Towards a Common Ageda for 21^st Century Ethiopia

By Getachew Mequanent

Introduction

Next September, Ethiopia enters a new century with good prospects for development. Different sources have confirmed the robust growth of the economy.[1] There has been progress in the social sector as well, including an increase in school enrolment; expansion of health services; and reduced vulnerability of peasants to famine. On April 10, 2007, Walta Information Centre reported that Ethiopia “has reportedly been selected to make presentation on its successes towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at an international high-level conference to be held in Geneva”.[2]

Ethiopia also faces many challenges. Millions of people go hungry everyday. Corruption is rampant. The masses of the people remain excluded from decision-making processes. Politics is undeveloped. Institutions of federalism and parliamentary democracy are not strong or lack capacity. The income gap between rich and poor is widening. Agriculture remains subjected to the vagaries of weather. National identity is threatened. The rate of environmental degradation is high. These are examples of the issues and challenges that Ethiopians will face in the new century.

A common agenda for Ethiopia then means that all of us, as stakeholders, have an interest in addressing the issues and challenges that will be confronted by the Ethiopian people in the 21^st century. It means initiating discussions that make sense and are fruitful. It means mobilizing ideas and resources and uniting behind the efforts of Ethiopians to lift themselves out of poverty. Development is not a partisan political agenda. Development – social, economic, political, cultural and institutional - is a common agenda.

This piece, written from a personal/Diaspora perspective, presents outlines of what I felt are some of the issues that serve as common agendas. The piece combines my usual “commentary” approach and scholarship thinking. Following are the issues considered:

I. Relating to our past positively

II. Ensuring continuity of societal changes

III. Overcoming intellectual dishonesty

IV. Revitalizing our values

V. Unifying the Ethiopian Diaspora

VI. Reformation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church

VII. Building local civil society

VIII. Monitoring economic growth

IX. Understanding the multidimensionality of rural development

X. Cultural Policy

XI. Enhancing public security

XII. Foreign policy

While there are proposals/suggestions/ideas, where possible, my main task is to provide brief descriptions of the issues. The following are what I feel are the most important proposals/suggestions/ideas identified in this piece (listed in no order of importance):

Gender

1) The strengthening of existing national agencies and programs to support initiatives that work towards the removal of multiple barriers of women’s participation in society.

Public participation

2) Encouragement and support for institutes, firms, civil society organizations and other independent analysts which can conduct and analyze public opinion polls and surveys to inform decision-makers, the Ethiopian public and other stakeholders of emerging trends and issues in society.

Unifying the Diaspora

3) The establishment of Diaspora Peace and Reconciliation Committee to organize and lead peace and reconciliation processes among different Ethiopian Diaspora political groups and between those Diaspora groups and Ethiopian major political parties.

Church reform

4) To be more relevant for 21^st century society, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church integrates modern ideas into its teachings and practices, as well as expands its role beyond the spiritual domain to address social and justice issues in different realms of society; and

5) The creation of a post-secondary Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church institute accredited with awarding diplomas and degrees.

Civil society

6) A national program that provides funding and training for the creation, growth and sustainability of local civil society organizations that advocate policies and play oversight roles of the state, markets and other agencies of Ethiopian society.

Economic development

7) Decentralization of economic intelligence agencies to improve the collection and analysis of information that helps to identify and correct negative trends in the growth and sustainability of Ethiopian economy;

8) A national program of research that maps out industrial development strategies and options; and

9) A national policy that supports programs intended to provide safety nets for the poor, elderly, disabled people and all those who cannot work.

Rural development

10) A national program of multidisciplinary research intended to a) study existing settlement patterns and develop innovative approaches including appropriate engineering technologies for the construction of rural houses and facilities, and b) agricultural production enhancing technologies; and

11) To protect Ethiopia’s diverse ecosystems, the promotion of reforestation programs focused on the plantation/and preservation of indigenous tree species along with appropriate and effective soil and water conservation systems.

Cultural policy

12) The formulation and adoption of cultural policy that fosters the retention, promotion and preservation of Ethiopia’s diverse cultural, historical and natural heritages; and

13) Support for national programs that raise awareness of the geography, history and diversity of Ethiopia including incentives for the acquisition of different Ethiopian language capacities.

Security

14) To protect national and international interests, and in light of the volatile security situation in the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopian government increases defence spending to provide adequate resources for the overhauling of the whole military, intelligence and police apparatus. The public security apparatus has a loophole and it needs immediate fixing.

Foreign policy

15) Study the Italian Diaspora model – that the Italian Diaspora electing their own Diaspora representatives to the Italian parliament - and other transnational citizenship models to explore the possibility of allowing Diaspora Ethiopians to participate directly in Ethiopian electoral processes;

16) The acknowledgement by the Ethiopian parliament of Ras Teferians living in different part of the world as people of Ethiopian origin and grant them the same rights and privileges as other people of Ethiopian origin living in different parts of the world;

17) Increasing the presence of Ethiopian embassy and consular offices around the world to protect the rights and dignity of Ethiopians living and working in different countries; and

18) Prior to writing a blueprint foreign policy towards Eritrea, commission a study to help better understand historical and existing relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and that, in terms of thinking, foreign policy aims to strengthen historical and lineage ties, as well as encourage economic and political union.

I. Relating to our past positively

We would better appreciate our experiences in the past if we conceptualize and articulate them in broader perspectives. Two classical theories of sociology are presented here as examples. The first theory is called structural functionalism. First proposed by the 19^th century French philosopher Emile Durkheim, this theory argues that existing patterns of social relations in society would work well and that their transformation must be incremental, carefully managed to avoid disturbing the status quo; for example, rapid changes could lead to communal conflicts and civil war. Emperor Haile Sellassie was cautious to touch the status quo, but perhaps too cautious to challenge a powerful feudal class that kept blocking his piecemeal, incremental reforms. As Ethiopia lagged behind development, and when poverty and famine engulfed the society, the Emperor became discredited, deposed and later murdered by military officers who represented a generation of frustrated educated elites.

The other theory, called conflict theory, originated from the Marxian school of thought and it argues that societies are always in a state of conflict as different classes of people compete for power and status. Conflicts in society provide opportunities for initiating changes. What is need is not an incremental change (gradual transformation of the status quo), but an understanding of the dynamics of relationships of social, economic and political power in society and facilitating the forces of change to transform them. Nonetheless, most revolutions often produce rapid changes and bring about undesirable consequences. History is full of examples including the 1974 Ethiopian revolution: political anarchy, civil war, repression, torture, murder, economic crisis, massive population displacement, the list can go on.

These two sociological theories could be complemented by another two competing lines of thinking in the field of planning science. The first is called comprehensive planning and it espouses the idea that everything can be done at once provided that there are sufficient resources. Comprehensive planning is about thinking and planning big like Dergue’s ye aser amet meri eqid (Ten-Year Comprehensive Plan) or EPRDF’s current Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). The second planning model is called incrementalism. This model emphasizes an incremental, step-by-step approach to promoting new changes instead of attempting to do everything at once. Propagators of this approach argue that it is not easy to construct a new order, as it is to dismantle it.³ As argued below, the Ethiopian society encounters political groups that aspire to dismantle the older order, as if it is easy to replace it.

II. Ensuring continuity of societal changes

Inducing, creating or causing change is one thing, managing it to produce positive results is quite another. In the past 30 years, Ethiopians saw the emergence of political movements that would strive to undo what is already done. In 1974, a group of young military officers seized state power and began promoting radical ideas of change. They created an atmosphere of hope and optimism for the poor masses that, in turn, trusted them and organized themselves around the officers’ political motto of ethiopia tikedem (Ethiopia First). Things suddenly turned around for the worst when the officers decided to execute 60 high-ranking government officials and the Emperor himself. They refuse to leave power. This angered civilian groups including the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP) which opted to wage unsuccessful urban guerrilla war. At the same time, Somalia had invaded the eastern part of Ethiopia. The young officers got into a business of military planning and so crushed any group that stood on their way of acquiring and exercising state power. They created one of the most brutal regimes of the 20^th century.

Nevertheless, Dergue, the regime created by the young military officers, takes the credit for radically transforming the Ethiopian state and society in the 20^th century through land reform measures; literacy programs; creation of planning discipline; inclusive party politics (as opposed to personalized feudal politics); and creating a sense of oneness through well orchestrated nationalist propaganda, such as “revolutionary Ethiopia or death”. Yet, beneath all this were growing ethnic nationalisms fomented by decades of grievances for cultural respect and recognition of regional autonomy. The Eritreans, Tigreans, Oromos and other ethnic groups had taken up arms to fight against the Ethiopian central state. Dergue’s regime would be overthrown by EPRDF in 1991.

EPRDF elites has a chance to build on what Dergue has achieved. Instead, they entered Addis Ababa with their own plan. The first plan was to facilitate Eritrean independence. In his recent interview with the Financial Times, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi conceded that EPRDF “had fully accepted the independence of Eritrea” before it seized power.⁴ The second plan was to create a federal state. EPRDF wrote a federal constitution and imposed it from above without consulting the Ethiopian people. It also dismissed or demoted qualified career bureaucrats for their association with Dergue’s Workers Party and this further eroded the capacity of Ethiopian state.

However, EPRDF had a good development vision. Its plan for a “big-push” approach⁵ – first the Agricultural Led Development Industrialization (ALDI) and the current PASDEP plan – has registered promising results. Yet, there are opposition forces vying to seize political power and then undo what EPRDF has done. Among them are some Diaspora-based extremist groups that have deployed their resources to wage round-the-clock propaganda dissemination campaign in order to discredit everything that EPRDF is doing. This vicious circle must not continue. It is time that Ethiopian opposition elites think positively and gather their energy to define an agenda that provides a framework for visioning alternative policies. That is why we fully support the United Ethiopian Democratic Party-Medhin (UEDP-Medhin)’s “third way” approach to politics, whereby an opposition party appreciates sound policies and practices and criticizes and rejects bad and unwanted ones.

With the exception of few who would accept the Ethiopian federal constitution at face value (i.e., it is perfect), I have not come across anyone who has fully endorsed it. And no constitution in history was written to perfection. The Swiss federation, regarded by many as a good example, has been modified several times since its creation in 1848. Nothing prevents Ethiopians from doing the same. The removal of the famous Article 39 (which allows the succession of ethnic groups) from the constitution or the redrawing of regional boundaries could be achieved through peaceful and democratic processes.

Two years after the May 2005 election, we still debate to determine what had gone wrong during that historic election: death of 193 civilians and six police officers; imprisonment of the entire leadership of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP); polarization of Ethiopian society; tarnishing of the country’s international image; and so on. What has been missing in our debate is the lack of consideration of the positive outcomes of the election. For instance, opposition parties have increased their parliamentary seats to 172 from 12 seats in 2000. The ruling and opposition parties have continued to talk about the rules and procedures governing the Ethiopian parliament including the restructuring of the National Election Board of Ethiopia. Heated parliamentary debates are quite common, although opposition politicians remain frustrated that the ruling parity does not take them seriously. These are examples of measures of progress towards democratization. The EPRDF leadership must do more to meet its commitment to promoting parliamentary democracy by recognizing and respecting the mandate of opposition parties – which is ensuring accountability. It must listen to people’s voices including persistent calls for the release from prison of opposition politicians and others who were arrested during the 2005 post-election crisis.

III. Overcoming intellectual dishonesty

The work of intellectuals is to theorize and communicate rational explanations of societal phenomena, such as changes in social systems, economy and culture. We were taught that intellectual work began in ancient Greece, more particularly, with the treatises of Plato (400 B.C.) and Aristotle (300 B.C.). The difference in the thinking of these two ancient philosophers also remains a perfect example of how intellectual discourse evolves overtime. For example, Plato promoted a republic ruled by a wise and virtuous man, the philosopher king. Aristotle favoured a middle class democracy; while sympathetic to the causes of the poor, he was not comfortable with the idea of rule by tyranny of the majority (the masses) (perhaps he would have been concerned that the masses would go after the oligarchy and rich people to take revenge). Of course, one of Aristotle’s students Alexander the Great destroyed every democratic entity in Greek and set about to conquer the world.

Intellectual dishonesty is caused by violations of standards of values and norms that guide rational explanations of societal phenomena. Or, to use the definition of Encyclopedia, intellectual dishonesty means “the advocacy of a position known to be false. Rhetoric is used to advance an agenda or to reinforce one's deeply held beliefs in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence”.⁶ There are consequences for society if intellectual dishonesty influences or attempts to influence the perception of other people including political and institutional actors, ordinary citizens and international society. Ethiopia has this problem. To provide examples of results from the influences of intellectual dishonesty:

1) When Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to displace the Union of Islamic Court radical militia, the Western media carried headline stories claiming that Christian Ethiopia went to war with Muslim Somalia. The other Ethiopians, Muslims who represent 50% of the population, were not mentioned. Certainly journalists did not get this information from EPRDF whose political ideology embodies cultural and religious diversity. The information might have originated from some educated elites who go around hotels and restaurants in Addis Ababa to feed foreigners with “analyses” of issues and information that distort reality.

2) There was a story (real or imagined) that TPLF dropped “oppression by Amharas” from its political vocabulary when its forces entered Gondar and Gojam. The Tigrean cadres had found out that the peasants in Gondar and Gojam were living in medieval times just as their relatives did back in Tigray. Even then, during the 2005 election, some angry TPLF politicians and supporters lashed out against their CUDP opponents by saying “Amharas” (oppressors).

3) Until recently, if you had taken a bus to Gondar from Addis Ababa, any sign of modernization would have stopped once you had entered the Abay (Nile) gorge to cross to Gojam. One should not be surprised with this reality. Ethiopian governments in the 20^th century were committed to developing Addis Ababa. In this instance, the Oromo areas in Central Ethiopia at least had a chance to benefit from the trickledown effects of this policy, such as access to modern schools, health facilities, electricity and employment in the state and private sectors. Yet, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and some Oromo politicians often talk about how, historically, Ethiopian governments extracted resources from the Oromia region to the benefits of “Abyssinians”. The fact is that millions of “Abyssinian” taxpayers died of famine and disease in the 20^th century because of central government neglect.

4) Some opponents of EPRDF accuse Tigreans of enjoying the exclusive benefits of EPRDF policies, while knowing that Tigray, like other regions of Northern Ethiopia, still remains poor and underdeveloped.

5) If “A” represents the pre-1991 status quo and “B” the post-1991 status quo, and if “B” is 10, 15 or 20 times greater than “A”, then my seven years old son understands that EPRDF has done a good job. Many among the opposition and some “prominent” intellectuals deny that nothing good is happening in Ethiopia even to the extent of criticizing donor officials for planning programs that aid the poor. Politics can be more interesting, relevant and inspiring by focusing on public policy and accountability issues, such as social policies, economic policies, environmental policies, agricultural policies, industrial policies, population policies, foreign policy, etc; why some policies work better than others and the role that is played by the leadership of EPRDF; or why Prime Minister Meles Zenawi appointed his guerrilla buddies Arkebe Iqubay and Bereket Simon to ministerial positions.

6) There is no question that Ethiopia is one of the countries suffering from corruption. It is now a conventional wisdom, for example, to give cash for a bureaucrat for a service rendered by the state or a certain portion of a loan for a bank manager when someone gets his/her loan request approved. Yet, in writing about corruption, many writers put the blame on EPRDF officials (perhaps to imply that they steal money?), instead of holding greedy and irresponsible elites accountable. By blaming EPRDF, they encourage and nurture a culture of corruption.

7) As we enter the 21^st century, Dergue is fading away from the annals of history. And we continue to talk about brutality and fascism under 17 years of Dergue rule. I myself might have written “brutal military regime” hundreds of times in my entire academic life. Another fact is that Dergue’s policies had supported national programs that brought about far-reaching changes including land reform and literacy. Deliberately ignoring the positive contributions of Dergue to Ethiopian society is perhaps a perfect example of intellectual dishonesty of our time.

8) Finally, after EPRDF came to power in 1991, powerful intellectual groups, unaccustomed to rule by elites outside of central Ethiopia, unleashed systematic and sophisticated propaganda against EPRDF including character assassination of the leaders. Their arguments centred around two main issues: a) Ethiopia is ruled by a minority ethnic group and b) the country is divided and in the verge of total disintegration. One should have no objection to their views, as they are entitled to express them. The issue is their lack of rationality. When we were children, our fathers and mothers relied on traditional arbitrary systems (for whatever they worth) to govern themselves, while Emperor Haile Sellassie and his ruling clique led lavish lifestyles in Addis Ababa. Dergue’s peasant associations extended the legal system to rural areas, but these associations lost legitimacy because of their instrumentality for political repression. EPRDF completed this process by strengthening the capacity of peasant (kebele) associations and integrating rural needs to the functions of public service agencies. Today communities across Ethiopia have been brought under the Ethiopian government administration. Federalism also brought together community representatives around the country to sit in a national parliament. Taking up public policy and accountability issues under EPRDF rule is legitimate, but to continue to argue that a minority ethnic group rules Ethiopia, or that Ethiopia is disintegrating, makes politics less relevant.

IV. Revitalizing our values

We could easily overcome intellectual dishonesty if we revitalize our values. They include, among other things, honesty, loyalty, mutual trust, mutual respect, integrity, transparency, civility, decency, generosity and all those values whose influences define who we are and sustain the social and cultural fabrics of our communities. If you conduct a survey among Ethiopians about their perception of educated elites, the responses could be: greedy, corrupt, dishonest, liar, vulgar, rude, opportunist, ferenji (Westerner), unreligious, lazy, uncompromising, autocratic/repressive and unpatriotic. And Ethiopians experience all this in their daily lives. For example, the bureaucracy is known for its notoriety of corruption and harassment. Humiliations and verbal and physical abuses at the hands of doctors and nurses are so common that Ethiopians no longer bother to talk about their experiences in hospitals and clinics. Nor do our human rights groups look beyond middle class issues (state power, free speech, free media, etc.) to defend the rights and dignity of ordinary Ethiopians.

In order to progress in the 21^st century, we need to promote the values of tolerance, positive dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. We need to overcome what Dessalegn Asfaw (pen name) calls “dysfunctional behaviors” of public conduct.⁷ He wrote, “endless feuding and infighting from the grassroots level on upwards have made it difficult for Ethiopians to attain the organic solidarity necessary to build and sustain the institutions necessary for democracy”. By scaring decent Ethiopians away from public domain, incompetent elites and their cadres take control of the political process, only to make a mockery of it.

We need to promote values that make societal institutions more inclusive and participatory. The issue here is that the Ethiopian masses are increasingly excluded in the development process. For example, in 1997, I found out that peasants would not be elected to a Woreda executive committee, because they could not write and read. The Ethiopian constitution does not say that an acquisition of modern education is a requirement for participation in key decision-making processes. Thirty years ago, it was perhaps unimaginable for a member of Ethiopian parliament to ask for an interpreter or a translation device, since all members of parliament were expected to speak Amharic. Today interpreters and translation devices are widely available because members of parliament are able to communicate in their mother tongues. Local governance systems must be tailored in the same way to create an enabling environment for citizens’ participation.

We need to improve the political profession. Many Ethiopians who enter politics are amateur politicians who, as Tecola Hagos points out, lack adequate experience in engaging citizens in the structures and processes of public domain.⁸ A web site called Ethiolion also once wrote to remind us the importance of knowing the backgrounds of Ethiopian political personalities.⁹ It wrote, “the lack of such tradition in our political culture has denied the Ethiopian society from appreciating the danger lurking behind the unknown personal background of these [Ethiopian] political actors”. This should also include the selection of members. Ethiopian political groups let anyone get involved without questioning whether an individual is fit for public life; as a result, we always see, for example, some supporters of Diaspora groups getting organized as gangsters to go around and intimidate their critics.

We need to promote the participation of women in Ethiopian society. In reading government press releases or project announcements, rarely do I come across a name of a woman, which is a clear indication of women’s inadequate institutional representation. The interesting thing is that we have leaders who rode to power on the backs of young Ethiopian women (who were guerrilla fighters). True, nearly 50% of members of parliament for EPRDF are female and there are female-headed ministerial and other high portfolios. But the overall status of Ethiopian women has changed little. For example, has family violence been reduced or social and cultural barriers removed? The Ethiopian government should strengthen existing national agencies and programs to support initiatives that overcome multiple barriers of women’s participation in society.

We need to promote values and systems that respect the voices of the Ethiopian people. In Western societies, for example, firms and research institutes work year-round to gather and analyze public opinion polls on politics or policy and program results. Heads of civil servants and political bosses line up their own analysts to analyze the poll data and find out whether or not citizens are happy or what the current issues are. For example, the issues (read = public complaints) can range from heavy fines for speed driving and a tax increase on alcoholic beverages to lack of sufficient funding for social programs and environment to foreign policy. Yet, people have different opinions at different times, so that someone who responds positively to the opposition party this month may change his/her mind next month to support the ruling party. In contrast, we, Ethiopians, are expected to pledge our support to a political party and keep it that way for a long time, perhaps for years to come. To support an opposition this week and switch to EPRDF next month, and vice versa, is almost a crime. To give another example, during American or Canadian elections, it is common for public polls to show undecided voters, sometimes up to 30%, up to the last day of election. In contrast, we are expected to make up our minds for 2010 election! I hope you understood the point here. And all this is not a hypothetical example. It happens to us and affects our lives by denying us the right to make informed choices. The interesting thing in all of this is that some of our political elites switch sides whenever they see an opportunity, say, today they are in EPRDF camp and next month they will have defected and joined the Diaspora opposition, and vice versa. Having said all this, the lesson here is that public opinion polls and surveys are means for influencing decision-making processes. It is therefore important that the Ethiopian government encourages and supports institutes, firms, civil society organizations and other independent analysts which can conduct and analyze public opinion polls and surveys to inform decision-makers, the Ethiopian public and other stakeholders of emerging trends and issues in society. The 2004 nation-wide pre-election survey by the Initiative Africa (IA) was a good start, but, unfortunately, opposition supporter dismissed it as EPRDF-sponsored initiative.

Finally, we need to set standards of conduct to set limiting conditions on how some Diaspora organizations act in the name of the Ethiopian people. For example, the campaign by the vocal Diaspora against foreign aid; the graphic display on the Diaspora web sites of dead bodies of people in Southern Ethiopia and that of a dead soldier in Mogadishu; Ethiopian Review applauding the massacre of 74 Ethiopian and Chinese oil field workers; the call to boycott the upcoming millennium celebration; dissemination of information that paints a negative image of Ethiopia; and supporting a militant group called Tegbar League to fight security forces on city streets of Ethiopia are examples of actions that do not serve the interest of Ethiopians at home and in the Diaspora.

V. Unifying the Ethiopian Diaspora

In the September 2006 issue of Metroplis World Bulletin, Steven Vetrovec wrote that some governments “broadly see diaspora as good things to engage for various kinds of mutually beneficial activity; at the same time, others believe diaspora are potentially bad things that may do various kinds of harm to national societies”.¹⁰ The Irish and Italians Diaspora provide a good model of Diasporas that have made positive contributions to the political development of their home countries; in fact, the Italian Diaspora elects representatives who sit in the Italian Parliament. The Chinese, Indians, Lebanese, Mexicans, Philippines, Israelis and other Diaspora have done well on the economic development front through financial remittances as well as transfer of skills and knowledge. Organizations that are banned under the US Patriot Act or British Terrorism Act are examples of bad Diaspora.

Although some of us behave badly politically – a large part of which is attributed to overwhelming political emotions – we, in the Ethiopian Diaspora, are decent and hard working people. As one of the largest Diaspora from Sub-Saharan Africa, we provide an increasing level of support for Ethiopian society through remittances, investment and transfer of knowledge, skills and other resources. Citing data from the National Bank of Ethiopia, Bruk Asmellash reports that, from 1997/98 to 2004/05, the Diaspora transferred nearly 11 billion birr or US $1.2 billion.¹¹ This money would be used to meet basic needs (food, shelter and cloth), cover the start-up costs of small businesses, buy real estate, pay for children’s education and so on. In recent years, we have also seen a growing number of professional and project organizations formed to facilitate the transfer of knowledge, skills and resources. For example, in 2006, the Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association sent medical teams that performed 203 surgeries including giving lectures, training and workshops.¹² The Ottawa-based Association for Higher Education and Development (AHEAD) and the Toronto-based People to People Canada (P2P Canada) are examples of project organizations. There are still more and better opportunities to mobilize the Diaspora, such as encouraging professionals to return and work with Ethiopian public and private sectors (thereby transferring skills and knowledge to the Ethiopian workforce) and raising funds to support development initiatives.

The challenge for the Ethiopian Diaspora is how to overcome political divisions that are in large part caused by differences over strategies, not principles. For example, while we agree with the concerns of vocal Diaspora groups about human rights and democratization issues, we do not agree with their choice of strategy. We do not believe that economic sanctions against the EPRDF government or the passage of H.R. 2003 by US legislature will force changes in the policies and practices of EPRDF; in fact, EPRDF leaders are very likely to scorn them off as the work of the Diaspora. We prefer dialogue with Ethiopian civil society and political parties.

In March 2007, Diaspora civil society and church leaders and web site hosts issued a joint declaration for peace and reconciliation.¹³ This is an addition to calls for peaceful dialogue by many other organizations and individuals. The time has come to gather our energy and organize ourselves around a common agenda of peace and reconciliation. To do this, we must first address grievances against all political parties including Dergue, EPRP, MEISON, EPRDF, OLF and others. Grievances are dealt with effectively if we are open and honest to each other. In early 1990s, an Ethiopian human rights activist (whose name remains unanimous) was speaking in Toronto denouncing EPRDF when a man stood up and asked, “why didn’t you speak up against previous regimes?” The defiant human rights activist replied “if a man marries when he is 60 years old, he should not be criticized for deciding to marry later in his life”. To give another example, during one of the public forums hosted by the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD), I listened on the Internet audio as an Oromo spoke about how he had been denied the right to speak his language. The chair of the meeting cut him off and reminded him that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss national affairs. Approaches like these defeat the whole purpose of open and genuine dialogue and reconciliation. South African blacks and whites talked openly and frankly about the evils of the apartheid system, reconciled their histories and experiences and moved on to build a democratic and an egalitarian society.

I rephrase and reproduce two approaches that I had suggested previously to make a proposal. I propose the establishment of Diaspora Peace and Reconciliation Committee. The members of this Committee can be drawn from Ethiopian Diaspora communities, civil society organizations and prominent friends of Ethiopia (Americans, Canadians, British, German, etc.). The Committee should be supported by the resources of Diaspora communities and various programs made available by Western governments and international organizations. It will organize town hall and community meetings, roundtables and focus groups, as appropriate, to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation among political parties in the Diaspora.¹⁴ Secondly, the Committee will facilitate dialogue between Diaspora groups and Ethiopian major political parties; at present, Diaspora groups are isolated from the Ethiopian civil and political society. The Ethiopian government should give its missions abroad a mandate to engage in discussions with Diaspora groups as a first step towards organizing high-level discussions aimed at bringing these groups to the Ethiopian political arena.¹⁵

VI. Reformation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church

The current stalemate between the two spiritual fathers, Abune Merkorios and Abune Paulos, is unfortunate and regrettable. But, let us not get preoccupied too much with this issue and instead focus on a common agenda, which is how to make the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewadeho Church relevant for 21^st century society. Although there are many religious denominations in Ethiopian society, the Orthodox Church still remains the most powerful and influential institution in the lives of Christian Ethiopians. Therefore, if the church lags behind rapid societal changes – such as by not changing outmoded teachings and practices – it could fail to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations. Where we live (the West) provides us with an example. Why do we sometimes see church building put out for sale? Because, church attendance in the West has declined over the years, as the younger generation got less and less interested in religion. Unable to maintain the churches, parishes are selling them. Even then, to progress with time – and, hopefully, to revive the interest of the younger generation – many church groups have transformed their roles to advocate social and justice issues.

Indeed, today church social activism has become a universal phenomenon. For instance, in Latin America, church thinking has been influenced by “liberation theology” - the notion that churches should be concerned with liberating the poor from poverty and political oppression. In Africa, churches have become active in policy advocacy and delivery of basic social services.

To be fair, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church has been able to adopt changes. Today urban churches are run more or less like modern state or private sector organizations integrating hierarchal decision-making structures and financial and human resources administration systems. More must be done to progress with time. Following are examples:

1) The Orthodox Church has not expanded its role beyond the spiritual domain to address social and justice issues in different realms of society, although it has been supporting relief and development work in some part of the country. Like other modern day churches, Ethiopian churches should, for example, organize and lead community meetings around public policy issues or speak out against corruption and human rights violations. As shown later, the dignity and rights of ordinary Ethiopians can be respected if there are local-based oversight entities that monitor the behaviours of the sate, markets and other agencies of society. We acknowledge political constraints – the Ethiopian government does not want churches to go political. On the other hand, today’s generation of politicians know that the role and functions of churches are no longer confined to spiritual domains. Through consultations with the Ethiopian public and government authorities, the Orthodox Church should write clear polices and guidelines that guide, encourage and support local churches to address social and justice issues at grassroots levels.

2) Poverty has resulted in the declining of church morality ranging from priests begging tourists for money to stealing and selling church treasurer. When I visited Lalibela in 1997, I heard that, a week earlier, a monk had been arrested accused of stealing a 15 kg gold cross belonging to one of the churches and selling it to a tourist. If I remember correctly, the cross was later found in Belgium and it was brought back by the Belgium Embassy in Addis Ababa after paying a lot of money. Such problems can be easily prevented if rural priests and monks are provided with livelihoods.

3) Perhaps there are over 10 Werhawi baalat (monthly religious holidays) observed by the followers of the Orthodox Church. If we assume that at least three of them overlap with Saturdays and Sundays, this still leaves us with seven baalat plus four Saturdays plus four Sundays, a total of 15 days of baalat a month. When poor farmers are prevented from working 180 days a years (15 days a month x 12 months), the negative economic impact of this outdated practice is self-evident.

4) To be more relevant for 21^st century society, the Orthodox Church must integrate modern ideas into its teachings and practices. Thanks to St. Augustine (4^th century) and St. Aquinas (13^th century) who reconciled Greek philosophy with the teachings of the bible, Western churches were able to change their teachings and practices early in their history, and by doing so, they ensured the retention of churches’ influence on societal changes throughout history. As a result, for example, today NASA scientists and renowned philosophers attend church masses every Sunday, while it is likely that many Ethiopian intellectuals watch sports or go out for an early drink on a Sunday morning. Fortunately, the church now produces its own intellectuals who are able to use their newly acquired scholarship skills to integrate modern ideas with traditional teachings and practices.

5) Finally, to preserve the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church teachings and traditions for the next millennium, all stakeholders including governments, churches and education institutions should join hands to create a post-secondary Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church institute accredited with awarding diplomas and degrees. Graduates of this institution should teach language and history at schools and post-secondary institutions.

VII. Building local civil society

Anyone who has read Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000) appreciates why the debate on civil society is getting more and more interesting. Putnam’s main argument is that associationa life, or communityhood, in America has declined over the years and that we may be approaching an era when individuals are left alone to fend for themslevles. Of course, there is always the state, but it often reflects the aggregation of powerful interest; the needs of powerfuless groups in society could be overlooked. Reviving associational life is one alternative. The other alternative is promoting civil society which can presumably cater services substituting for the pyschological, social, organizational and cultural functions of community.

In the international development literature, civil society lump sums all organizations together including relief and development NGOs, teachers unions, students unions, public service unions, profession associations, workers’ unions, churches, mutual help associations and farmers associations. The issue in developing countries is not about the decline of association life or lack of what academics would like to call “social capital” – although such realities are imminent in conflict affected areas where communities totally collapse -, but the idea that civil society supports the development of societies by mobilizing the resources of local, national and international societies. One World Bank report noted that, in 2004, civil society organizations worldwide employed a full time equivalent of 140,000 staff and had revenues in the amount of US $13 billion.¹⁶

In Ethiopia, the most resourceful and influential segment of NGOs are satellite organizations of big foreign NGOs. The NGO sector employs a highly educated workforce, as many elites have sought employment for better remunerations. Ethiopians once called NGO workers adisu kebertewoch (the new bourgeoisie). A recent global study by an NGO called CIVICUS indicates “most organizations are based in large cities. These organizations are often disconnected from the grassroots level and obtain the lion’s share of international funds”.¹⁷ These findings are relevant for the NGO sector in Ethiopia.

The recent years have also seen the emergence of Diaspora-based civil society organizations. The politically defiant Ethiopian Scholars Network is one example whose vice president recently wrote (with disclaimer) that Oromo and Amhara elites have a legitimate right to rule Ethiopia. There are other political advocacy organizations, as are those developmental organizations that mobilize the resources of the Diaspora and international community to help the Ethiopian people.

Historically, Ethiopian governments had not encouraged the growth of civil society. Haile Sellassie had an autocratic feudal state. Dergue’s Workers Party was totalitarian. When it was fighting a guerrilla war, EPRDF was very appreciative of NGOs for helping to channel relief, during the 1980s famine, from Sudan to rebel controlled areas in Northern Ethiopia. Once in power, however, EPRDF might not have liked NGOs to interfere in politics, and in the aftermath of the 2005 post-election crisis, it adopted a negative attitude towards some of the them which it believed were supporting the opposition. On the positive side, EPRDF has encouraged the creation of what are in the African literature called “hometown associations”, more specifically, associations formed by Tigreans, Oromos, Guragues, Amharas, Harraris, etc. Although critics may see these entities as an extension of EPRDF’s ethnic policy (for being organized around ethnicity), they have been instrumental in mobilizing resources from high income educated Ethiopians and Diaspora to support development efforts in different areas of the country. More must be done to encourage and support the growth of local organizations that advocate policy and play oversight roles of the functions of the state, markets and other agencies of Ethiopian society. For example, most of the abuses by local politicians, bureaucrats, health and education professionals and others go unreported because of the absence of oversight organizations. If you refuse to pay a bribe, you may be refused a service, and if you try to report this to regional or federal authorities, you could be ridiculed by local state and political elites. In contrast, if there is a human rights or other oversight organization in the local area, bureaucrats and politicians clearly understand that someone is watching them - they could be held accountable. It is therefore important that the Ethiopian government create a national program that provides funding and training for the creation, growth and sustainability of local civil society organizations. In the absence of strong local civil society, governmental and non-governmental organizations will remain limited in their capacity to protect the social, economic and political rights of Ethiopians.

VIII. Monitoring the sustainability of economic growth

A recent report by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ranks the Ethiopian economy the 4^th top performer economies of Africa with 8.5% growth rate, compared with 17.8% for Angola (1^st ), 14.1% Mauritania (2^nd) and 9.8% Sudan (3^rd) (see endnote1). As this report points out, the economies of Angola, Mauritania and Sudan are fuelled by oil revenues, whereas growth for the Ethiopian economy is attributed to the expansion of productive capacities in agricultural and export sectors (good harvest and revenues from coffee and other exports). The World Bank also ranks Ethiopia among the top African countries that have sustained an average economic growth rate of above 5% from 1996 to 2005 (endnote 1). In his recent (March 2007) report to Ethiopian parliament, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reported that the economy has grown by 10.1 percent, with growth rate in the manufacturing sector (12.5%) surpassing agriculture (10.9%).¹⁸ The government’s five-year PASDEP (2005-2010) plan is expected to stimulate more economic growth by supporting private sector development and production of food and high value export crops.¹⁹

Developing economies are vulnerable to economic shocks as a result of inflation, natural disasters, global recession, political instability, misguided policy directions or other factors. History is full of examples including the “Asian meltdown” and “boom and bust” experiences of countries in Latin America. As one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, the Ethiopian economy could lose its momentum unless it is carefully monitored to identify and correct emerging negative trends. Inflation is an example. The increases in the prices of food items have already created a hardship for urban households (the government’s wheat subsidy program is commendable). The high price of cement almost brought the booming construction industry to an abrupt halt. The Ethiopian government and International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not seem to agree on the real cause of inflation. IMF mainly considers the classical explanation of inflation (expansion of money supply), while government officials appear to be somewhat reluctant to attribute inflation to specific economic variables. I am of the view that an analysis of the rises in the prices of cement, oil and other hot commodities does not in itself provide sufficient explanation. It could be possible that traders or retailers are unable to transport supplies faster to meet demand. Remittance, aid, loans and grants infuse a lot of cash to the Ethiopian economy, and if the classical economic theory holds true, when there is too much money in the country, spending activity increases. When this causes a sharp increase in consumption (demand), prices rise. Urban population growth can also be another factor (probably underestimated). Each year, hundreds of thousands of rural young people graduate from schools and join the urban population. This, added with rural-urban migration, leads to population explosions in urban areas. Imagine a small rural town whose population dramatically increases from 5,000 to 10,000 in two or four years. The implication of this is that urban consumption increases, while supplies remain the same or increase little. For example, the price of chicken has skyrocketed even in small rural towns (where agricultural produce are usually cheaper), because too many people are lining up on the streets or going to nearby villages to buy chicken (especially during holidays seasons), whereas farmers in the area have done little to increase the production of chicken. The price of chicken will come down if there are modern farms across the country to support mass production. All this gives us an idea of the different factors that could possibly cause inflation in the Ethiopian economy. The Ethiopian government has shown an open approach to the inflation problem, as evidenced by its willingness to allow independent institutions such as the Economic Commission for Africa to study the cause of inflation (endnote 4). The government must also enlarge the capacity of economic intelligence agencies or institutions across the country, in order to identify, monitor and correct negative trends in the economy. In particular, the government should decentralize economic intelligence gathering activities by locating them, for example, at universities in regions and sub-regions of the country. Through a deployment of instruments of economic surveillance (e.g., ongoing surveys and observations of selected sites) decentralized activities allow the effective collection and analysis of data that help to monitor economic growth.

I have come across two or more reports that mentioned what economists call the “Dutch disease” as potential problem for Ethiopian economy. What exactly is the Dutch disease? Let me explain it this way: when the Dutch discovered natural gas in 1960s, they suddenly became rich in cash (from the export of gas) and so they began buying imported goods. Meanwhile, the cash which was flowing from outside overvalued the Dutch currency. This made Dutch exports expensive and they lost out for competition. In the absence of export markets, Dutch domestic industries would decline. Briefly, then, the “Dutch disease” concept is used to explain the impact of a rising exchange rate on domestic industrial growth. How is this relevant for Ethiopia? A lot of cash flows in the form of loans, grants and remittance. Thus, the theory is that should the Birr overvalue, Ethiopian exports will be expensive and the export sector will lose out for global competition. One economist wrote, “a recent model of Ethiopia suggests that, with no productivity benefits from aid [i.e., should the flow of aid results in overvaluation of the birr), if aid doubled from 20% of GDP to 40% of GDP, exports might fall to 6% of GDP over ten years” (emphasis mine).²⁰ Nonetheless, a study of five African countries including Ethiopia in 2005 indicates that foreign aid absorption had not resulted in Dutch disease.²¹

Ethiopia needs a clear industrial development strategy. Economic policy in the post-1991 period has mainly focused on promoting foreign and domestic investment in the economy. A policy intended to create a good investment climate is likely to focus on the supply side of investment issues, that is, satisfying the needs of investors through incentives, better regulatory regimes, etc. And 1999 (E.C) has been a good year for Ethiopia. On April 26 and 27, 2007, Walta Information Centre reported the issuance of investment licenses worth 9.4 billion birr in Amhara region, 49 billion birr in East Shoa Zone and 1.2 billion birr in Tigray region, a combined value of 59.6 billion birr.²² Such investments create jobs and contribute to the growth of gross domestic product; politicians are happy to report on them. However, an investment policy is more effective if it promotes sustainable industrial development. A growing economy like Ethiopia’s will have a strong foundation of growth and sustainability if it is supported by a myriad of industries ranging from family operated bakeries and diary processing firms to mass production factories to services and manufactures that replicate and apply modern science and technology to innovate the economy. Having read and reviewed the excerpts from Meles Zenawi’s paper (endnote 14), I wouldn’t say that the free market economic ideology has influenced Ethiopian government investment policy and decisions. On the other hand, I want to share my insights in this area. Are local industries taking advantage of foreign investment to innovate and grow? Which ones have potential for uptake by big industries? Consider the recent trend in the West where big hi-tech companies buy small enterprises (some of them run from kitchen and basement floors) by paying hundreds of millions of dollars; they want to use the innovative ideas and infrastructure of small-scale enterprises to innovate and expand. The Ethiopian government micro-financing schemes have supported the creations of a myriad of small- and medium- size enterprises. Will these enterprises innovate and grow or whither away by losing out for competition or lacking relevance for society? Which industries require cultural changes or regulations to improve productivity and safety? To what extent are big investment decisions conceived around the whole classical economic theory of creating backward and forward supply-demand linkages to stimulate and sustain growth in different sectors of Ethiopian economy? Ethiopia needs a national program of research that maps out industrial development strategies and options.

Local ownership of natural resources is an important issue. Developing economies like Ethiopia’s rely on primary industries to motor economic growth. Mining, forestry, oil, gas and mechanized commercial farms are examples. In most cases, national governments claim ownership of resource areas to obtain exclusive rights to taxes, royalties and other forms of levies without sharing the benefits with local people. In this instance, Ethiopian regional and local governments must be empowered to have a say in how their resources are exploited and the benefits are shared, and more importantly, they must ensure that there are no short- and long-term environmental impacts. In the West, municipal governments and communities in resource extraction areas negotiate with companies and different levels of government on jobs (hiring of local people) and revenue sharing arrangements. They have also learned how to plan strategically to avoid the collapse of local economies when companies close up and go (when resources are depleted). All these are useful lessons for Ethiopia whose society already faces the challenge of rectifying historical grievances of economic exploitation and marginalization. Failure to acknowledge and respect the resource rights of local people will aggravate this problem.

Finally, the growing gap between Ethiopia’s rich and poor. Populous developing countries often face sever problems of income distribution. India has more billionaires than any other country, but 600 million people live with less that US $2 a day. It appears that developing countries have not learned as much from the social policies of industrialized countries as they did from their free market economic policies. Western governments tax the economy through various taxation methods (sales, payroll, personal income and other levies) and use the money to finance welfare programs for the poor, disabled and elderly, such as financial assistance, income support and community-based social services. Although international agencies have rated the Ethiopian government policy as pro-poor, the reality is that income gaps between the rich and poor have got wider and wider each year. Ethiopia needs national social programs that provide comprehensive benefits for poor, elderly, disabled people and all those who cannot to work. The five-year PASDEP plan says nothing in this area except generally stating, under “managing risk and volatility”, that the Plan will aim to “reduce the repeated swings of households in and out of poverty (p. 53)”. We are, however, pleased to learn that a Parliamentary Committee chaired by W/o Azeb Mesfin is looking at social security issues in Ethiopian society.²³

IX. Understanding the multidimensionality of rural development

Those of us who are familiar with the history of development in the 20^th century understand why international agencies praise EPRDF for formulating pro-poor policies. The development history of developing countries starts mostly in the 1960s and their policies were focused on urban development – or what was then called import substitution industrialization (ISI) (for example, if a country was importing shoes from England, the government chose to support domestic enterprises that produce the same shoes to replace imported ones). The theory was that ISI industries would also create demand and supply linkages to stimulate economic productivity and growth. Urban entrepreneurs would be allowed to get rich (capital accumulation factor) and then gradually encouraged to set up industries in different part of the country to create jobs. Meles Zenawi ridiculed this notion of development (footnote 14). Indeed, by the 1970s, this approach was seriously criticized for failing to make an impact on social and economic development. Policy-makers (mainly from international agencies) began propagating the “basic needs” development strategy, more focused on rural development. Even then, there was no easy solution. Complex socio-economic systems made rural development planning difficult, if not impossible. States were also dominated by urban political and commercial elites who did little to look after the interests of the rural poor. However, governments like EPRDF’s emerged and demonstrated a capacity to formulate innovative rural development strategies. Read what Walta Information Centre reported on April 19, 2007: the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) “has already begun activities to make all woreda towns access automatic telephones and broadband data service, raise mobile phone and radio wave coverage to 85 percent and provide telephone services for 18,000 rural kebeles”.²⁴ This does not guarantee that the program will be successful. For example, everything can change abruptly if EPRDF goes to war or if ETC personnel loot project resources and escape to seek “political asylum” in the West. This initiative demonstrates a heart-felt commitment by EPRDF elites to sharing the benefits of modernization with rural society.

This piece raises five issues that could help us understand the multidimensionality of rural development. The firs issue is how to change rural settlement patterns. Dergue implemented a villagization program aimed at resettling people in town-like villages. And it was a good idea. By bringing the scattered population together, it could have been easier and cheaper to provide public services. However, people left the resettlement sites shortly after Dergue was overthrown and the explanation for this was that they were forced to resettle in the first place. Whatever is the cause of failure of Dergue’s villagization program, the fact is that the medieval settlement style of rural Ethiopia cannot be acceptable in the 21^st century; most of today’s diseases are preventable through proper feeding, drinking and sanitation. We do not dispute some of the negative effects of town-like rural settlements; for example, there will be environmental, economic and health consequences if human and livestock populations from three or four villages are concentrated in a single site: cattle overgrazes the grass and this causes soil erosion; poor sanitation makes people sick; or that people (with their oxen) spend more time commuting to and from their farm lands. On the contrary, imagine how easy and inexpensive it will be to build public services and facilities in town-like settlement areas, as opposed to, for example, extending electric transmission grids or water pipes to each isolated rural household. There is no easy solution. Ethiopia needs a national program of multidisciplinary research to study and identify the social and economic implications of existing settlement patterns, as well as requirements of engineering technology to build rural houses and facilities. A national standard for building rural houses is needed, just as there is now a national standard for the construction of urban condo houses or apartments. These issues and those outlined below equally apply to newly created resettlement sites in lowland areas.

The second issue is land ownership. The current debate on land policy in Ethiopia is influenced by the classical agrarian economic theory that farmers would manage the land better if they have legal ownership rights. For example, farmers will not invest time and resources to build soil terraces, plant trees, take stewardship of surrounding ecosystems or apply production enhancing technologies unless they are sure that they will be able to rent, exchange, sell or inherit. Experienced agrarian experts like Dessalegn Rahmato (formerly of Addis Ababa University) have been calling the Ethiopian government to come up with a system that guarantees these rights. There had been legal land registration in the Amhara region,²⁵ and, if successful, this practice can be replicated.

The third issue is improving the productivity of farming systems. A long time ago, land was plenty and so farmers used a method of crop rotation and shifting cultivation to regenerate croplands. Today the reality is different. Population growth has led to land scarcity. Farmers can no longer afford to practice crop rotation and shifting cultivation; they must cultivate their plot each year to earn livelihoods. The consequences are increased soil erosion and reduced yields. Secondly, farming still remains dependent on oxen-plough technology. It is impossible to use tractors in highland areas. Modern science and technology can be applied to design appropriate technologies that improve oxen-plough farming.

The fourth issue is the sustainability of the agricultural system. Agricultural policy under EPRDF has encouraged the use of fertilizers and other chemical inputs to increase crop production. This may not be sustainable. In the first place, there could be potential water pollution problems starting from highland Ethiopia all the way to the Mediterranean Sea and Awash, Baro and other river ecosystems. As an example, fertilizers and pesticides have poisonous substances, and when they are washes away and enter water systems, all human and animal species drinking the water can contract diseases. India, Philippines and other countries which had intensively applied the so called green revolution technologies (high yield varieties and chemical inputs) have re-oriented their policies to encourage organic agriculture (a long time ago, I remember reading a piece which told a story of how Indian farmers were breading snakes to re-introduce them in their farm fields. Earlier, they had applied pesticides to control mice and other rodents. The snake population was wiped out [poisoned] after eating these dead pests. The mice became immune to pesticides and, with nothing to check population growth, they began devastating crops. Wise farmers turned to a natural pesticide [breading snakes that feed on mice]). In the second place, modern agricultural practices encourage farmers to plant the same type of hybrid crops. The fear among scientists is that, when all farmers plant the same crops, a disease in one corner of the country or globe can spread and wipe out all crops. Two people that I know personally, Awgechew Teshome and Melaku Worede, have done a good work to promote awareness of how Ethiopian traditional farmers diversify crop production. If you look at a hand full of sorghum, for example, you will see black, brown or white genes (race). Should the black gene be vulnerable to crop disease or climate changes, the brown and red genes survive and enable the farmer to secure livelihoods. Scientists worry that these kinds of agricultural practices are fast disappearing, as farmers are encouraged to plant hybrid crops. The Ethiopian government has a crop gene bank, thanks to dedicated scientists. The best alternative is to promote the retention of traditional farming practices. Modern science and technology provide opportunities to improve the productivity of traditional farming systems. Should farmers’ income not rise, the Ethiopian government can provide them with income supplements in the form of cash, goods and services.

Finally, highland Ethiopia faces potential ecological crisis. Ethiopia loses billions of tones of topsoil each year because of erosion. Deforestation further aggravates this problem. As people plant fast growing eucalyptus trees for firewood and construction, indigenous trees are fast disappearing. Eucalyptus trees presumably damage the health of the ecosystem by draining too much water (leading to the drying of streams and springs) and destroying biodiversity. In fact, when I toured some of the eucalyptus forests, there was nothing on the ground except ants and mice, compared with areas that were covered by indigenous trees where different plant and animal species were found. Local people have given the eucalyptus tree a nick name of abarari (which means it chases every species away to colonize space). Reforestation programs should promote the plantation of indigenous trees along with appropriate and effective soil and water conservation systems to rehabilitate sensitive ecosystem across Ethiopia. The government should also grant local ownership of plants to revive community traditions of environmental stewardship. When people are denied of ownership rights, the organic link between environment and communities is broken, encouraging a culture of ecological neglect and abuse.

X. Cultural Policy

A way of life of a group, community or national society is distinguished from other ways of life by its particular ways of cooking and eating, dressing, speaking, interacting, worshiping, singing, dancing, marriage, associations, and so on – all this is generally referred to as culture. Ultimately, in the era of globalization, societies that are afraid of losing their cultural values and identities pressure their governments to safeguard and preserve them. As an example, consider the following list of cultural programs found on the web site of the Department of Canadian Heritage of the Government of Canada: books, broadcasting, conservation, copyright, exhibitions, film and video, literature, magazines, media arts, museums and galleries, music, new media, newspapers, performing arts, publishing, radio, sound recording, television, tomorrow starts today and visual arts.²⁶ For example, why would the Canadian government be concerned with books or films? Because, the government wants to encourage Canadians to write books or make films that reflect their country’s unique history, culture and identity; otherwise, Canadians could end up being consumers of Hollywood products.

In spite of the existence of international cultural agencies like UNESCO, and in spite of a mountain of social science literature on culture and identity, many developing countries have been slow to formulate cultural policies. Where there are national initiatives, they are mainly driven by economic planning, such as maintaining historical sites (like Lalibella, Axum, Harrar or Gondar) and curving out wildlife parks for purposes of tourism.

Ethiopia’s unique history, geography and cultural diversity have made her one of the top tourism destinations in the world, thanks to the Ethiopian tourism industry and government. This will contribute to economic growth and promote Ethiopia abroad. On the other hand, the country needs a cultural policy that supports the retention, promotion and preservation of her cultural, historical and natural heritages. Recently, my childhood friend said to me that, in Gondar, he saw what he had not seen in America (too much westernization of this ancient city). The anglicization of the Amharic language is a perfect example. Every time you hear government officials speak or TV anchors read news, you are very likely to hear English words. In fact, when we enter the new Ethiopian millennium, we will have added an English language to the Amharic vocabulary, which is milenyiem = millennium. It is regrettable that the National Millennium Secretariat failed to choose a celebration theme that reflects the proud traditions of Ethiopian people, such as ሁለት ሽህ አምት, ሽአመት or በርኩሜ in Oromiffa.²⁷ The diverse cultures and identities of Ethiopia are destined to extinction unless measures are taken to preserve and safeguard them.

Cultural policy should also promote awareness of cultural diversity among the Ethiopian people. EPRDF’s approach so far has been that of containment, that is, accommodations of decades of grievances for cultural respect and political inclusion by allowing the exercise of local autonomy and transferring resources to support development. The question is how much, for example, the people of Gondar know about cultural and linguistic communities in Southern Ethiopia and vice versa. Other than well-orchestrated parading of cultural dance troops during Nationalities Day and Pastoralists Day, which are observed once a year, respectively, Ethiopia has no national programs that promote awareness of cultural and linguistic diversity. Ethiopian cultural policy should therefore support programs that raise awareness of the geography, history and diversity of Ethiopia. These programs should also provide incentives for the acquisition of different Ethiopian language capacities, such as reserving some federal government jobs for civil servants who speak at least one or two second languages (Oromiffa, Tigrigna, Somali, Afar, etc).

XI. Enhancing Public Security

The massacre of Ethiopian and Chinese oil field workers by ONLF clearly demonstrates the critical need for strengthening security measures in Ethiopian society. We were told that Ethiopian military and intelligence units were patrolling the Ethiopia-Somalia border area to prevent the infiltration of armed groups inside Ethiopia. Perhaps the Ethiopian military underestimated the cleverness of ONLF or that intelligence units were not doing enough surveillance. What is clear is that what happened in the Somali Region could happen anywhere in Ethiopia. In the past, Ethiopians had also witnessed small incidents culminating into deadly communal conflicts because of the absence of public security agents in the area. The public security apparatus in Ethiopia has a loophole and it needs immediate fixing.

There are five reasons for enhancing public security measures. First, foremost, is that Ethiopians are getting ready to host a millennium celebration which runs for many months. The celebration will attract hundreds of thousands of visitors including those Ethiopians residing abroad. Armed groups may take advantage of the relaxing environment to carry out attacks. Second, Ethiopia is a country of 80 million people with vast and complex geography. Pubic security and military capacity must match the size of the population and vastness and complexity of the geographic terrain. Third, with Addis Ababa the seat of African Union and other international and regional organizations, Ethiopia is a destination for people all over the world. The Ethiopian government has legal obligation and responsibility to provide safety for diplomats and their families, foreign aid workers, tourists, business people and others who travel in and out of the country every day. Finally, as regional power, Ethiopia has a global responsibility to maintain peace and security in the region. These and other issues, coupled with the volatile security situation in the Horn of Africa, justify an increase in defence spending to revamp the intelligence, police and defence apparatus. Armed forces should be equipped with the latest training and equipment to pro-act and react quickly along with recruitment and training of reserve units that will be called on to assist during specific situations such as the millennium celebration (which is going to require an extensive security coverage) or in times of war. There is a need to increase the size of intelligence units and federal police force.

The Ethiopian government should deploy its diplomatic resources to pressure Western and Middle Eastern countries not to allow groups to use their soil to support armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa. In pre- 9/11 era, the West was indifferent to extremist groups that were using university campuses and later public domains to organize and spread hate politics. Today some of those groups are banned and other are closely watched by intelligence agencies. Donor countries in particular cannot talk about the promotion of rule of law in the Horn of Africa if they allow groups to support armed struggle from their soil. Conversely, the ruling EPRDF party must be pressured to negotiate with political groups to achieve peaceful settlements. EPRDF leaders do not need a reminder that OLF, ONFL and other groups are the products of Ethiopian history.

XII. Foreign Policy

Decades of poverty and dependency on foreign aid have increased the intervention of outsiders in Ethiopia’s affairs. The reaction of EPRDF leaders to this has ranged from complete arrogance - consider their refusal to listen to outsiders’ calls for the release of CUDP leaders from prison - to tactical submissions to get access to foreign aid resources. It is time to start working towards the restoration of the proud tradition of Ethiopian independence. I recall, a few weeks ago, the Egyptian foreign minister complaining about a remark made by US Secretary of State Condaliza Rice on a proposed reform of an electoral law. He complained that Rice should not have interfered in the internal affairs of Egypt (note that, historically, Egypt is the second largest recipient of US aid, next to Israel). India has declined to accept bilateral aid including even emergency assistance to tsunami victims. Other middle-income countries would follow suit. Ethiopia just started to develop and foreign aid will continue to play a crucial role, at least for another two decades. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian government will have to create a delicate balance between the requirements of foreign aid management – such as harmonization of donor policy priorities – and the need to preserve the country’s sovereignty.

Ethiopia’s foreign policy towards neighbouring countries puts an emphasis on trade, collective security and resource management. The plan to link electricity power grids to Kenya and Sudan will allow Ethiopia to sell electricity to other African countries. The utilization of Sudanese, Kenyan and Somali ports have ended the “sea port” (Assab-Massawa) political debate and it might have also raised awareness of new opportunities of regional trade, such as trade between Gondar and Gadaref or Kassalla. With Ethiopia emerging as one of the economic magnets of East Africa, the government deserves a praised for all these foreign policy initiatives. There will be a need for close coordination with governments of neighbouring countries to address public security issues, such as international crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling of illegal goods.

Today’s vibrant Diaspora communities are conduits for the internationalization of Ethiopian cultural traditions. For example, the famous injera and spicy watt has already become an international cousin. The churches are exposing the uniqueness of Ethiopian culture and history. As pointed out earlier, the Diaspora transfers knowledge, skills and resources to Ethiopia. In appreciation and recognition of these contributions, the Ethiopian government has issued a directive that enables Ethiopians in the Diaspora to possess an Ethiopian Origin Identify Card. Building on this commitment, and to encourage the retention of strong ties between the Diaspora and Ethiopian society, the Ethiopian government or parliament should formulate a policy allowing the Diaspora to elect representatives (in the Diaspora) to the Ethiopian parliament. The Italian Diaspora model and other transnational citizenship models should be studied to identify the pros and cons of this policy. The Diaspora has learned a lesson from the 2005 election and things will be different in the future.

The Ras Teferians living in different parts of the world identify with the Ethiopian nation. The Ethiopian parliament should therefore pass legislation to acknowledge these proud people as Ethiopian origin and grant them the same rights and privileges as other people of Ethiopian origin living in different parts of the world.

The Ethiopian government should increase its presence around the world, by opening more embassies and consular offices, to protect the rights and dignity of Ethiopians who live and work in different countries.

Eritrea remains a foreign policy problem and it is understandable why Ethiopians are frustrated with their government’s lack of clarity on this issue. With government departments busy planning development, and amid preparations of months-long millennium celebration, booming tourism, and so on, it is wrong to even think of going to war with Eritrea to remove Issayas Afewerki from power. Isayas is also a military genius who would not go down easily. As well, there are deep divisions among Eritrea elites, so that the overthrow of Issayas could even create a political crisis that does not serve Ethiopia’s interest.

Eritreans were ambitious to turn their new country into “Singapore”. Today Eritrea has become another sad story of post-independence Africa. In terms of their relation with Ethiopians, Eritreans dwelled too much on the past. They remained jubilant over their defeat of Dergue and some of them sought to undermine Ethiopian society and economy, instead of being sympathetic to a demoralized society (which saw hundreds of thousands of soldiers surrender to Issayas) and using this historic occasion to cultivate productive relations. They expected to continue accessing Ethiopian resources; above all, under the previous governments, Asmara and Addis Ababa received the lion’s share (life in Asmara was good in the old days). The main point here is that the dynamics of Ethiopia-Eritrea relations are so complicated that they will have to be properly understood before writing a blueprint foreign policy. The current approach of the Ethiopian government is commendable. Building on this strength, the government should commission a study to understand the different angles of Eritriea-Ethiopia relations and identify foreign policy options. In terms of thinking, any foreign policy towards Eritrea should aim to maintain historical and lineage ties, as well as envisage economic and political union in the future.

Conclusion

The main message of this piece is that politics is not the only issue in Ethiopian society. There are formidable development challenges. We need to create a common agenda to initiate discussions that contribute to understandings of issues, approaches, strategies and priorities and mobilize resource to support a variety of development initiatives. Our goal is to make the 21^st century Ethiopia’s century. And there are good prospects. The current political leaders (ruling and opposition) are progressive and hard working. The state bureaucracy is getting more efficient and effective, although corruption remains a problem. The business climate is good. There is a rising spirit of entrepreneurship among Ethiopians. Donors are committed to providing aid. International trade and diplomacy have improved. The economy is growing. These and other positive trends produce mutually reinforcing results that elevate Ethiopia to a rank of middle-income country status within two decades.

I am very pleased to have shared my thoughts with you and I look forward to participating in a renewed debate on Ethiopian development in the new century.

Getachew Mequanent

Ottawa, Canada

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End Notes

1. For example, Economic Commission for Africa. Economic Report on Africa 2007: Accelerating Africa’s Development Through Diversification, February 2007; World Bank. Africa Development Indicators (ADI), World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2006; Statement by IMF Deputy Managing Director Takatoshi Kato at the Conclusion of a Visit to Ethiopia, Press Release No. 07/42, March 9, 2007

2. Ethiopia selected to showcase successes in MDGs at high-level conference in Geneva., http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2007/Apr/10Apr07/27288.htm

3. For good literature review see G. Benveniste. “Six Theories of Planning: Myth and Realities” in Mastering the Politics of Planning, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1989.

The consensus among today’s planners is that planning approaches are effective if they are situationally appropriate or if they address specific issues within specific contexts. For example, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were deliberately articulated or conceived to be comprehensive, because all of the elements of the plan (increasing income, access to education and health services, good governance, food security, etc) must be addressed simultaneously to achieve sustainable development. A land reform requires not only land redistribution, but complementary support systems that enable farmers to have improved means of production. In contrast, certain program such agricultural technology diffusion require incremental, experimental approaches since it will not be feasible to pursue them at a grand scale without knowing if they will work.

4. FT interview: Meles Zenawi, Ethiopian prime minister, February 6 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/4db917b4-b5bd-11db-9eea-0000779e2340,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F4db917b4-b5bd-11db-9eea-0000779e2340.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fca.search.yahoo.com%2Fsearch%3Ffr%3Drogers-web

6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_dishonesty

7. Time to Declare war on dysfunctional behaviors, http://www.ethiomedia.com/carepress/dysfunctional_behaviors.html

9. On the Wisdom of Known the Backgrounds of Our Leaders!!!, http://www.ethiolion.com/pdf/ANDARGATCHEWs%20WISDOM%20INTRODUCTION.pdf

10. “Diasporas Good? Diasporas Bad?” in Metropolis World Bulletin, Vol. 6, September 2006, p. 5.

11. Overview of Remittance in Ethiopia, Submitted to the Ethiopian Economic Association for the Fourth International Conference on the Ethiopian Economy, April 2006, http://www.eeaecon.org/Papers%20presented%20final/Bruk%20Asmelash%20_%20Remittance.htm

12. See news bulletin of December 2006 on organization’s web site http://www.enahpa.org/Newsletter.html

13. Joint Call for Peace and Reconciliation, March 20, 2007, http://www.ethioforum.org/News/article/sid=2401.html

14. The Developmental State in Meles Zenawi's African: Development:Dead Ends and New Beginnings - A Commentary, http://www.ethiopiafirst.com/news2006/Mar/Developmental-State.html, http://www.aigaforum.com/Review_of_Meles_Zenawi_s_Paper.html ;

15. Let us Think Positive, http://www.aigaforum.com/letsthinkpositive.htm,

16. Aid Architecture: An Overview of the Main Trends in Official Development Assistance Flows. International Development Association Resource Mobilization, February 2007, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21234677~menuPK:3492269~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html

18. Walta Information Centre, Ethiopia’s economy to grow by 10.1 percent, http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2007/Mar/29Mar07/26780.htm

19. Ethiopia: Building on Progress - Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (05/06-09/10). Volume I, Main Text. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Addis Ababa, September 2006.

20. Owen Barder. A Policymakers’ Guide to the Dutch Disease, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 91, July 2006, p. 7.

21. Shekhar Aiyar, Andrew Berg and Mumtaz Hussain. “The Macroeconomic Challenge of More Aid” Finance an Development, Vol. 42, No. 3, Sep. 2005.

22. Investors with 1.2 billion birr licensed in Tigray State, http://www.waltainfo