UN Biggest Peace Keeping Mission to the Horn: Implications for the Region

The UN-AU Biggest Peace Keeping Mission to the Horn it set to Impact the Sub-region

Mulugeta Alemu

2 August 2007

After a mind boggling diplomatic deadlock and wrangling, the United Nations Security Council finally adopted Resolution 1766?2007 which seeks to send one of the largest and the first of its kind UN-AU hybrid force to the West Darfur region of the Sudan. The first time we heard of a possible UN resolution on Darfur was years back. The force under the new resolution, dubbed the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur(UNMID), is expected to be fully deployed by December this year. Already a 7000 strongmen African troop is stationed in the region under the auspice of the African Union. The operation will have up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, a civilian component including up to 3,772 international police and 19 special police units with up to 2,660 officers. The force is expected to have a “predominantly African Character” where the day to day activity will be run by the African Union with a UN command and control.

Resolution 1766 was adopted by unanimous vote by the 15 members of the Security Council. But the journey toward such consensual agreement took longer than expected. Perhaps the African Union should come as a big winner by the adoption of the resolution. It has managed to ensure that the force is not exclusively UN and that African forces and commander will be in charge of the day to day activities of the peace keeping mission. The hybrid nature of the force is tainted as groundbreaking in the practise of the maintenance of international peace and security. Though the United Nations Charter provides for the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 52 and 53), these institutions have never been taken with seriousness. The relationship between regional organizations such as the African Union and the UN in peace keeping has never been clarified. As such the earlier report of the Secretary General on the Hybrid force and Resolution 1766/2007 breathe new thinking and perspective.

UNAMID’s lasting contributions will be reflected in the kind of support it lends to the development of regional and sub-regional peace and security architecture in Africa. African members of the Security Council such as South Africa, and Ghana highlighted this element in their official statement following the adoption of the resolution. Ethiopia was one of the leading countries supporting the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). This force is established as a sub-regional component of the African Standby Force as envisaged under the Constitutive Act and the Protocol for the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council. Ethiopia has ratified both instruments. The headquarters and the logistic base of EASBRIG are based in Ethiopia. Hence Ethiopia should support the effort that these sub-regional forces benefit from the promote location of the UN AU force.

Ethiopia has consistently supported the resolution of the conflict in Darfur through a peaceful dialogue. As a member of the African Union Peace and Security Council, it participated in the various decisions made by this important organ regarding this beleaguered region. It was also a leading member of IGAD which has been involved in Sudanese peace process for years. It has actively encouraged the leading role of the African Union as a mediating institution and of course as a credible force on the ground. It has emphasised the role of diplomacy and peaceful dialogue as a means of settling the dispute and that the AU should be allowed to play a central role.

A diplomatic axis involving Eritrea and Libya had been playing a role that put to risk the centrality of the AU in this endeavour. Eritrea was involved in arming various groups involved in the Darfur conflict. Eritrea, consistent with its policy of meddling in the affairs of other countries in the region was arming some of the rebel groups in Darfur. Eritrea’s support to the Al-Sharq Front is an open secrete. The same Eritrea tried to use its connections among its brothers in arms posing itself as a mediator. It was very effective in forcing the Sudan government to acknowledge its role. During the Libya talks which brought parties from the Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic, no one had questioned the presence of the white elephant, Eritrea. Eritrea was among those who strongly rejected the presence of the UN troops in Western Darfur. However it tried to sale itself as a “neutral negotiator.” These futile attempts by Eritrea not only led to no concrete results but were rejected by the AU in numerous occasions. The presence of the hybrid force and the peace talks in Tanzania will close the door on actors such as Eritrea who see plenty of advantages in others miseries.

France’s hyper-active and limelight-loving new government had also gathered mainly western Governments in Paris to discuss the future of Darfur in June 2007. The AU, which noted the absurdly self-serving nature of the diplomatic drama rightly rejected these moves and declined to participate in the conference. Though Resolution 1766/2007 is a result of the hard work of the AU and the UN, and that the Sudanese Government agreed to the deployment of the force way before the resolution was adopted, the new leaders of France and UK stole the show by posing as grand achievers of how to end the misery in Drafur. As usual ceremonies tend to attract the glorification of the uninvolved. Diplomatic events are not immune to such vices.

The Sudanese government had shown a remarkable strength and vitality in negotiating the final shape and content of the resolution, thanks to the country’s oil and the friendship it has brought particularly from China. China was a big factor in the adoption of the new resolution. It has supported Sudan’s resistance against the inclusion of a provision in the resolution involving a possible imposing economic sanction in case of non-compliance on the part of the Sudanese Government. The Sudan is already under a US bilateral sanction. Countries such as the UK threatened to follow such bilateral routes if the Sudanese government is not willing to comply. If these measures are taken in the future, they may affect trade relationships between the Sudan and its neighbours. But the Sudanese government had learnt an important lesson in the meantime. The new emerging financial centres in the Middle East and good friends from Far East provide an important relief from pressure from the West.

No one exactly knows how long UNAMID will stay in the region. Neither is it clear how it will affect the future of Sudan. After all, as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon noted, the purpose of the deployment is achieving lasting peace. It is likely that the force will remain within the territory of the Sudan when the future of the Southern Sudan unravels in the coming few years. Will UNAMID’s mandate change in due course of time to include the enforcement of existing agreements regarding the Southern Sudan? These changes can not happen at ease. The Sudanese Government will never allow such shifts to happen. Moreover, preserving the territorial integrity of the Sudan is encoded as an important element of Resolution 1766/2007. But some argue that after the Sudan gave in to the presence of such a huge force in its territory, their future realise less on the will of its government.