Terrorism in Ethiopia

By Weldeselassie Woldemichael

Feb 22, 2007

INTRODUCTION

 

Terrorism has been part and parcel of human history. The terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’, arose from the events of the French Revolution of 1789 (Hayes, 1980:10). Terrorism has become part of our daily news diet. Hardly a day goes by without news of an assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking, or bombing somewhere in the world. The terrorist threat is also changing in ways that make it more dangerous and difficult to counter. Now, a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed to kill as many people as possible. As such, incidents of terrorism have increased in this decade. The phenomenon of terrorism has become one of increasing concern to governments and of increasing interest to scholars.

 

The trend towards higher causalities reflects, in part, the changing motivation of today's terrorists. The glaring change of motivation in our contemporary world emanates from religious corners. Religiously motivated terrorist groups, such as Osama Bin Ladin's group Al-Qaida are operating at a global level. The shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change in the way some international terrorist groups are structured. Religious motives in general may lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda; they have less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they rely on loose affiliations with like-minded groups from a variety of countries to support their common causes against their perceived enemies. Religious groups like Al-Qaida use this fertile ground as their pool for selecting the most dedicated individuals and build a tight and professionally structured organization. They maximize exploiting the situation to lay their underground network thereby their tentacles reaching most part of the world.

 

Over the past few decades, a number of countries have been forced to deal with the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Terrorists effectively use suicide against densely populated civilian and military targets.  Suicide terrorism constitutes an additional stage in the escalation of terrorist activity. In its ability to implement the attack at precisely set time and place, where it will cause the maximum number of causalities and greatest damage, the suicide bomber possesses the potential of virtually guaranteed success.

 

Academics, politicians, security experts and journalists have tried to define terrorism in their own way. Some definitions focus on the terrorist organization's mode of operation while others emphasize the motivations and characteristics of terrorism. Thus, a universally acceptable definition of terrorism is difficult to have, for one man's terrorist will always be another's freedom fighter. Nevertheless, terrorism is what a terrorist does and every one recognizes it by its acts, regardless of differences, be it ideological, political or religious. There is nothing about it as a general phenomenon, nor is it confined to a particular group, philosophy or region of the world.

 

The term "terrorism" has no precise or widely accepted definition. The problem of defining terrorism is compounded by the fact that terrorism has often been applied to a variety of acts of violence, which are not strictly terrorism by definition. Some government are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while anti government movements frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one's perception of the act.

 

  Statement of the Problem

 

Today international terrorism has created unstable political situations and unexpected economic losses at the global level. And if it is left uncontrolled, it is believed that future terrorist incidents could be much more destructive, particularly with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Horn of Africa because of the political aims of the international terrorist and its geopolitical significance has been the target of terrorism and highly suffered by the acts of Terrorism. Historically Ethiopia has an important place in international politics of the Horn and is perceived by others as a strong Christian country and a threat to Islam. Since 1991 Al- Itihad Al-Islam, one of the international terrorist groups, has challenged the country's peace and security. Ethiopia should therefore identify the motivations behind these political aims, specific political goals towards Ethiopia, mass base, financial sources, cooperation with other terrorist groups, area of operations, long and short term plans and tactics of the terrorists in order to provide appropriate solutions.

 

The main objective of the essay is to examine the nature of AL-Itihad AL-Islamia and its effects on Ethiopia. Thus, the essay specifically attempts to address the following specific research questions:

Are there historical factors such as ideology or religious beliefs that motivate terrorists to make Ethiopia a primary target among the countries of the Horn of Africa? What is the significance of the change of political order in Ethiopia after 1991 to Al-Itihad Al-Islamia? What are the economic, social and political consequences of the incidents taken by Al-Itihad? What are Al-Itihad's resource base and its cooperation with other international terrorist groups?

The main thesis of the study is that Ethiopia is a major target of AL-Itihad AL-Islamia. It tries to identify the factors such as political, economic and religious that motivates the terrorist to put Ethiopia as the primary target among the countries in the Horn.

Methodology

The essay is essentially based on secondary data such as books, articles, various magazines and unpublished materials as a source of information. It has also benefited from interviews that the author held with people who know about AL-Itihad AL-Islamia. The primary data collected from Somali Regional State, Dire Dawa, Harar and Addis Ababa is included.

The study is limited in scope. It covers only terrorist group Al-Itihad Al-Islamia vis-à-vis Ethiopia over the last 10 years. Yet it hopes to make a modest contribution to the understanding of terrorism and Al-Itihad Al-Islamia.

 

The Marxist perspective, at the doctrinal level, has always considered terrorism fundamentally opposed to the basic tenets of Marxism- Leninism. Marx and Engels believed in revolution, not in individual or group terror. They considered violence as advisable only at the right time and place and if it were to proceed together with the people. There were endless polemics between Lenin and the social revolutionaries about who believed in terrorism what ‘together with the people’ meant. [Laqueur and Alexander, 1987:198-199].

Foreign revolutionaries were encouraged to use methods based on the Bolshevik experience-low-intensity warfare, preferably carried out by others, to lead to a general uprising and thus to victory. During the 1905 Russian Revolution, Lenin instructed the Combat Committee of the St.Petersburg Bolsheviks on methods to be used. He wrote, "You must proceed to propaganda on a wide scale. Let five or ten people make the round of hundreds of workers' and students' study circles in a week, penetrate wherever they can, and everywhere propose a clear, brief, direct, and simple plan: organize combat groups immediately…." [Ibid]. The use of bombs and violence as an aspect of the popular revolution was recommended. The revolutionaries’ main duty was to prepare the people for revolutionary acts including the use of violence on the basis of their initiative in line with revolutionary thoughts and methods.

 

According to Lenin, “The propagandists must supply each group with brief and simple recipes for making bombs, give them an elementary explanation of the type of the work, and then leave it all to them. Squads must at once begin military training by launching operations immediately, at once’ (Romerster, 1986:59-60).   He elaborated:  “Some may at once undertake to kill a spy or blow up a police station, others to raid a bank to confiscate funds for the insurrection…. Let every group learn, if it is only by beating up policemen: a score or so victims will be more than compensated for by the fact that this will train hundreds of experienced fighters, who tomorrow will be leading hundreds of thousands” [ibid. 60].

 

The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern held in Moscow in the summer of 1935 is best known for the instructions it gave to the World Communist Movement to organize a united front against fascism. But, it did other things as well. Soviet Communist Party official Otto Kuusinen frankly explained the role of youth in the Communist movement as follows (ibid.: 63 )

We want to attack our class enemies in the rear when they start war against the Soviet Union. But how can we do so if the majority of the working youth follow not us but, for instance the Catholic priests or not us. We often repeat the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war against the bourgeoisie. In itself, the slogan is a good one; but it becomes an empty and harmful phrase if we do not do everything today to create a united youth front.

 

Communist revolutionary methods of achieving revolutionary political objectives recognize the use of violence as a legitimate and acceptable way of liberating the people from oppression and exploitation. "In Russia at the turn of the century the intellectual elite considers, terrorist violence as the only effective way to modernize Russian Society" (Stern, 1999: 16). This contradicts with the tenets of western liberal democracy that attributes violence as a criminal offence and consequently, an illegal act and anti human rights. This has made the definition of terrorism more complex and intriguing. And so long as there are implicit and explicit conflicting interests, be it political or legal, it seems as if there won’t be an agreed up on definition of terrorism.

 

The political definition of terrorism, nevertheless, remains controversial. This is partly because several states, which are members of the United Nations, think that the global political and economic situation is unfavorable to them. They think that they are politically and economically disadvantaged and are practically marginalized from international issues. They believe that the developed world is imposing on them economically, socially and politically unfavorable conditions. They think that terrorism is political; not a legal or a technical matter as the developed world defines it [Obote-Odora, 1999:Vol.6, No.1]. In other words, it is an out come of an over all crisis in the less developed countries [LCD's], which in turn are outcomes of external political and economic environments 

 

The concept of terrorism has evolved over the centuries. Terrorism has appeared in human history one-way or the other. After the Second World War came to an end, a new kind of terrorism emerged: random violence. The terrorist attack on the LOD international Airport, which shocked the world, is a typical example.  In January 1972 a terrorist group was formed in Japan by the name The United Red Army. The organization launched a terrorist operation at LOD International Air Port. During the attack 24 people were killed and eighty wounded: the terrorists were Japanese, the victims were mostly Puerto Ricans, the setting was Israel; the weapons utilized were Czech in origin; the cause was the Palestinian Question, and the impact was worldwide. According to Hayes (1980: 7-9), this act of terrorism firstly makes terrorism complex and exhibits its international nature. Secondly it is an act for a purpose: to create a homeland for Palestinian people. Thirdly it is part of a cycle of suffering, destruction and hatred. And fourthly, it shows that any one can become a victim since the individuals injured at LOD were innocent people.

 

In the 1970s and 1980s there was a dramatic increase in terrorism through out the world. Bomb attacks, kidnappings, assassinations, and armed robberies have become an every day reality [ibid. 7-8]. Over the past two decades suicide terrorism has become an over spreading phenomenon. Fifteen different terrorist organizations in twelve different countries resorted to the use of suicide tactics against their enemies. As of February 2000, about 275 suicide incidents have occurred [Schweitzer, 2001:75].

 

The statistics on both domestic and international terrorism for the last twenty years are shocking. During the 1970s the total number of confirmed incidents worldwide was 8,114. There were 4,978 people killed and 6,902 injured. In terms of geographic distribution, Europe was the most active region, with a total of 3,598 incidents. Latin America followed with a total of 2,252 incidents. Third in rank was the Middle East with 1,097. Incidentally the most targeted victim of the '70s was the business community, with a total of 3,290 incidents recorded [Holms and Burke, 1994:250].

 

The action in the 1980s was even more intense in terms of both scope and scale of incidents. In 1980 only 2,755 attacks were registered, and the number of attacks increased to a record high of 4,422 in 1989, a 16 percent increase over the previous year. The '80s saw a grand total of 31,426 incidents, with 70,859 people killed and 47,849 injured, reflecting a frightening trend toward acts of violence designed to murder at random. Unlike the previous decade, in the 1980s the action was in Latin America, where 18,173 incidents were recorded. Europe was next with 4,613, followed by Asia with 4,302 and the Middle East with 3, 06 [Ibid: 250-251].

 

Record on international terrorist incidents, underscores a constant global rise in terrorism. In 1970, a total of 309 international operations were recorded; this figure more than doubled in two decades, reaching 661 incidents in 1989. Overall, in the 1970s there were a total of 4,234 international terrorist actions, with 2,873 people killed and 4,799 wounded. The primary target was the business community, with 1,011 incidents recorded. Targets also involved 967 diplomats, 255 government officials, and 173 military personnel [ibid: 251].

 

The 1980’s marked a substantial increase in the number of international terrorist incidents and casualties. Overall, 6,501 operations were registered with a total of 5,042 people killed and 11,702 wounded. Whereas in the 1970s, Europe led the world in international incidents The Middle East became the predominant location of international terrorist attacks in the '80s. One thing remained consistent: the primary target of the '80s was business interest, with a total of 1,630 incidents. In the ten years from 1982 to 1992, there were 165 terrorist incidents, in the United States. The peak year was 1982, with 51 incidents, and 1992 tied with 1989 for the lowest with 4. [Ibid: 251-252].

 

Although there are several causes for the expansion of terrorism and terrorist attacks throughout the world, some scholars and politicians correlate it with American dominance of world affairs. “ As part of its global power position, the United States is called upon frequently to respond to international causes and deploy forces around the world. America's position in the world invites attack simply because of its presence. Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.”[Emphasis in original] [Ivan, 1998:2]. Throughout the bloody history of modern international terrorism between 1968 and 1980, US citizens and facilities were always major targets  [Wilkinson, 1986:205].

 

All of the examples of terrorist attacks against the United States can be explained as retaliation for American intervention abroad. At present, empirically validating the connection between an interventionist foreign policy and such attacks is more critical than ever before that terrorist can more readily obtain weapons of mass destruction and seem to be more willing to use them.  The extensive number of incidents of terrorism linked to American foreign policy implies that the United States could substantially reduce the chance of catastrophic terrorist attacks if it lowered its military profile overseas. The United States needs to adopt a new policy that would use military force only as a last resort in the defense of truly vital national interests while at the same time respecting the national interest of others. [Eland, 1998:2].

 

There are analysts who try to obfuscate the link between American intervention and terrorism against American targets by arguing that a multitude of factors led to such attacks. [Ibib.3].

President Clinton, for example, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, attempted to diffuse the link between U.S foreign policy and terrorist incidents. He said:

 

Because we are blessed to be a wealthy nation with a powerful military and a world presence active in promoting peace and security, we are often a target. We love our country for its dedication to political and religious freedom, to economic opportunity, to respect for the rights of the individual. But we know many people see us as a symbol of a system and values they reject, and often they find it expedient to blame us for problems with deep roots elsewhere. [Ibid.].

 

The advancement of technology and means of communication gave birth to a truly international form of terrorism. It significantly helped the terrorist to manage fast to be well organized, and adapt sophisticated operations at a global level. The threat coming from the use of weapons of mass destruction like the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials by the terrorists have significantly increased in security and fear at the international level. The capacity to terrorize may increase as more sophisticated weapons become available on the international market. This is in part because some states give arms, money and shelter to terrorists [Hayes, 1980:86]

 

 

Patterns and Trends in Contemporary International Terrorism

 

The international terrorism of the second half of the 1990's has diminished in quantity of incidents while the quality of the attacks and their lethality has increased dramatically. Among the reasons given for the increased lethality of terrorist attacks is the appearance of new terrorist organizations with more amorphous religious and millenarian aims, organizations with nationalist or ideological motivations [Karmon, 2001:33-34].  

One of the main strategic modes of operation used by such organizations has been suicide terrorism [Karmon, 2001:33]. Suicide terror attack is defined: “As politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely cause his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission.” [Schweitzer, 2001:76]. Suicide attacks are attractive to terrorist organizations because they may result in many casualties and cause extensive damage and attract wide media coverage. The attack is very simple and the success is virtually guaranteed. [Ibid]. 

 

Modern suicide terrorism is aimed at causing devastating physical damage through which it inflicts profound fear and anxiety. Its goal is to produce a negative psychological effect on an entire population, rather than just the victims of the actual attack [Ibid].

 

Even the least deadly of such attacks succeed in striking a devastating blow to public morale. Suicide terrorism is all the more threatening because of the difficulties in confronting it, the large number of casualties it causes, and the religious or ideological feel it inspires.  It is a phenomenon that often, though not always, attaches its goals hand in hand with religious extremism-- distorting religion in the service of political aims [ibid.].

 

According to Karmon, (2001:33-34), there are two conflicting trends in international terrorism: one essentially violent and radical and the other more or less moderate and politically oriented. He elaborates:

On the one hand, there is indeed a trend of radicalization. But the center of gravity of this intense activity has moved from parts of the Middle East and Europe to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Caucus and central Asia. This is a result of the dismembering of the Soviet Union and the political instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan…. On the other hand, it is important to stress that we witness a shift to the political process and negotiation by important organizations as a means to achieve their strategic goals. This later trend is probably the result of the failure of armed or violent struggle or from the success of the terrorist attacks, which can result in securing political compromise from the target country.

The impact of the extreme terrorist group is immense. Until September 11th 2001, terrorists both in the United States and abroad had killed a total of no more than perhaps 1,000 Americans. Until the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, no terrorist operation had killed more than 500 people at one time [Hoffman, 2001:22]. What is indeed threatening to peace is that such extreme terrorist attacks are becoming well coordinated and sophisticated in design surpassing high level of security precautions.  The September 11th attack, for example, was unique in its characteristics:

Its ambitious scope and dimensions, consummate coordination and synchronization, professionalism and trade craft that kept so large an operation so secret, and the unswerving dedication and determination of the 19 aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers and crews of the four aircraft they commandeered and the thousands of persons working in or visiting both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon coupled with its unusually high death and casualty tolls. [ibid.]

 

According to Time magazine of September 24, 2001, the level of destruction would have far reaching consequences: “5,515 people reported missing or dead, 350 Fire Fighters missing or dead, and the cost of the world Trade Center Building is estimated to be $1.1 billion.

 

The new major changes in the terrorism of the 1990's have been the appearance of cults in the arena of terrorism and the breaking of the taboo in the use of non-conventional terrorism, which is connected to the activity of one cult. [Karmon, 2001:35].  Some researches and practical operations of different terrorist group's show that religious groups and cults, which may be less concerned about creating mass destruction than the traditional political terrorist, have increasingly taken up terrorism.

 

State sponsored terrorism has significantly diminished, however, a trend observed in the second half of the 1990s.  “The main states sponsoring terrorism - Libya, Syria, Iraq, North Korea, and even Iran (after the 1997 election of reformist president Khatami) have diminished substantially their involvement in international terrorism, especially after the Gulf War. This was mainly the result of the political and economic pressure exerted by the United States and the International Community”. [Ibid.].

The withdrawal from the terrorist scene by many states and the state supported organizations, however, has been accompanied by growth in the number and significance of non-state organizations, who in many ways pose more persistent and intractable threats than do governments or government-supported groups [Anderson, 2001:53]. This may suggest that the current trend and approach in terrorism require more attention and coordinated action.

 

International Terrorism and International Co-operation

 

The issues, which motivate international terrorism, the people who commit international terrorist acts, the weapons, the money, almost always come from or at least, move among multiple countries [Anderson, 2001:48]. The causes and counter measures of terrorism are, to a great extent, integral to, or at the very least, affected by the broader realm of international affairs. Certainly, international co-operation against terrorism is tied to the overall relationship between countries. [Ibid.].

"The campaign against terrorism will likely last a longtime. After all, it took Europe and Japan more than a generation to overcome the transnational terrorism of the 1960, and 1970s". (NYE, 2001:209)

 

Working against terrorism necessarily involves a broader effort to address the core issues, which underlie these conflicts. An effective effort against terrorism must be part of an effective foreign policy. Beyond political and diplomatic efforts, finding solutions to the conflicts from where international terrorism arises is necessary [Anderson, 2001:48]. Diplomacy plays an important and necessary role in countering terrorism. Diplomatic effort is required to build coalitions against terrorism and those who support them. Diplomacy can and often does play an important role in efforts to deny capabilities to terrorists and to states that sponsor them. Diplomacy is needed to create and sustain export - control regimes and financial controls, which are important, albeit surprisingly difficult and costly measure to limit the flow of arms and cash to terrorist organizations. [Ibid. 49-50].

 

Military response to terrorism has recently been effective, but problematic. It has a significant impact on relations between the acting nation and the target. It also inevitably involves other difficult interactions with nations who disagree with the action, as it always involves unintended or, at least, un-welcome effects on many people and interests beyond the intended targets. Military forces are organized, equipped and trained to destroy other military forces. Using them for other purposes always involves a costly and difficult process. [ibid.].

According to Herman and Gerry the West has established an Industry of institutes and experts who channel analysis and information on terrorism (1989: 229). "By 1985 it was estimated that the U.S government was spending $ 2 billion and employing 18,000 people to deal with terrorism. “ [Ibid.].

Combinations of nations, which are unable or unwilling to co-operate openly on most or all issues, nevertheless have a strong interest to co-operate on the issue of terrorism. This makes counter - terrorism an issue on which nations, which are otherwise enemies, can open lines of communication and co-operation. These openings are sensitive and complex, and usually, do not bear exposure well. [Anderson, 2001: 49-50]. In addition, the more loosely affiliated transnational terrorist net works are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate. They rely on a variety of sources for funding and logistical support, including self-financing criminal activities.

 

Islamic Tenet of Jihad and

International Terrorism in Africa

 

In the course of the armed struggle waged to fight colonialism and the subsequent violent struggles waged to rid of suppressive regimes, some facts could be charged as terrorism.  Fighters for freedom, justice and democracy may have used the same method and this will continue to prevail so long as there are advantaged and disadvantaged individuals, communities and nations. The basic aim below is to examine the current terrorism waged in the name of Islamic jihad, which is becoming a social and political threat to Africa, particularly the horn states. In order to have a fair understanding of the process, an attempt is made to describe the Islamic tenet of jihad; the current concept of Islamic fundamentalism and the objectives it hopes to achieve. Descriptions of the so-called Islamic terrorist groups operating in Africa are spelt out and the issues they claim to address are outlined.

 

International terrorism in the 1970's and 1980's was different in many respects from what we see today. The motivations of the most active of the terrorist groups were primarily secular, nationalist, and often leftist. The origins of today's Islamist thought and organizations can be traced to the society of the Muslim brotherhood, created by the school teacher A al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, and the JamaatI Islami of Pakistan, established by Abdul-Ala Mau-dudi in 1941. Their overlapping themes and intellectual contacts were soon established. [Roy, 1994: 35].  During the 1980's, more violent terrorism emerged often motivated by religious extremism claiming to represent fundamentalist values in other countries. According to Roy: "The socioeconomic realities that sustained the Islamists are poverty, disenfranchisement, crisis in values and identities, the decay of educational systems, the North-South dichotomy, the problem of immigrant integration in to the lost societies". [27]. These groups began the practice of recruiting impressionable young men and women, giving them fundamentalist religious indoctrination and preparing them for martyrdom. Unlike secular terrorist groups, these Islamic terrorists fully intended to die in the course of carrying out an attack (Sheehan, 2001: 61-62).

 

The 1990's were marked by a long series of suicide bombing and assassinations by fundamentalist terrorist groups. They have demonstrated that they can easily recruit new members from disillusioned elements of society. In some cases, the prospect of martyrdom actually increases these groups’ appeal among the youth. The focused youth for this act is the group, which feels disenfranchised and has members who are looking for ways to make a name for them and achieve special treatment for their families. Osama Bin Laden and his organization, for example, represent perhaps the most alarming trend in suicide terrorism emanating from the Middle East and South Asia. And this group has created the first truly transitional fundamentalist terrorist enterprise; drawing recruits from Muslims across Asia, Africa, European and the Middle East (ibid: 62-63).

 

The initiators of Islamic fundamentalism are those who are university educated and those who have come from urbanized families. "The Islamist movement is not led by clerics (except in Iran), but by young secular intellectuals, who openly claim to be ‘religious thinkers’ ...Islamism adopts.”. [Roy, 1994: 35-37]. They adopt the classical vision of Islam as a complete and universal system, classical vision of Islam as a complete and universal system.

 

Many researchers tend to describe Islamism as a form of "resurgent" Islam. The traditional Muslim scholars read its appearance as ‘a symptom of secularization, a reshaping of their religion in the form of a modern ideological totalitarianism’. Fundamentalism, in essence, is thus becoming an ideology. This is especially evident in Islamist deformation of the role of Jihad, which is far from the original teaching of Prophet Mohammed. According to Armstrong (2001, 57):"Muhammad did not expect Christians and Jews to convert to Islam unless they particularly wished to do so."

 

 In the original meaning of the term, Jihad is not limited to military action but generally means ‘striving hard towards a certain goal’. According to the saying of the prophet Mohammed in the compilation known as sahih AL-BU.K hair, ‘Delivery is the Jihad for a woman’.  For someone whose parents are old, Jihad is ‘taking care of them’.  On the contrary, the military aspect of Jihad is not a case of spreading the religion under false pretenses, but is a form of defense against religious persecution. [Palazzi, 2001: 66-67].

 

The military Jihad is not meant to serve as a key to expand a given situation. It is rather used as a way to defend the rights of those who are persecuted because of their religion, the deprivation of religious freedom as justification of defense. According to Palazzi, the above statement defers not only to mosques, but also to monasteries, churches, and places where God's name is frequented by worshippers. [ibid].

 

The legitimate form of military Jihad in ancient Islamic sources is based on various rules and conditions. The first stipulation says that Jihad must be waged by a regular army battling against another army. Terrorist acts against a civilian population are simply not included in the definition of Jihad. The collection of prophetic sayings mentioned that when the prophet Mohammed learned that a certain group of Jihad fighters had killed several women, he raised his hands to heaven and prayed, ‘ Oh God, be my witness that my hands are innocent of this crime.’ The second says that even when self-defense is justified, the reaction must not be extreme. The third is when the former enemy is ready to cease hostilities and seeks an opportunity to achieve peace, it is the duty of Muslims to stop fighting and accept a peaceful solution. [ibid: 68].

 

Islamists think that they represent the tradition of Islam and are hundred percent Muslims. However, this is not the case. Islamists on the contrary, have a problem with the traditionalists, especially with the mystics. Whether they like the term ‘Fundamentalism’ or not, their understanding of religion resembles that of fundamentalist in other religions. That is not to say that Islamists are more religious or more genuinely Islamic than other Muslims. In fact, Islamism is late 20th century totalitarianism.  It follows in the wake of fascists seeking to rectify their methods of domination, Islamists mold tradition so as to serve their political ends, and this causes them to clash with traditionalist Muslims who try to resist this manipulation of religion for power politics. Islamism, thus, is not a reaction of people feeling a loss of religious meaning, but a reaction to a sense of loss in the political sphere.

 

For their political ends, Islamists rely on the youth, which is prone for their suicidal missions.  EL - Sharawi's [in Paz, 2001:87] responding to the June 1995 attempt on the life Egyptian president Mubarak in Ethiopia pointed that they [Islamists] are dealing with youngsters who are at the age of fruitful creativity, but at the same time are under a lot of pressure. These youngsters, he adds ‘are impelled to act and are easy to exploit and to recruit them as soldiers’.  They believe that they kill and get killed in such acts; the act will bring them to ‘Allah’, for death is presented as martyrdom, an act that will bring the suicide attacker closer to Allah. Some of the common characteristics of the Shahid, which serve as a basic profile of the suicide bomber, are the following:

 

§          §         Young usually from 18 to 27 years age

§          §         Usually not married, unemployed and from a poor family

§          §         Usually completed high school

§          §         Most were devoted students in the Islamic Fundamentalist centers [Ganor, 2001:134].

For the Islamists, Islam has been favorable for their purpose. According to Kosrani [in Paz, 2001:88] for Lebanese youth religion plays an important role in the resistance, and the Islamist culture has created a psychological atmosphere of willingness to fight and sacrifice to death. He adds a permanent willingness to die for the sake of the greater social group can be traced. Some scholars have argued U.S. policy toward the Islamic world has also created a favorable condition for such Islamist groups to strengthen terrorism. U.S. policy towards Islam is skewed by negative stereotypes and has failed to recognize the diversity that exists in Islam. Radical Islamic movements often arise out of the legitimate needs and grievances of oppressed sectors of the population who see the U.S as partly responsible for their suffering. In this way America has encouraged the rise of extremist Islamic politics both through shortsighted support for such groups or governments and through its support of repressive regimes.

Western attitude towards Islam is based on a number of misconceptions. Even though the vast majority of the world's Muslims oppose terrorism, religious intolerance, and the oppression of women, the most prevalent images of the Muslim faith throughout the western world remains as anti human rights. The western media and government officials often exacerbate such misconceptions about Islam and Islamic movements. America, moreover, has used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a justification for keeping a high military, economic, and political pressure of attack on the Middle East. And it supported Muslim hard-liners and repressive governments when they were perceived to enhance U.S. interests, as they did in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  Extremist Islamic movements often arise in direct response to U.S policies. The roots of Islamic radicalism stem from economic inequality, military occupation, and authoritarianism. [Zunes, 2001:1-2].

 

The Islamists say that they are fighting for the preservation of Islam and against western conspiracy against Islam. According to Reuven, (2000: 91): "The core perception of the Islamist Arab groups is that they face a global conspiracy against the Islamic world, against Islamic countries, and against the Islamic mind.”  He adds: “They fear a plot to implant in Islamic minds /mainly those of youngsters/ secularism and heretical ideas. This plot's aim is to induce them to forget Islamic principles and, according to their perception, to lose their backbone, which is not nationalism, communism, socialism, or any other of the imported ideologies from the west, but Islam as the only truth.”       

 

It is also suggested that with the end of overt colonial rule, third world nationalists may begin to look towards the ultimate sources of imperialism. They see the world as controlled by an imperialist - capitalist- racist conspiracy of vast power, immune to conventional revolutionary strategies. [Gleason, 1981: 244]. This also facilitates conditions such as safe heaven and support for terrorists.

 

To be able to respond effectively to Islamic radicalism, it is necessary to understand the reasons why a small but dangerous minority of Muslims has embraced extremist ideologies and violent tactics. These movements are often rooted in legitimate grievances voiced by underrepresented and oppressed segments of the population, particularly the poor.  Stephen elaborates, "Washington's use and threat of military force, its imposition of punitive sanctions, and its support of oppressive regimes result in a popular reaction that often takes the form of religious extremism"; and adds, “When people have lost their identity there is a great pull to embrace something that can provide their identity.”[Zunes, 2001:1-2].

 

 International Terrorism in Africa

Africa is exhibiting nowadays a lot of terrorist activities. There are multiple sources for all these terrorist activities happening in the continent. The lack of democratic practices in the post colonial regimes in Africa, the increasing poverty and social crisis predominantly caused by unjust economic relation between the north and the south; the existence of corrupt and unresponsive administrative set up; the unstable nature of the political system and power base; all play to the existing violent acts that the continent is undergoing at present. Moreover, these conditions have laid conducive conditions for international Islamist terrorist organizations to be attracted to Africa and make it one of their strong fronts.

 

Capitanchik argues that "both terrorism and movements for fundamentalist Islamic reform have frequently appeared in times of political, social or economic crisis"[1986:117]. According to the FBI report the Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, the following terrorist groups are having linkages in African especially in the Horn:

 

The Al-Qaida network is of special security concern, particularly in Africa. In 1991, Bin Laden relocated to Sudan with the approval of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF) leader Hasan al-Turabi (Ibid). The Sudanese government became officially Islamic when a 1989 military coup d’etat brought Lieutenant General Umar Hasan Ahmed al- Bashir to power. While General Bashir remains the head of state, he was dominated by the extremist national Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan al Turabi, who was the speaker of the Sudan’s Parliament and is considered to hold the real power in Sudan. [Adl, 1998. This created favorable condition for Bin Laden’s terrorist mission.

 

 

There, in concert with NIF leaders, he built a network of businesses, including Islamic bank, an import-export firm, and firms that exported agricultural products. And also he used his family connections in construction businesses in Sudan. In May 1996, following strong U.S. and Egyptian pressure, Sudan expelled Bin Laden. (Katzman, 2000:14). Al- Qaida cells, nevertheless, have been identified or suspected in Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and other parts of Africa, too. [Ibid. 15].

 

Islamist Politics in the Horn region

 

The major states of the greater horn - Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea- confront a variety of Islamic challenges that have consequences on their political stability. Islamic groups carrying assorted grievances have taken advantage of weak political structures and authoritarian political systems to evolve new forms of activism and organizations that the world needs to heed. Somalia, a failed state has spawned Islamic groups that are building new linkages with radical elements in the gulf and Middle East. [Menkhaus, 2001:1]. 

The contemporary focus on al-Quada needs to be broadened to encompass the AL - Itihad, a group of Islamic cells wiith sympathies and links to the radical anti - western agenda.  AL-Itihad has grown in the past decade on the stateless Somalia and support from abroad (Ibid,). When we see the scope, strength, and origins of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia, it is a new phenomenon that visibly emerged for the first time after the demise of the Somalia government in 1991. The Said Barre's regime 1969-1990 was socialist by orientation. The regime launched massive campaigns against religious groups in general and religious leaders in particular, rightly or wrongly, perceived as anti-socialism. The regime proclaimed a modern legislation conferring women as legally recognized with equal rights and status with men, and a controversial marriage family law, which was hard to accept for most of the people and religious leaders. In 1975 ten Islamic religious leaders were executed for publicly opposing the government decree providing equal rights to women. These Islamic religious leaders had a long history of association with the Muslim Brother Hood; many religious leaders were subsequently sent to Jails. Those who were not arrested either fled the country or simply assumed a low profile existence and went underground.

 

In the mid 1990's smaller religious groups began to emerge by taking advantage of the shrinking governmental authority and the breakdown of law and order. Small minority groups, who were influenced by the Gulf Based Islamic Group, began to call for an Islamic state in Somalia. Today, a number of Islamic groups are actively operating in Somalia [Medhane, 2001].

 

The most prominent ones with extensive network and presentation are AL-ITTIHAD, JAMIATAL--ISLAH, and JAMIAT AL-DA'WA TABLIQ. JAMIAT-AL-ISLAH is a politically- oriented group that splintered from the Muslim Brother-hood. It intends to seize political power through political enlightenment of the general public, promotion of Islamic political culture and through the "ballot box" used by renowned Islamic leaders such as Hassan AL-Turabi of Sudan, Erbakan of Turkey, and Abbas Madani of Algeria. [Adar, 2002].

JAMIAT-AL-DA’WATABLIQ is non-violent movement engaged in preaching Islamic values, culture and teaching. Their missionary nature of preaching Islam emphasizes on spirituality. Their spiritual seat is the port city of Karachi, Pakistan. It maintains large followers in Somalia, South Africa, Ethiopia, Canada, Europe, and the Gulf Arab States and in the United States [Ibid.].

 

AL-ITIHAD is inspired, influenced and utilized to disseminate Wahabbism and the most organized and militaristic of all the Islamism groups operating in Somalia. The most prominent terrorist groups in Somalia work separately and in partnership through a loose united front in the Supreme Somalia Islamic League. They are united mainly in their international connection and financial network. The money circulation of their businesses inside Somalia is connected with Gulf Stock Market Exchange centers and collected "donations" in the form of Zeka. The international network is also in the military wing, which is supported by mujahidin forces from the Middle East and the Northern Tier countries. [Medhane, 2001].

 

 Ethiopian Investigations, which were conducted following the arrest of three terrorists after an attempt on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa on June 26, 1995, revealed a link with Osama Bin Laden. The Egyptian Islamic union claimed responsibility for the operation after ten days of its execution. After 12 days of the attempt to assassinate Mubarak, the Ethiopian Minister of transportation, Abdel Meguid Hussen, also faced an assassination attempt. The Islamic union, AL-ITTIHAD, claimed responsibility for the operation on the following day. On December 24, 1996, the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense announced that its troops killed 19 terrorists and wounded 81 others belonging to a multinational, fundamentalist group that tried to launch an attack on Dolo town. It declared that the dead, who were left on the ground after the battle, were members of multinational fundamentalist groups. Most of them were of Arabs in origin from several Arab countries.

 

The U.S terrorism research center and the FBI have declared repeatedly that some Islamist international terrorist groups have connections with the terrorist groups, which are mainly operating in the Horn of Africa. It is reported that they are well and extensively established, especially in Somalia and Sudan. America formally designated Sudan as a country that has repeatedly provided support to groups engaged in acts of International Terrorism. It provided and continues to provide safe haven to terrorist groups, training facilities, and a transit point for these groups, such as for those who carried out the June 1995 attack by Al - Gama'at al - Islamiya against president Mubarak in Addis Ababa. [Mckure, 1997:1-2].

 

Sudan harbors a number of terrorist groups. They include an "Old line" secular group and the Abu Nidal organization, but most of them are militant Islamic extremist organizations; among them are HAMAS, the Lebanese Hizballa, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Egypt's Al - Gama'at al - Islamiya. The Sudanese government also supports Islamic and non-Islamic opposition groups in Algeria, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. [Ibid: 3].

 

  Fundamentalist Islam is what the Islamists use as an ideology to achieve political power and justify terrorism as an appropriate means of achieving their preset objectives. Islamic terrorism has now become an international terrorism waged under the umbrella of protecting the interests of Moslems everywhere. Various factors play for the spread of different forms of Islamic international terrorism.

 

Furthermore, the prevalence of high poverty and frustration among the population in the third world, particularly the youth, has yielded fertile grounds for the rise of such groups. Africa has been prone to terrorist activities due to its social and economic problems, which have made political stability shaky and unwarranted. The Horn of Africa is a case in point. Somalia being a stateless country has become a free ground for terrorist activities. Political instability in the Sudan has brought fundamentalists to power or influential positions. Masterminds of Islamic terrorism like Osama Bin Laden see a fertile ground in Somalia and the Sudan to expand on their terrorist activities. Al Quida cells are networked in the Horn countries. Al Itiahad is operating from Somalia to neighboring countries and made Ethiopia its major target

 

Al-Itihad Al-Islamia and the

Horn of Africa

 

After the downfall of Siad Barre’s regime in January 1991, Somalia descended into anarchy and disintegration. Somalia is today without recognized central government, official currency, public schools, and post office, police force, laws and judiciary system.  It is a country where clan ties are stronger than religious convictions, where clan is in reality a bone of contention (Adar, 2002: 1-7).

 

The country has continued to deteriorate politically, economically, and socially for more than a decade. The country has been divided by and large into a number of separate administrative entities run by clan leaders, religious leaders or clan-based militias.  However, in Somaliland in May 1991, and subsequently in Punt land, an environment of peace, stability and functional local administrations have emerged.  Both of the regional administrations have constituted a semblance of government: elected parliament, executive branch, judiciary and police forces (Ibid.).

 

According to some sources in the mid -1990's, Islamic courts began to emerge in some parts of the country, especially in the capital Mogadishu.  These courts functioned as clan leaders and often enforced decisions by using their own Islamic militia. Members of the Al-Itihad militia reportedly provided the bulk of the security forces for these courts. A number of radical Islamic groups in Somalia are loosely allied with each other under Al-Itihad Al-Islamia.  They are structured more across clan lines and they appear independent of any factional control.  This may make Al-Itihad Al-Islmaia and its ally’s unpredictable forces in the Horn region.

 

The absence of central authority in Somalia has created an environment conducive to terrorist and extremist groups. Fundamentalist Islamic groups such as Al-Itihad have taken shelter in Southern Somalia, taking advantage of the prevailing anarchy in the country. Historically, clan division has been the overriding organizational force in Somalia, even though the country has the uniting features of almost universal adherence to the Muslim faith. The Transitional National Government, for example, emerged out of a peace conference of Somalia clan leaders in Djibouti in 2000. A number of facts and evidences, however, indicate that individuals who are Islamic fundamentalists dominate the Transitional National Government. Members of the Al-Itihad Al-Islamia security forces and some of their leaders are integrated into the Transitional National Government, although it has repeatedly denied any links to terrorist and Islamic fundamentalist groups.

 

Now in Somalia, much power still lies with the armed factions and warlords and few warlords have recognized the Transitional National Government. Still it seems that, Somalia is an ideal base for the worldwide Islamic Fundamentalist movement. The conditions of persistent civil war make it conducive for this purpose.

 

The Origins, Composition, and developments of Al-Itihad Al-Islamia

 

Al-Itihad Al-Islamia means Islamic union. It has its roots in the Middle East an Arab Countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  Early penetrations to undermine the traditional Islamic school have started in the mid -1960s by a well-known Somali scholar who graduated from Al Madina University in Saudi Arabia by the name of Sheikh Nur Ali Olow. (Adar, 2002: 7-10)

 

According to the Al-Hayat news paper, Al Azhar educational institutions, whether in Somalia or Egypt, have also contributed to the formation of religious scholars who have been greatly influenced by the Islamic Brotherhood movement, which enjoyed a considerable number of followers inside Egypt. They produced leaders from terrorist groups in Somalia like Sheikh Mohamed Moallim Hassan, a graduate of Azhar, who laid the foundation of Islamic fundamentalist movement in Somalia.  The growth of politicized Islam has taken place during the socialist era of Siad Barre rule in opposition to scientific socialism.  This has taken the form of an underground movement, mostly founded by Saudi Arabia and Gulf Islamic Organizations.

 

The Islamic fundamentalist political recruitment, during this period, has gained new growth through opportunities offered by Saudi Arabia Academic Educational Institutions specialized in Wahabia Islamic teaching.  Wahabia has an underlying political indoctrination based on the philosophy of Islamic renewal, which has become the spring source for the current expansion of International Islamic Fundamentalism as is observed in Somalia. (Ibid.)

 

The civil war in Somalia, now ranging for over a decade, has left the country to be a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism of all tendencies and for its open political advocacy, thriving on the assistance given by Islamic charity organizations from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, Yemen, Libya and other Arab Gulf countries, such as Kuwait, UAE and Qatar, mainly exploiting the conditions of misery and poverty in Somalia.  This has enabled Islamic fundamentalist trends to consolidate and boost Islamic extremist political ambitions.  Through these connections, a network of close ties has been developed with all International Islamic fundamentalist groups in Europe, North America, Australia and Some from Far East countries like Pakistan and Malaysia (Adar, 2002: 12-16).

 

In 1967, in Southern Somalia the anti-western reaction formed Islamic radical group called Al-Ahal.  The Al-Ahal broke up in to two groups, Attakfir and Assalafiya.  In Northern-Western Somalia, the anti-western reaction culminated in the creation of Muslim Youth Union (Wahdada) by a group of religious figures in Hargeisa in late 1960s.  Assalafia and the Muslim Youth Union merged in a meeting held in Burao in 1984, and jointly gave birth to a new group to be known as the Al-Itihad Al-Islamia and the Southern Gedo region became its base.  Several other groups such as Al Islah remained outside of Al-Itihad, even though it had generally common objectives (Ibid.).

A fertile ground such as extreme poverty, destitution, disease and ignorance helped Al-Itihad’s take over Somalia in 1991.  It involved in the business sector, and set up trade network. It established many profitable businesses such as banks, import-export trading companies, shopping centers, small industries, telecommunications, transport networks, relief organizations and well-financed religious schools (not traditional Koranic schools).

According to former member of AL-Itihad since the beginning of 1991, Al-Itihad's approach was by means of violence (armed struggle) to realize its aims and has showed a rapid development in terms of manpower, logistical supply and area of control. Islamic groups in the Middle East have provided huge amount of funds to Al- Itihad. This is one of the main factors that enabled Al-Itihad to grow fast. Al-Itihad has organized itself militarily and politically in six wings such as Mogadishu, Hiran and Lower Shebelle, Lower Juba (Kismayo), the Gedo region, the northern Punt land, the Somaliland republic, and the Ethiopian Somali Region (extension of the Gedo region). The development and expansion of its political, military and economic influence in the period 1991-1997 has generally been characterized by two main phases of progress.  In the period from 1991 to 1993, it embarked on offensive policies, preparation for armed confrontation with the Somali warlords.  In the period from 1993 to 1997 its emphasis was on massive political campaign and intensive military operations within Somalia and in other Horn area, especially in Ethiopia.

 

Objectives, Methods, and Tactics of Al Itihad Al Islamia

 

            According to internal memos the ideological and political basis of the Al-Itihad encompass religious interpretation of world history, total rejection of the existing world order, total denial the basic rights of women and the individual, total intolerance of non Muslim believers, and the rejection of common (universal) human values. The prime objective of Al Itihad Al Islasma is to establish an Islamic state in the image of Iran or Afghanistan in the Horn of Africa. The ultimate objective is changing all constitutional or democratic states in the world to Islamic States.

In order to promote its objectives, the Al Itihad organization has relatively flat hierarchy enabling it to decide quickly. It is also intended to help communicate effectively. The structure is top down and has two important wings: the military and religious wings. The military wing is structured to carry out all kinds of sabotages and the religious wing does the political work. (See structural organization below).

 

 

 

 

Organizational Structure of the Al-Itihad

 

 
 

Chairman

 
 

Vice Chairman

 
 

Executive Committee

 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Secretary

 
 

Military Division

 
 

Explosives

 
 

Logistics

 
 

Communications

 
 

Administration & Finance

 
 

Intelligence

 
 

Religious Affairs Division

 
 

Intelligence Division

 
 

External Relations Division

 
 

Regional Administration Division

 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: A Document, which was obtained during the Battle of Luqe, in 1997.

 

However, the Al Itihad al Islamia has not been able to sustain its operations due to the traditional clan structure of the Somali people, depriving of its strength and unity of purpose.

 

According to some unclassified sources, Al Itihad formulated a strategy, which defined most of its activities.  Al-Itihad apparently concluded that for a number of reasons Somali Society was not yet ready for Islamic rule. It has now designed a long-term strategy of educating and preparing Somali Society, with emphasis on an Islamic education.  This strategy entailed the establishment or expansion of Islamic schools and relief centers (e.g. Pakistan’s Madrasa) this was usually achieved through external Islamic aid agencies (non-government organizations), which possessed the funding to provide quality schools (in Arabia), free lunches, and other benefits to local populations.

 

The provision of services to desperately poor local communities destined them local support; instruction of Arabic language was valued as a potential ticket out of Somalia to work in the Gulf region.  This tactic has made it to some extent difficult to distinguish between those who are simply committed to a fair political agenda and those groups who are using Islamic schools as a means to deeper Islamization in order to create a conducive base to the formation of an Islamic State in Somalia.

 

Military sources indicate that, Al Itihad members are oriented to integrate into local communities.  Members generally stay in their own clan areas, shaved their beards to avoid suspicious, and kept out of local politics, often at the explicit request of local elders.  It is also important to point out that it is difficult to discern the difference between very strict, devoted Somali Muslims and political radicals. According to some ex-officials of Al-Itihad, in addition to the above general approaches, the following tactics have actively been in place since the 1990s:

 

· Taking over the traditional Islamic institutions such as Mosques, Koranic and other religious schools and institutes, by bribing or brain washing the traditional Sheiks gradually,

· Creating Islamic NGO’s who enjoy the financial support of the Arab World,

· Creating new type of clan leaders of their own; chiefs, and sultans,

· Establishing financial institutions, money transfer system and other trading institutions that overwhelmingly dominate the trade and financial system in the Somali speaking regions;

· Persuading the youth for joining their ranks through financial support, and by giving them scholarships to study at religious Islamic universities abroad.

· Paying great attention and effort to get the support of the prominent clan religious leaders and politicians, or at neutralizing them.

· Integrating into local communities and clans, and working within legitimate (traditional) sectors as teachers, health workers, merchants, journalists, and judicial structures to ward a long-term goal of preparing Somalia for eventual Islamic rule. This has been practiced for the last five years.

 

 External Relations and Economic Resources of Al-Itihad Al-Islamia

 

Al-Itihad is believed to have a strong external relation and economic resource for the realization of its objectives. In November 2001, Ethiopian authorities closed some branches of Somali remittance organizations while investigating possible ties to international terrorist groups. A senior Ethiopian official (after the September 11, 2001 World Trade Centre in New York attack) stated that the Government of Ethiopia has “documents and pictures of dead bodies of Arabs” captured during the Ethiopian military operations against Al-Itihad Al-Islamia testifying this.  President Bush of the USA included Al-Itihad to the list of terrorist groups and ordered the freezing of its assets.  The Ethiopian Government also has taken the same measure on Al-Barakaat, Somali Business which is believed to have connections with Al-Itihad and Al-Qaeda.

According to unclassified sources, members of Al-Itihad have taken part in terrorist activities in various places alongside international terrorists. Member of this group have taken military training in the Sudan and Afghanistan.  In 1994, nine members of Alqauda infiltrated Somalia and provided a training service for one year.  Most of the Al-Itihad’s leaders have taken ‘religious’ education in religious institutions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and the Sudan.

 

According to some ex-officials of Al-Itihad, members of the transitional terrorist groups had taken part in the fighting, which took place in the Ogaden and Gedo areas and some of them were killed during the fighting.

 

According to some sources the Sudanese National Islamic Front, the Islamic Army of Yemen and the Islamic Jihad of Egypt have connections with Al-Itiahd. Members of these terrorist groups have entered Somalia and have provided material support such as medicines, clothes, food and other materials. Additionally, these terrorist groups provided military equipments to Al-Itihad. Some organizations, NGO’s in the Middle East have supported financially Al-Itihad through different mechanisms such as business trading, relief and aid.

 

According to internal memos Al-Itihad has recruited businessmen and encouraged members to enter business themselves in order to expand its resource bases.  The main source of income for Al-Itihad is the business activity it carries out in the trade sector.  The organization does not have a business entity registered by its own name.  Nonetheless, it has been engaged in transport, construction, express postal service, and hotel businesses in Somalia, through its members, and under the cover of other individuals.  It also collects income by exporting cattle, goats, sheep and other livestock abroad .Members residing in Arab Countries, North America, Europe and Africa are the sources of money for Al-Itihad, too

 

AL-Itihad Al-Islamia and Ethiopia.

 

Islamic Movements in Ethiopia

 

Islam expanded gradually in Ethiopia, especially in the low land parts of the country.  Ethiopian Muslims belong to indigenous ethnic groups.  Before 1991, Muslims were treated as secondary citizens and experienced discrimination.  The Derg regime discouraged all religions. The current Government came to power in 1991 and has encouraged cordial Christian-Muslim relations. The present Government understands the need to build a secular political system based on religious tolerance. [Shinn, 2002:2].

 

As a result of the way Islam has developed in Ethiopia and due to more effort by the present government, to avoid religious conflict, Ethiopian Muslims are generally not receptive to Islamic Fundamentalism. They rather identify themselves with their ethnic kin, and are geographically intermixed except for Somali and Afar inhabited areas.  Although the supreme Islamic Council is an important organization, political power among Ethiopian Muslims tends to be decentralized. [Ibid].

 

The 1994 census indicates that there are 14.3 million Muslims in Ethiopia or about 29 percent of the total population. The same census places the Ethiopian Orthodox percentage at about 52 percent.  In recent survey of the Islamic populations around the world, the International Population Center at San Diego State University reported that Ethiopia’s Muslim population is 29 million. Although there are Islamic movements within the Ethiopian Muslim communities it can be said that there is no serious danger or threat to Christian. Muslins and Christians have lived together peacefully. [Ibid.].

 

Apart from the large Muslim population in Ethiopia, the existence of close ethnic, religious and linguistic affiliation of the people in eastern Ethiopia to people in the Somalia, in particular, has created a conducive ground for Al-Itihad to penetrate its Ideology and to deploy its armed forces in this part of our country. Unlike the previous regimes in Ethiopia, thousands of Somali refugees entered Ethiopia and were received as welcome guests. Although too early to conclude, it is possible to assume that this give the benefit of dramatically changing the perception of people to people relations between the two countries. Ethiopian policy of peace and cooperation meanwhile suffered a set back. Al-Itihad launched a series of attacks in the Somali Region and in different towns of eastern Ethiopia and the capital, Addis Ababa, between 1993 and 1995.

 

According to unclassified sources Wahabian faith activists are operating in Ethiopia and are responsible for the loss of life and destruction of property in the country. The movement has centered on spreading its mission by force. Subsequently, Al-Itihad used Wahabism as a basis of its Islamist teaching. This teaching contradict with the teaching of traditional Islam. Wahabias provoked disturbances (According to the report of the Central Investigation Department) in different parts of the country including the following:

§          §         in 1994 and 1995 in Dessie town at different mosques;

§          §         in 1998, 1990 and 2000 in Kombolcha town at different mosques;

§          §         in 1999 in Kemissie and Bati towns;

§          §         in 1998, 1999 and 2000 in the city of Gonder;

§          §         in 1999 in Bahir Dar city;

§          §         in 1995 in Addis Ababa at the Grand Anwar Mosque, where clashes that was initiated by Wahabia resulted in loss of life and destruction of property.

 

Terrorist Activities carried out by Al-Itihad Al-Islamia against Ethiopia

According to Al-Itihad activists Ethiopia is perceived as a country predominantly settled by Moslems but ruled by minority Christians. The two tapes that the Ethiopian army captured in the Luq battlefield and the captured insurgents who were members of the Al-Itihad leadership testified this attitude in the following manner:

 According to unclassified sources the main targets of Al Itihad [see Ch.III] is to establish Islamic states in the Horn of Africa. It believes to assume power through armed struggle; strengthen its ties with the International Extreme Islamic Groups for financial support in order to stabilize the backing of its power, and to block democratic forces from taking power in Horn countries. In general, Al Itihad aims at disturbing the stability of the countries neighboring Somalia, especially Ethiopia and Kenya. At the end of 1992, Al-Itihad, in close coordination with the Ogden National Liberation Front (ONLF) launched attacks in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Al Itihad began to attack Ethiopia in 1997. A large Al Itihad force, including members of International extremist elements launched attacks in Ethiopia in the border towns Luq, Dolo and Gedo.  In the Horn region, Ethiopia is a country, which has suffered more from the Somali terrorism. Some of the terrorist attacks launched by Al Itihad on Ethiopia are:

 

 

Ÿ The bomb attack on Ghion and Wabi Shebele Hotel in Addis Ababa, 1997;

Ÿ The attempted assassination against minister of Transport and Communication Dr. Abdulmejid Hussein ,1998;

Ÿ The bomb attack on Dire Dawa and Harrar Ras Hotels;

Ÿ The attempted assassination against military officers and civilians in Jijiga;

Ÿ  Repeated land mine assaults on roads in Jijiga, Harrar and Drie Dawa;

Ÿ Bomb attacks and killings in Gode, Degehabour, Kebridehar and Warder on the civilian passengers and military, government vehicles and on Ethio-Djibouti Railway. 

The above terrorist attacks that were carried out by Al Itihad resulted in the killing of 27 people, 34 wounded persons and the destruction of property. Recently five of the terrorists have been sentenced to death and the other five to long term jail ranging from five to twenty-five years by the Ethiopian Federal High Court (The Ethiopian Herald, April12, 02,p.1).

In 1996, Ethiopia decided to destroy Al-Itihad's military wings near its border. After a short period of battles, Al-Itihad was effectively dislodged from the area. The 1997 military defeat of the Al-Itihad in Gedo was considered as a turning point. Now it seems that Ethiopia sees the current Transitional National Government (TNG) in Mogadishu as a Trojan horse for Al-Itihad.

 

Current Trends and Tactics of Al-Itihad Al-Islamia

 

Military sources indicate that after its establishment, Al-Itihad used violence as a means or method to achieve power.  Following the collapse of the Somali State in early 1991, Al-Itihad attempted to take over the port of Bosaso on the North Coast and won Merka and Kismayo in the South and controlled Luuq in the Gedo region in 1991.  The strategy of Al-Itihad in its seizure of Gedo region was to make inland linkages between Al-Itihad in Somalia and those in North Eastern District of Kenya.  At the end of 1992, Al-Itihad launched attacks in the Somali region of Ethiopia and as mentioned earlier it carried out a number of terrorist attacks and explosions in Addis Ababa and other cities between 1993 and 1996.

 

According to the former member of the AL-Itihad after a short period of combats with Ethiopian troops Al-Itihad incurred a series of defeats. Disagreements among the leaders, and continuous clashes with other groups in Somalia resulted in most of its former armed members to lay down their arms and return to their villages of origin.  Others have submitted to the regional government in the Somalia state of Ethiopia and other factions. Many of the top Al-Itihad leaders have retreated to their traditional hideaway, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.  Many of the mid level leaders have been relocated in areas away from their habitual residence.  Some of the top and mid level leaders have entered to the transitional government.

 

According to the internal memos, after Al-Itihad failed in its earlier attempts to exert control over the territory in Somalia and the Somalia region of Ethiopia, by the 1998 Al-Itihad, decided to focus on a new orientation and strategy; still maintaining the military training camps. It concluded that Somalia was not yet ready for Islamic rule. And instead it focused on long- term strategy that included:

§          §         promoting education in fundamentalist Islam by working within clans and other traditional, religious institutions to avoid the problems it experienced when it tried to work across them;

§          §          Increasing ties with traders, and infiltrating existing governmental organizations rather than seizing power. Members of Al-Itihad are recruited for defense, security, police, and other institutions of the transitional government and at present leading members of Al-Itihad have been appointed to different positions of power in which they considered it as opportunity to pursue their goals in a manner of Turabi’s strategy.