reflection of the absence of
transparency both in terms of Eritrean Regime’s handling of its internal and foreign
affairs.
Part I: Eritrean Affairs
Inhibiting
the wave of struggles of the Eritrean peoples, Issaias Afeworki’s despotic
regime has chosen to rule the country under a hard handed one-man-dictatorship.
Soon after the euphoria of the de facto Eritrea independence from Ethiopia was
over in 1993, Issaias Afeworki introduced his long-stretching authoritarian arms
brought forward from his hay-days as commander in chief of EPLF, a guerrilla
fighting front, of the 1980s thereby spreading spy soldiers throughout Eritrea,
polarizing, subjugating and ultimately putting people in prison - including
those who struggled within EPLF’s 30 years of liberation process (labeling them
as the gang of 15). Currently, the inhuman acts of spying, liquidations,
tortures, purges, the intrigues played against those Eritrean groups who
attempted to opt for power struggle especially since 2004 and the slavery of
the rank-and-file members within his government machinery are among incidences
worth noting.
The foremost victims of the hitherto ongoing anti-peace
policy and moves of the hard-handed Eritrean government are the Eritrean people
itself. The
secular life of people has fallen under tight control of the government’s
manipulative mechanisms. For instance, soon after Issaias Afeworki’s tyrannical
government banned Evangelical churches in 2002, the condition for Christians
has rapidly deteriorated. The government has closed Evangelical houses of
worship, confiscated and destroyed their property, and imprisoned and tortured
many Evangelicals. The government is also restricting activities of previously
approved Lutheran, Catholic, and Orthodox churches. “In the beginning of 2006,
the government forced the head of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch Abune
Antonios, to step down. Eleven months later, the state demanded that all
offerings and tithes collected through the Orthodox Church be deposited
directly into a government account. The government further made restrictions by
limiting the number of priests to be allowed to serve in each parish throughout
Eritrea.” (1)
As if to
say: ‘I know everything except myself’, Eritrea is ruled by an increasingly
repressive, isolated, and unpredictable regime that is not willing to open-up
pathways for a democratic political platform that guarantee justice, peace,
equality among all. Instead of opening-up the way for peace, prosperity,
empowerment and socio-economic development through which all the nine ethnic
groups of the Eritrean peoples can live in harmony, Issaias Afeworki’s
totalitarian regime became raison d’etre for the flaring-up of opposition groups
and quagmire among Eritrean factious groups and those in Diaspora. In effect, the
clandestine opposition process that started in 2004 inside Sudan has ringed the
bell for a wake-up call and has shown signs of progress towards putting
pressure on straightening up of the Shaabia think-tank. People are now working
ways and means on how to push the arrogant Wedi Afom out of office by any and
all means available on the ground. This episode has really become a reminder to
Issayas Afeworki and to Shaabia cohorts to respond in time to key popular
demands asking for sharing power. Before long Issaias Afeworki’s Shaabia regime
will have no choice but to relinquish power and to embark on a multi-party
politics that includes the rights and empowerment of all the nine ethnic groups
within Eritrea proper.
There is
popular consensus among the public expressing their feelings by suggesting that
Eritrean political leadership must stop dumping its nose into political matters
of neighboring states and start to mind its own national affairs. This
autocratic regime must also stop fostering military training that it gives to opposition
political groups coming from neighboring countries. In its place Shaabia should
attempt to foster peace, prosperity and fraternity among and between the
Eritrean peoples and the peoples of the neighboring states existing primarily
within the region.
Likely Demise of
Despotism
Due to
misfortunes both at home and abroad, Issaias Afeworki’s tyranny is temporarily
ailing politically beyond repair and counting its doomsday. All its
Machiavellian tactics of governance by using spy soldiers at home and by
spreading terrorist tactics using foot-soldiers like OLF, ONLF, AFD and the
like have collapsed and all its cards have now burnt out. The arrogant Issaias
Afeworki’s Shaabia regime sided with UIC that harbored fundamentalists and
dashed in Somalia simply to show its “presence” to the fund raising few Arab governments
but in vain. By now, Issaias knows it better that he is just buying time;
otherwise he knows it well that he cannot make it all alone by support coming
from few Arab countries. As he can no longer collect funds through Eritrean
persons living in Diaspora any more, it is not difficult to guess what the
final option of this abhorred clique with few Arab countries will take him
through. Obviously, the road which the Issaias Afeworki’s despotic regime has
chosen may buy it time but definitely it is this same venue that will take his
tyrant regime to its ultimate downfall.
The Eritrean
people living in Diaspora and those who are closely following developments at
home, can't be fooled by Issaias Afeworki’s troubled, drained and domineering
regime. Simply, Shaabia is trying to deceive all eyes wearing glittering robes within
and from handful Arab governments. For as long as the direction held by Issaias
Afeworki’s single-handed totalitarian regime is moving towards its ultimate demise,
there is equally a serious need to prevent the Eritrean peoples from likely danger
and change the political direction until the polity lands on and proceed towards
democracy that allows fostering a multi-party parliamentarian constitution.
This corrective action must become operational without any delay simply due to
the fact that all options that are being attempted outside the voice and choice
of the Eritrean people will end up to be unproductive and chaotic. Enough is
enough. Communities should be empowered to take their fate in their own hands. The
ever growing and ongoing - one man show – and his protagonist political
platform characterized for the most part by dictatorial governance and despotic
polity must be clogged once and for all.
Tension at the Horn
The Horn
of Africa that consists of: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,
and Uganda are a region of strategic geopolitical importance. It is also a
region in crisis. Particularly, tensions along the heavily militarized
Ethiopian-Eritrean border escalated in late 2005 as Eritrea imposed new
restrictions on the movement of the UN peacekeeping mission mandated to monitor
the demilitarized zone established by the 2000 Algiers Agreement. The breakdown
of the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace implementation process contributes to the
dangerous escalation of regional conflicts. The ongoing stalemate on the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border is further fueled by the growing authoritarianism in
both states. Since the 2000 cease-fire, ruling parties in both Eritrea and
Ethiopia have responded to demands for political openings with harsh
restrictions and arrests criminalizing dissent.
(i) The border dispute
with Ethiopia: These
heightened border tensions, along with internal political turmoil in Ethiopia,
increasing political repression and tyranny in Eritrea, and the rooting out and
chasing away of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) of Somalia out of the country
by the end of December 2006 are core factors among the political feud in the
region. As to the fragmentary border issues between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, on January 17, 2007, the UN indicated that it would
reduce the peacekeeping forces on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border by 600 persons (from
its current 2300 UN-troops to 1700 UN-troops) by the end of January 2007 working
in or near the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) of the disputed regions of the
border, which separates Ethiopia and Eritrea. Actually, the UN mandate for the
Ethiopia-Eritrea mission must be renewed by January 31.
Unless
the Ethio-Eritrea border issue comes to a closure, the tension will further
persist eventually igniting yet other unsettled matter like Ethiopia’s legitimate
access to the sea causing another war resulting in excessive death-toll on
either sides of the conflicting countries. In fact, failure to resolve the
Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute could exacerbate governance, health, and
humanitarian problems within the region.
In
connection to the border conflict, the hegemonic rule devised by Issias
Afeworki and his cohorts are breeding political danger of ant-peace policy
against Ethiopia pertaining to ethnicity and tribal politics by supporting
groups like OLF, ONLF, AFD, EPPF and the like.
(ii) Altruistic access
to the sea:
With reference to Assab port’s feasible utilization, it is crucial that all stakeholders show concern beyond today’s short-sighted geographical seizure of the port and try to resolve this matter through a negotiated settlement in the way that Assab will no longer remain as a permanent source of future instability between Eritrea and Ethiopia. If maintaining sustainable stability and socio-economic relations between these two states is given its due recognition, then the significance of Assab must be taken into critical consideration and be given eminent and immediate solutions. So far Meles Zenawi and his cohorts have been shrugging their shoulders as regards access to the sea and adamantly grumble Ethiopia’s rightful ownership of the port of Assab. According to likely suggestions made in earlier reports it is argued that Ethiopia may stage-up the not yet demarcated border matter including that of the Assab port as points of negotiation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Likely justification to be drawn for the Assab port case would be: (a) that Assab port was part of Wollo until 1990 and it was given to Eritrea by TPLF as a good will gesture, will simply prolong the suffering of the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia.(2) (b) that the 1993 Eritrean referendum was conducted on emergency grounds; without formally conducting the border demarcation prior to the 1993 inauguration date;(3) and (c) with its nearly 80 million peoples living landlocked inside Ethiopia, makes the Ethiopian population feel like living in a closed house without any of the windows or doors open to the outer world.
In any case, once anti-peace policy is discarded, it is high
time for both the Eritrean and the Ethiopian governments to jointly discuss in
order to arrive at viable options on how to enable Ethiopia secure its access
to the sea. As stakeholders on this critical national issue, both Ethiopian
opposition political groups as well as the Eritrean opposition groups alike
must be consulted and take a tenacious stand.
There is,
however one fear factor: Issaias Afeworki and his cohorts are so
self-righteous, so-ill-informed, and so-dogmatic in their dealings that nothing
one can say or do will change their minds. Trying to convince them to negotiate
may at times seem a futile and not particularly useful exercise. Notwithstanding
the likelihood of facing challenges and tough times in arriving at viable
solutions, justice should govern in order to end anti-peace policy stance and
sole Ethiopia’s landlocked bottleneck through viable provision of a sustainable
outlet to the international water.
At the end of the day, economic and social development in
the region cannot be achieved through military intimidation and confrontation by
any party; but through partnership, peaceful dialogue and negotiated settlement
between the two countries. Denying access to the sea would jeopardize
sustenance of permanent peace between the two nations. And for Shaabia to hold
on to the port of Assab coercively, that will carry forward instability between
the two states.
So if anti-peace-policy is to be reversed by a sustainable
peace in the region, it is highly justifiable for the nearly 80 million Ethiopian
peoples to regain their legitimate rights to access the sea through Assab port.
Likewise, by returning the port of Assab to Ethiopia, Eritrea will be in a
better socio-economic and political networking position not only with Ethiopia but
also with the rest of its neighbors in the region. It means none of the two
countries have to worry about counter-fighting one another.
In connection to the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict management issue, the long sustained relationship between Canada and the USA or between Mexico and the USA in North America; between Switzerland and its neighboring countries in Europe or between the three neighboring countries in Scandinavia may be considered as models or exemplary factors for re-enforcing such suggestions at the Horn of Africa. The previous attempt by Eritrea to rent the Assab port in early 1990s in return for extracted hard currency from Ethiopia is simply a bizarre attempt as Assab legally belongs to Ethiopia. Therefore, the Ethiopian government and the opposition political parties jointly must start dialogue with their counter parts in Eritrea in order to set the course for a visionary regional solution that may bring durable peace between the two nations. The bell is ringing in different sounds. Eritrea and Ethiopia should come up with viable solutions at this critical and urgent time. All told, the night may be long but surely and eventually, a day will come soon when Ethiopia will retain access to the sea. Likewise, a day will come soon when Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples will join hands, talk the talk and walk the walk jointly for mutual socio-economic progress and peaceful co-existence. But the main precondition for these factors to be fulfilled is the wearing away of any form of tyranny both from Eritrea and Ethiopia.
(iii) Unknown fate of
some Sudanese in Eritrea
Although
not so serious, intermittently, few tensions have been cropping up between
Sudan
and
Eritrea. For instance, in its article published on Saturday, 11 February 2006 by the Sudanese Media Center (SMC), the fate of some Sudanese persons who have been in Eritrea since some
time in the past few years is not yet known. Although detailed and well
accounted evidences are not yet provided, according to SMC, some of the
Sudanese individuals are said to be languishing in the following eight prisons
located within Eritrea:
It is hoped
that Amnesty International, International Red-Crescent and Red Cross as well as
other humanitarian aid agencies may attempt to investigate these cases and come
up with tangible answers to this particular issue.
(iv) Instable
conditions in Somali politics
Somalia has
lacked a central government since 1991, when the overthrow of U.S.-backed
dictator Mohamed Siad Barre threw the country into the hands of rival warlords.
Hence the last fifteen years of Somalia’s history could easily be called an era
of lawlessness and chaos. With no strong central government to bring stability,
warlords established their own authority in the capital of Mogadishu, fighting
each other for greater control and influence. Amidst all the chaos, the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was formed in 2004 by a
conference convened in neighboring Kenya but remained confined in Baidoa away
from the capital Mogadishu for nearly two years. In June 2006 the Union of
Islamic Courts (UIC) captured Mogadishu and imposed a Taliban-style
fundamentalist Islamic rule on Somalia.
The prime
objective of the UIC since it seizure of power in Mogadishu in June 2006 was to
expand its fundamentalist Islamic ideology into neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya and
Djibouti. As the UIC started to govern Southern Somalia, they indoctrinated
school children and pushed them into the militant "al Shebab," whose
merciless leaders were emerging progressively close to al Qaeda with the end
goal to form a Muslim caliphate in Greater Somalia under whose banner their
reach would extend throughout the Horn and even deep into Central and Southern
Africa. Ethiopia, along with the African Union (AU) and the international
community, pressed both sides for dialogue. But the Islamic Courts, covertly
funded and armed by Eritrea and supporters of a radical Islamic state in the
Horn of Africa, declared a jihad on Ethiopia and attacked the TFG. Markedly, as
per accounts made by Pajamas Media, the Eritrean soldiers “were in full
combat” alongside the Islamic Courts Union army, including firing on Ethiopian
and Somali government forces (4).
On its
part, Eritrea hoped to use the conflict in Somalia to destabilize its archenemy
Ethiopia, while Islamists hoped to upset the delicate balance between
Ethiopia's nearly 80 million evenly divided Orthodox Christians and
Muslims.
In due time
the UN and the AU recognized the TFG that took power after driving out the
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from the country with the support from Ethiopia.
Likewise, by the beginning of December 2006, the U.S. sowed its support to the
TFG as the government was already supported by the African Union (AU) and the
United Nations (UN). At the same time,
the Security Council of the UN authorized a regional “peacekeeping” force to
protect the TFG, which was then biding its time in Somalia’s second city of
Baidoa. By the end of the first week of January 2007, more or less the war of
driving out the Islamists from Somalia was completed within a period of two
weeks time.
By
mid-January 2007, Kenya and Ethiopia have issued a joint statement asking
African nations to provide peacekeeping troops for Somalia. Ethiopia insists that
it will withdraw its military forces from Somalia "within weeks." An
African Union regional security meeting is scheduled for January 29 and no
doubt peacekeeping contingents for Somalia will be discussed at this conference.
On
January 12, 2007, Eritrea warned the US of "dangerous consequences"
because of US air strikes made on Islamic Courts militia positions in Somalia.
What those consequences might be was not made clear. Initially, Eritrea has in
fact been a de facto US ally in the War on Terror, but when Ethiopia failed to
implement the border changes, Eritrea expected the US and the UN to force
Ethiopia to comply but in vain. When the US and UN did not react according to
Issayas Afeworki’s wishes, Eritrea turned on both and maintained its support
for the Islamic Courts militia. The Ethiopian and the Somali transitional
government joint victories in Somalia have been a clear defeat for Eritrea.
Eritrea might consider letting radical Islamic terrorists operate from its
territory. That would be a stupid mistake, but angry governments do stupid
things. As Eritrea has little interest in radical Islamists and the Islamists
utopian goals, Issaias Afeworki found the Islamists as useful tools for his tactical
alliance with them in order to carry out a proxy war with his arch-foe
Ethiopia.
Conclusive remarks:
When
all is said and done, despite
his ideological acrobatics, Issaias Afeworki remained consistent in his
anti-peace policy in the region in crisis and in his internal policy of
arbitrary killings, divide-and- rule, intrigues, manipulations, and psychological
terror in marathon and endless meetings within his despotic government system
since 1993. For Issaias Afeworki his left-wing inclined and age-old partisan political
ideology grafted from China has remained as a means to stick to power and never
an end in itself. Consequently, Issaias has not only deepened Eritrea in huge socio-economic,
political and geopolitics crisis but he has also duplicated the problems at hand
at least for the next generation to take over power.
Footnotes:
(1) For
details kindly see, an article posted by ICC on www.persecution.org
- icc@persecution.org.
(2)
Heard as Saying -
"The Port of Assab is a pure gift of TPLF to Eritrea." (In 1996 in
Asmara, at the presence of an Ethiopian pilot instructor, it was claimed that Solomon
Petros, was heard saying the
above quotation. Solomon was the former EPLF second-in-command). Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petros_Solomon.
(3) For
details please see, an article posted by Toommaa on December 27, 2006 on: http://www.ethioforum.org/Forums/viewtopic/t=680.html).
(4) (http://www.pajamasmedia.com/2007/01/eritrea_sides_with_alqaeda_in.php).
The author
can be reached at: <alexbirhanu@yahoo.com>.