Post-Meles Ethiopia—Legacies and Challenges: Linking the Past and the Present with the Future

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Abstract

Politics is a purely human action. As such, the personal qualities, philosophies and leadership skills of long-serving and influential leaders have a lot to do with the courses, dynamics, directions and orientations of national politics after their deaths. More often than not, politics of a country rarely tends to be the same before and after the death of such stylistic leaders. The question however is: what will the extent of the difference be? Are there social science approaches and adequate experiences that could be employed for studying this phenomenon? How can one scientifically and objectively study the most likely differentials between pre-and-post influential leader politics, economics, social and international relations? What are the most decisive factors that have to be carefully analyzed to undertake such complex and difficult post-influential leader unfolding realities? How can one establish logical links between the past and the present with the future in an attempt to predict challenges in the ways of the new succeeding leaders amidst many legacies? The death of the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, has brought with itself a formidable challenge for Ethiopian scholars to undertake a study of this much huge proportion. This paper is an attempt by way of responding to these demands.

Introduction

The questions above are heard here and there amidst uproars of mass grief over Meles’s death. For us, as students of Political Science, the questions in their totality are never a naïve worry specifically here in Ethiopia. They are rather thorniest questions of top most intellectual concerns that need scientific queries and most plausible answers. This is so because Political Psychology and Political Sociology tell us that the sudden deaths of ‘Great Leaders’, not ‘Strong Leaders’, in emerging societies of extremely diversified interests, more often than not, cause in the minds of citizens a wide sense of ‘inner instability and vacuum’ that could have consequences.¹

Curious examinations of a list of international experiences in the study of political developments following the deaths of ‘extraordinary’, ‘most influential’, ‘exceptional’ or ‘idiosyncratic’ political leaders reveal the fact that their personalities always have had a

strong correlation with what would happen after their deaths. This criterion is by no means exhaustive and final as research results also could come up with mixed developments difficult for analysis. That is the explaining rationale for Political Sociologists why they argue that to apply long established scientific criteria is by far acceptable.

Before we proceed to applying a set of most agreed criteria of Political Sociology for the analysis of politics in Post-Meles Ethiopia, it is again methodologically logical first to examine the questions against some dominant theoretical approaches. We will still however start by demonstrating the political anatomy of the late Prime Minister Meles in Ethiopia’s political history through a quick review of most relevant theoretical approaches.

1. Theoretical Approaches

On the very question about what, as a rule, happens after most ‘extraordinary leaders suddenly die, scholars wondered much but diverged to have differing theoretical approaches. The two most influential sociological theories in vogue to date across global academia are ‘Heroic Determinism’, ‘Social Determinism’ and ‘Evolutionary Adaptive’ approaches stand to this day to the test historical facts.

The heroic determinism approach argues that history has always been the makings of great individual leaders who were at birth marked by exceptional humanely qualities. This approach adapts a pessimistic view of people’s capacity as a collective entity either to determine the course of history or influence its directions as its central theme in addition to the following points. The direct opposite of this approach is social determinism which argues that Great Leaders are simply creations of history. Great Men and Great Leaders have no any unique and inherent excellences of their own individual creation without the social backgrounds that shapes them.

Both theories have grains of truth but tend to posit themselves at polarized positions, which make it difficult to apply them to test practical cases, post-Meles Ethiopia.

We therefore switch to the third, popularly known ‘middle-of-the-road’ approach, evolutionary adaptive approach which probably better fits the current situations of Ethiopia as implied in the questions above. Evolutionary Adaptive theory systematically blends the roles and influences of a Great Leader and what this means to the background society, the choice less choices of successors, the environment and the most likely

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political situation after his/her death. Let us have a look at the following extract of these notions:

...So much for the forms that actions may take. Now, if we move to the content at targets of actions taken by Great Individual Actors, we find them always and everywhere to be more explicit on the entire ‘structure’ than its ‘functional parts’. ‘Great Leaders’ are here qualified as Agents who irreversibly changed, transformed and altered the overall structure which places them under the category of the ‘structure-building proper.’ The Great Leader is identified as who is enormously able to have effectively shattered old norms and replaced them with new ones, devised new and original ideas and successfully imposed, implanted, and cemented them into the Welschustang (World View) of his followers. When norms are changed, ideas reformulated, interactional channels switched, and opportunities redistributed, then, morphogenesis or structural dynamics gains momentum. No successor of a Great Leader could stop, divert, reverse or distort this dynamism as he/she is left choice-less but to embrace the structure. No world history of this proportion has happened against this rule (pp. 261).

According to Evolutionary Adaptive approach, ‘the Great Leader’ is the making of his/her exceptionality in direct and unavoidable interaction with the larger society surrounding him/her. This approach bases its argument on two principles: first, genetic accident makes some people candidates to stand at the lead front of the masses due to their unusual talents they have had by natural biological factors, which it calls the ‘variation’ principle; second, then the next and second starts to operate, the principle of selection. Great Leaders must hit a ‘ripe soil’ for their ideas, innovations and actions. They are required of successfully meeting some ‘existing and independently evolved social demands, needs, expectations and aspirations of the larger population’. The most important concern of evolutionary adaptive theory is the size of the followers aligned behind a dead Great Leader without which ‘Greatness’ should be carefully examined.

However, according to evolutionary adaptive approach, the Great Leader differs from the ‘Great Man’ in that the first (the Great Leader) precisely combines the qualities of both supreme knowledge and dramatic action while the latter is much more superior in either knowledge like Karl Marx or action like Joseph Stalin, the Strong Leader after Lenin. While Shakespeare is a Great Man, George Madison of the United States of America is a Great Leader. Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Elyanove Elich Lenin of Russia and Mao Setuing of China were Great Leaders satisfying the above criteria and none of these Great Leaders was wrongly succeeded (with the controversial exception of Stalin) thus, after their deaths so far as structural dynamism was and is their legacy, succession and regime continuity as a historical fact.

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Another Great Leader will become a demand only when this dynamism lags, stagnates, or gets reversed overtime for some challenge or mediocrity of succeeding leaders. If this happens, then, it means, the choice-less choice has already got obsolete, and more options appeared than the previous one. This was exactly the case in the disintegration of the former Soviet Union when a ‘Strong Leader’, not a Great Leader, dies suddenly in a socio-economically fast declining state.9

It is against this theoretical background that we are going to investigate into what the post-Meles politics of Ethiopia will most likely. In these task however, what are the yardsticks to objectively and subjectively appreciate and scientifically predict the picture of Post-Meles Ethiopia and its politics? What challenges decisively await Meles’s successors, the Ruling Party, the Government and the Ethiopian People in Meles;’s absence?

By way of meeting these questions, we have identified some five yardsticks to investigate into the crux of the matter: post-Meles future of Ethiopia as discussed below.

2. Post-Meles Mind Set-Up of the Majority

Peoples’ mind-set up has been recognized by scholars as one major factor to be seriously considered in the study of prospectively unfolding political developments, desired or undesired. Is it grief or confusion that reigns following Meles’s death? Is it sense of sympathy and solidarity with the lost Meles or is it a pure moral concern for the sad manners how Meles died as any known public figure, which has shaped peoples’ attitude? Is there evident and clearly articulated fear, uncertainty and dilemma in the daily parlance among the common majority people? Is there any sign of trying to abandon and search for safe space among the leading elites in all aspects of national life at present?

History and historical comparisons are the first forceful factors that shape mass attitudes or mind-set ups that in turn prove to be working indicators as to what will most probably follow the death of a Great Leader on Meles’s proportion. Let us make a brief bird’s eye view of Meles as compared in history to his predecessors.

In the political history of modern Ethiopia (as an internationally recognized political entity with its morphology of the present day), PM Meles Zenawi is the ninth Leader since Emperor Minilik10. Emperor Haile Slessae I skillfully ascended to the Imperial Crown since 1920 at the elimination of Lej Eysas through a court coup. How Lij Eyasu

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10 Bahirue Zewde, *Political History of Ethiopia-1855-1974*, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University Press, 1991 for deceptions of pre-Derg Ethiopian leaders. Similarly, Meles, after Minilk, is the only second leader in Ethiopia to have died while he was in office and by natural causes. However, Emperor Minilk’s death was kept oblivion and his funeral was All leaders from Empress Zeuditu (1916-1917) to Tesfaye Gebrekidan (May, 1991) (a week long president after the fall of Mensgitu Haile Mariam) died artificial deaths.
died and where his body was laid remained a historical puzzle. Emperor Haile Slasee, in his turn, suffered brutal death allegedly at the hands of his successors, Derg officers. Much worse, his body was discovered from a secret and unofficial tomb at the threshold grounds of Mengistu’s Office in 1993 after 20 years of complete ignorance. Mengistu Haile Mariam lost his office in May 1991 by ERDF-led revolutionary action, and his death will obviously be on foreign soil as he escaped a death sentence judicially after he was charged by his successors for crimes against humanity.

Seen against these background political traditions of Ethiopia and Ethiopians, Meles is the first ever Ethiopian leader whose body was freely driven along the streets of Addis Ababa amidst mass tears. Meles is again the only Ethiopian leader to go to his cemetery escorted by hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians and his own comrades and successors. Meles is also the first Ethiopian leader to have won National Condolence Creed of several days by a government of his own creation.

Now, let us try to make sense out of these brief background statements and questions of comparative facts in order to meet the basic question mentioned above. However, we have to still search for relevant and working criteria which will help us to link pre-Meles political realities with the expected nature post-Meles politics and in the future by briefly diagnosing into the popular events at the death of Meles in Ethiopia.

Different Peace and Security scholars employ different indicators and measurement techniques of majority mind-set up following the death of a Great Leader. Some focus on the social compositions of supporters and committed followers not in the political but in the value sense of the term.

A. Socially, the most articulate and affected sections of specially the Ethiopian urban population were women and the youth, with no need to conduct a survey.
B. In most major cities across Ethiopia, traditionally formerly member-oriented social associations (Edirs) set up their tents, posed Mele’s different photos and mourned as if he was one of their families and members;
C. Women in major cities organized a big condoling occasion at big Squares and expressed their grief in bitter traditional norms for more than ten days. Most wear black dresses for days even though they did not have any physical contacts with Meles;
D. The urban youth stood as the vanguard social grouping to nervously break into emotional grief over the loss of Meles. Most youth slogans were promises of getting the visions of Meles completes at all costs and sacrifices;

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E. Culturally, both Christian and Islam leaders officially requested the government for national ‘pray days’ for the late leaders, which the government agreed for one day amidst extremely busy international schedule;

F. Almost all ethno-linguistic groups organized at national, regional and national levels mourning events in their own traditions and languages everywhere. As televised pictures show, there was no the usual fear of Camera and interviews; there were no direct or indirect government pressures; rather, government officials themselves were under pressure to prepare space for popular mourning repeatedly.

What do all these mean in the eyes of these scholars?

Collier Paul, Grossman, H.I and Kuran T\(^{13}\) argue that considerable concern by women in developing societies in favor of existing policies, more often than not, social, economic and political representations of feelings than simply moral and cultural involvements. This happens mostly when there were socio-economic improvements, reliable peace and stability prospects and majority hopes after fall of troubled dictatorial regimes as was seen in Latin America, Asia and Africa in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Time\(^{14}\) agrees with this from its surveys of women impressions during the Afro-Arab Revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2010 and 2011.

For these scholars, women come out to take the front line of positive concern as they sociologically represent their children and marriage partners, who usually suffer the agonies of poverty and insecurity. War is, as a rule, the primary target of women hatred as they experienced the loss of their lovers and sons. Poverty adds up to their burden as the first responsibility to insure that they their kids are fed well and their partners enjoy the home. Women are as beneficiaries in peace as much as losers in war because peace and development pours spill-over advantages in three directions: the woman herself, her partner and sons and daughters.

Equally, there are specific interests determining youth positive concern in favor of existing regimes and policies. According to the Economist\(^{15}\), especially African youngsters prioritize three expectations and practical responses of their governments: education, employment and restraint from intervening in their liberties. For the Economist, while urban youth are automatic in the expression of their attitudes, rural youth are more dangerous if dissatisfied with existing policies. Youth mind set-up takes little time to align itself along a definite line of thought (negative or positive about their leaders) including other youngsters still in school compounds. Massive employment of

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\(^{15}\) The Economist. 2011. Middle East and Africa. Who will benefit from the chaos? Vol.40, No. 8761.
successive generations of youth quickly affects those yet at their schools’ desks to trust leaders, develop confidence and find reasons to positively hope in the future.

We argue that this has been the general feeling that perfectly reigns among the Ethiopian women and the youth as demonstrated from their slogans in various wordings representing three dispositions: trust in post-Meles leaders and his regime, self-confidence in their capacities to complete what Meles launched including voluntary contributions and services; and, hope in the future that Ethiopia shall rise up back to its past glory.

That the death of Meles precipitated a tide of artistic boom also witnesses a promise of grown solidarity as artists naturally tend to be easily provoked by positive political developments. More than 34 pieces of condoling music reached the ears and eyes of the audience within just six days in more than six languages including English conveying messages of continued commitment, the irreversibility of what Meles started and the assured continuity of his profound legacies.

This is what is in place now for post-Meles successors as they themselves repeatedly said that they have captured the message and felt the burden.16

3. Nature of Post-Meles Social Conflicts

The nature of social conflicts (the degree of its gravity, whether it is secondary or primary, internally instigated and sustained or supported by external powers, etc.) affects the manner and behavior of power transition and stability following death of an incumbent influential leader. At times, the extraordinary personality of Big Leaders on the proportions of Marshal Brose Tito of the former Yugoslavia concealed background social conflicts from openly surfacing themselves for timely remedy.

There are also records of escalated conflicts that transferred political power from the moderate and exceptional Vladimir Elich Lenin of Russia in 1928 into the hands of Brutal Joseph Stalin. Equally, complex and volatile social conflicts evidently disturbed smooth post-Great Leader political Transitions in Post-Nehiru India in the 1970s pushing the state almost to edge of civil war.18 The post-Brezhnev former Soviet Union also

16 Hailemariam Deslagn made four official speeches since Meles’s death. The first was the next day after the news of Meles’s death was revealed to the people; the second was a Press Conference with reporters; third one was at the funeral event and the fourth one at his Appointment as a Prime Minister in November 21/2012 before the House of Representatives. Other high ranking Party and Government Officials also have been speaking unusually frequently including Berket Simeon, Abay Theahye, Syum Mesfin, Aba Dula Gmeda, Kuma Demeksa, Redwan Hussien and others. All of them expressed that they and their party realized the messages of the people every where.

17 The former Yugoslavia erupted in a vicious civil war, still reverberating in Kosovo and Macedonia; conflict erupted between Moscow and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan; and between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabah; and within the Russian republic over Chechnya.

suddenly collapsed in 1991 from what Donald Rothschild called accumulated but ‘avoided conflicts’ of deeper bottom-up social conflicts and the eroded economic reversal that denied Michael Gorbacheve, the immediate successor, to finance the ever soared expenses of the Soviet Global Empire.  

In Latin America, scholars note that in post-colonial states of Chile, for example, the sudden violent death of the socialist president Alvarez Ayende was quickly exploited by the despotic General Pinochet, the successor, who pushed the country into bloodshed. Most colonial countries suffered such succession crises, country after country, due largely to the persistent prevalence of structural conflicts between economic classes like the rural peasant and the urban based comprador bourgeoisie, the urban poor and the urban high-income social group.

Now, the question is: Has Prime Minister Meles left behind social conflicts in Ethiopia that squarely fit these proportions and cases? The answer is clear: No; but why? Social conflicts in Yugoslavia’s case, for instance, were allowed by policy to conceal themselves at the background but finally erupted like a time bomb or a volcano when the Strong Leader, Brose Toto, was no more in office. This would not lead to likely be the case in post-Meles Ethiopia for five reasons:

the age of 55, while he was still in office, suddenly and for natural causes—illness due to heavy stress of work. Both led violent revolutionary movements that broke established regimes; both organized new regimes and political systems and so on. Thus, we can safely categorize Meles as the Great Ethiopian Leader. Meles again is comparably a Great Leader rightly on the scale of Mao Sedung of China. Chairman Mao led rural-based revolutionary guerrilla warfare against the Kuomintang Rule in Shan-gay from 1934 to 1949 for 16 years almost similarly like Meles in our case. Mao ascended the leadership of the Chinese state in 1949 and stayed in office up to 1976 for 27 years exceeding that of Prime Minister Meles by 6 more years. Mao like Lenin and Meles organized a totally new regime, furnished new value codes for the people and, set the regime into socio-economic transformation. Mao died in office and for natural cause Seen in comparison with Great Turkish Leader, Ahmed Ataturk of the early 20th century, both decisively changed the course of history in their respective countries by boldly taking extremely controversial and constitutional steps of paramount ramifications. Ataturk irreversibly de-like the Turkish national political traditions fused into Islamic values; he progressed amidst mass uproars to open the door to western and eastern commerce; Ataturk promoted in-side out development path. Likewise, Meles risked the constitutional entrust of self-determination including cessation, organized a federal order on controversially ethnic lines; maintained the public ownership of land, diverted economic growth policy to free market capitalism which provoked the final showdown with his own comrades.


21 We distinguished the sociological phraseology of the ‘Great Leader’ from the ‘Strong Leader’ for understandable technicality divergences ascribed to the respective notions in modern Political Science. The academic search for parceling Post-Meles scenarios of Ethiopia’s politics has to adequately consider and, in the process, should clarify these terminologies. This is because the terms rightly constitute the commonest yardsticks to measure the degrees in the likelihood of which scenario would most likely unfold. In day to day parlance of the media and the lay commentator, both terminologies, ‘the Great Leader’ vis-à-vis ‘the
A. While Tito (usually identified with the state itself) was himself the ‘setter of the rules of the game’ over national distribution of national wealth and political offices among the various constituent Member Federations of Yugoslavia, Prime Minister Meles was more the creator of the fundamental norms, faire distribution of wealth vertically and horizontally. Meles proceeded in action and formalized an official, Parliament-debated and endorsed standards and procedures of wealth distribution and allocations of political offices. In short, the official procedure of post-Meles Ethiopia has almost nothing within itself such irregularities like concealed formulas, arbitrarily changeable loopholes and vague arrangements that could incite controversies in his absence. And, of course, by chance, this was done with no irregularity in the absence of Meles Zenawi while he was in bed since May 2012;

B. Meles has not also left behind him any appreciably escalated social conflict unlike the case in Post-Lenin Russia where relatively weaker Russia was suddenly encircled by a great coalition of Western Interventionist forces and their domestic agents. Joseph Stalin lacked both the qualities of a Great Leader and the necessary time to immortalize Lenin’s legacies. He desperately slipped into the muscular calculus of political rule. Prime Minister Meles has closed all possible social fault-lines that could have triggered armed warfare through massive mobilizations of supporters as was the case in his guerilla time. Meles also decisively reduced the serious vulnerability to national security from Eritrea both militarily and diplomatically to almost ground zero level. As the result, there is no any visible rationale on the ground for the post-Meles leadership to undertake any degree of policy diversion or plunge into policy dispute over the question how to handle social conflicts;

C. Meles again, unlike the case in India, has successfully managed to bring down possibilities of complex and volatile social conflicts continuously since 1991 up to now. Meles has a list of records that greatly affects the incidences of such category of conflicts. Meles, after a series of negotiations, led the last armed contingents of the Oromo

Strong Leader’ usually appear to bear heavy emotional undertones in their attachments to qualified and much towering political leaders in many countries. That is however only partly true. Political Sociologists take serious cares in the study of political personalities, their roles and legacies. Icon age of ‘the Great Leader’ is mostly reserved for a few ‘idiosyncratic’ personalities; and, of course, in some instances, it is officially awarded by parliamentary decisions as a compulsory mention of the individual concerned. The term ‘the Strong Leader’ is attached, as a rule than the exception, arbitrarily, informally, and even critically. ‘Great Leaders’ are different from ‘Strong Leaders’ mainly for personality and competence differentials; Great Leaders mobilize their supports to break an established old regime—dominant and deep-rooted value systems, the agency of government, its institutions, state symbols in existence for long time period, well-entrenched political traditions, cultures and beliefs, etc. This regime break of fundamental nature however results in massive confusion and sense of loss of reliable directions by creating value voids, complicating national life and disturbing social solidarity into turbulence.

22 African Business, January/2012, Vol. 2
23 M Van Creveld, p 20. Furthermore, contemporary wars are tactically fought with a mixture of guerilla warfare, terrorism and counter-insurgency. They are not fought for the capture or control of territory as in conventional or regular war, in that “the aim is to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity (and indeed of a different opinion)” through the use of means such as mass killings, forcible resettlement, as well as political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation
Liberation Front to have surrendered in 2009.\textsuperscript{24} Since 2005, Meles bargained with the two armed opposition Somali Organizations, namely; the Ogaden National Liberation Front and Western Somali Liberation Front, which finally led to organization-level surrender. This significantly improved the stability of the Somali Region.\textsuperscript{25} Except the stationing of regular army contingents in some remote parts of Somali, Meles was able to engage only in police actions to deal with some sparks of armed resistance to his regime;

D. Unlike the experiences in Chile, Brazil and Argentina where the peasant social group was betrayed after independence by Liberation Leaders, Meles probably paid the bitterest sacrifice in his fight against program and policy erosion in his alignment with the broadest Ethiopian peasant social group. The most serious and dangerous conflict over this was the inner party crises in 2002 in his Basic Party, TPLF, with his own former comrades. His paper ‘Bonapartism’\textsuperscript{26} came up with as a promise of his commitment to the Ethiopian Peasant arguing that EPRDF was in the danger of internal decay manifested in its gradual betrayal of its social base.

The dangerous dispute led to the sharpest bifurcation of the TPLF in which Meles finally emerged victorious out of the crises. With this, Meles ultimately and probably permanently resolved the real possibility of structural conflict that relieved his successors today of any possibilities of succession crises. Now, one could reasonably be sure that no part of the Ethiopian rural part is of adequate justification to sponsor any armed group to challenge the existing stability.

E. The only social conflict at inter-state level probably lingering the post-Meles politics of Ethiopia is the deadlocked conflict and peace process with Eritrea that appear to be a burden for his successors. However, Meles greatly lubricated and minimized the danger level involved with this conflict far down to secondary, and even, to negligible scale in two aspects\textsuperscript{27}: he was able to diplomatically expose the behaviors of Eritrean leaders that effectively pushed them to the extreme political edge where they lost their potential

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\textsuperscript{24} Daily Telegraph, 2010, vo.l.61, No. 52 reports that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi met top officials of the two armed organizations while he was in Rome, Italy. After six months, the Reporter interviewed the leaders of the organizations and told him that they unanimously decided to surrender to the Ethiopian Government in exchange for government pledge to grant total amnesty for all members outside and inside.

\textsuperscript{25} What Prime Minister Meles said in 1994 about how his Party and Government were to manage armed social conflicts in post-Derg Ethiopia is indicative of what will happen after his death. He said that he knew social conflicts of any form would continue but we would make sure that there would no be no just causes for political groups to pick arms, mobilize masses and force us deploy regular armies, under any circumstances.

\textsuperscript{26} Reporter Weekly, Vol.17, No 17.2002

\textsuperscript{27} African Confidential, on Ethiopia and Eritrea in Border Conflict, Vol. 22, March, 22/2004. The reporter notes that the war with Ethiopia and the resultant defeat it suffered completely reduced Eritrea to an international solitude and structurally frustrated from its ambitions to attain regional power. He also observes that Prime Minister Meles’s decision to abandon use of Eritrea’s ports was a punitive measure leaving the new state of Eritrea empty handed from its cash cow neighbor. The German Shimmer also commented that Eritrea’s loss out of the war with Ethiopia goes far deeper to affect its demography, the pre-1992 popular zeal and confidence. Tadese Medhine, the Ethio-Eritrean War, 1999, also argues that Ethiopia broke the Eritrean myth of invincibility that could have been harnessed for purposes of socio-economic growth,
influence to exert pressures for breaking the deadlock. Moreover, Meles left behind him a package of internationally accepted 5-point peace overture. His successors could easily pick as a baseline for future engagements. Secondly, Meles substantially neutralized any potent influence of Eritrean leadership to impose its wishes on his successors by structurally and militarily inhibiting their military capability. Eritrea is now, unlike the case in pre-2000 regional balance, by no means, a catalytic factor to cause post-Meles succession crises and Ethiopia’s peace at any degree.

All in all, one can see that there is little or no surviving social conflict that could harm post-Meles continuation of the statuesque in greater depth of stability and peace. This is a great asset for his successors and Ethiopia in the distant their future.

4. Post-Meles EPRDF Legitimacy

“Legitimacy” as the unchallenged right of political leaders to rule their people is by far the crucial factor in affecting, both negatively and positively, post-Great Leaders succession and political situations, including that of post-Meles Ethiopia.

Legitimacy is a real challenge of any political leadership every where in the world particularly in backward and agrarian countries for several major reasons. Above all else, legitimacy is a fundamental condition of effective political authority that can mobilize the people toward achieving the most demanded development goals. Insuring legitimacy is even more challenging for societies like that of ours for other timely reasons. Unlike the Weberian identification of Traditional and Charismatic sources, the Euro-American model of Rational-Legal source of political legitimacy is the only and dominant guarantee of legitimacy in the existing globalized politics, including Ethiopia. Legitimacy is an extremely expensive currency of ruling voluntary and supportive majority of people. This requires leaders of undergoing the most difficult process as sources of unbridled legitimacy in backward states are diverse, tiresome and complex.

It is only the progressive ideas of Great Leaders like Mao by use of their exceptional personality and extraordinary wisdom that it would be mostly possible to achieve legitimacy or acceptance by the people for rule. Only Great Leaders could cultivate the new values of order as accepted and agreed rules of the game, which otherwise means, that the survival of the new regime is quite questionable. Most Great Leaders, as a rule, step into the second phase of their mission, which is, galvanizing the society forward.

29 Despite a controversial extent of socio-economic transformation, Mao towered over the entire Chinese politics particularly in his extraordinary influence in curving up an exclusive Chinese view of life and national growth. At his sudden death, Mao was replaced by Ziejaw Ping who introduced some policy reforms but officially continued as basically Maoist. The succession of power was done contrarily to Western propaganda and scholarly prognosis of ‘looming leadership crisis’ and without having caused any disorder or confusion. Mao is currently widely revered as ‘the Great Leader’ of historical China across the present Chinese Generation of leaders and their population; his symbolism remained intact and having won the credit for the present remarkable economic achievement raising the country to global power status.
along the lines of their political ideologies, beliefs and programs to the greater ultimate goal.

The Italian leftist Scholar Antonio Gramscie\(^3\) characterizes this value (not power) dominance of Great Leaders as ‘Hegemonic Supremacy’ arguing that it is always achieved through convincing a sizable mass of citizens, setting actual examples and building trust in their mentalities. Legitimacy could never be achieved through brutality and use of naked force, and if it appeared so gained, it would definitely evaporate when the potential gets eroded. Derg suffered this crises; Emperor Haile Selasse, too, already was derailed of all his traditional sources of legitimacy in the 1970s that made the transition exceptionally peaceful.

The former Soviet Union failed to last longer than 70 years that it crumbled away in the early 1990s a year after the death of yet controversially another ‘Strong Leader’, Leonid Brezhnev. This happened when Brezhnev’s and Uri Andropov’s relatively young successor, Michael Gorbachove, tried to reform the Political System, which already declined to have finally stood on shaky socio-economic foundations and arrested dynamism. Economic decline, of course, seemed to be the major catalyst that caused the Soviet Collapse; this is meaningful however if understood as Soviet exhaustion of it legitimacy in the eyes and hearts of Soviet citizens and its former Republics. \(^3\)

Meles and his Party EPRDF underwent untold challenges in the last 21 years to attain legitimacy of rule particularly in most urban centers and some Regions. At taking control of Addis Ababa in May, 1991, Meles and his Party had had only a few bases and sources of legitimacy in major urban centers. That the Derg Regime was the worst ever rule was one source; the unreserved support of the Tigrian people, and relatively warm receptions in agrarian, pastoralist and remotest nations and nationalities as well as parts of Ethiopia were also additional sources of legitimacy. \(^2\)

Meles and his young government suffered the most variegated legitimacy in major urban areas particularly Addis Ababa, Desse, Gondar and others. The post-1997 Election crisis was an unquestionable demonstration of this legitimacy crisis. Eritrea’s separation and the change of Ethiopia into a land-locked state status, extremely negligible socio-economic dynamism, poor record of good governance, the loss of Badme area through judicial decision and others proved the harsh chances of legitimacy for Meles. Meles lost a lot of his comrades who were disparate of this cold reception by the people particularly after the Post-1997 election crisis. \(^3\)

Post-Meles Ethiopia’s politics would be at danger if Meles failed to achieve a reliable degree of a right to rule particularly in the last eight formative years of his rule. His remarkable success in socio-economic development along a broad-based line of wealth

\(^3\) Antonio Gramscie, False Consciousness of the Bourgeois Liberal Ideology, Prison notes, Rome Italy1,934.
\(^3\) Anderson, K. 1997. International Relations and the Contemporary World. USA.
\(^2\) Reporter, see Vol, 11, September., 2003
\(^3\) Reporter, see Vol, 11, September., 2003
distribution, the radical improvements in the global image of Ethiopia, the start of big national growth projects, etc, furnished unreserved legitimacy for his regime clearly consistently. His party EPRDF has proven wide acceptance of the people which manifests itself in what Mohamed Mahathir calls a massive psychological uplift—hope, trust and self-confidence as was evidenced by the peaceful and EPRDF landslide victory of the 2002 Election in Addis Ababa.

These developments may add up much heavier duties and responsibilities to post-Meles successors but least likely to trigger any appreciable concern of legitimacy. Equally, the smooth political transition is a fertile ground for the successors as it is the only guarantee for their survivals as a group of ruling elites under EPRDF. Questions over legitimacy take longer times only if there occurs an appreciable degree of arrest and deadlock in the present dynamism.

The recent smooth and peaceful power transition is also another asset of EPRDF’s Legitimacy.

5. Post-Meles State Institutions

In addition to all the above, the argument that post-Meles political situation shall see the continuation of the pre-Meles statuesque can be evidenced by the reliable existence and functioning of key institutions. Institutions like the Defense Forces, the Policies and National Security have been priority concerns of this enquiry from our own and other worst experiences of several developing states. Peaceful, stable and predictable developmental governance could be foiled or aborted due to military interventions in the political process.

Out of the 67 recorded coups and violent removals of Civilian Governments in Africa and Latin America in between 1950 and 1985, 64 were staged by military officers.

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34 African Economic Outlook 2012 3 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA. In 2011, the economy continued on the high-growth trajectory of the previous seven years. Growth has been broad-based, with the services and the industrial sectors growing at the highest rates. This momentum is expected to continue in 2012 and 2013, albeit at a slower pace. The five-year Growth and Transformation Plan(GTP), however, which emphasises agricultural transformation and industrial growth, projects the economy to grow at much higher rates. In the 2010/11 fiscal year (8 July – 7 July), macroeconomic management failed to reduce inflation, which was driven mainly by escalating food prices. Both domestic and exogenous factors were responsible for causing the resurgence in inflation. These include a loose monetary policy, rising prices of imported inputs, malfunctioning of the domestic market, and supply shocks. However, inflation is expected to decline notably in 2013 owing to continued macro stabilization efforts. The government has been pursuing prudent fiscal policies which have focused on boosting domestic revenue mobilization and reducing domestic borrowing. This has led to improvements in the fiscal position in 2011. The fiscal deficit is, nonetheless, expected to increase during the GTP period. The balance of payments position improved in 2010/11 on strong export growth and increases in private transfers and external financing. Between 2010 and 2011, exports grew substantially while imports slowed down, thereby contributing to improvements in the trade deficit. The trade deficit is expected to deteriorate in 2012 and 2013 which will contribute to a worsening of the current account during this period.
Ethiopia is one of the countries which had the bitterest memories of military rule for 17 years, full of bloodshed and backwardness. What value, institutional, procedural and legal guarantees are there here in Ethiopia with Meles Zenawi departing in death? How could the newly appointed Prime Minister, Haile Mariam Desalgn, a civilian without military experience of any kind, command such a strong and well armed national army cultivated for two decades by Meles Zenawi?

These fundamental questions dominating the process of Power Transition at present could be seen from two angles in the field of Political Sociology: the structural and functional angles. Structurally, the political leadership and statecraft are the unquestioned domains of civilian government leaders. Functionally, the military is only a segment of the larger society tasked to discharge a functional division of labor by delinking itself from political positions, ideologies and sectional beliefs. Specialized scholars in African politics empirically identified a set of what they call political recessionary conditions, which disturb this normal state of affairs by tempting and inviting the military to jump into politics to the extent of overtaking ultimate decision making seats. These include the following:

- Growing loss of public confidence and legitimacy in the incumbent government including all its levels, officials, the ruling party, and the chief leader, which usually aggravates people’s grievance, fury and practical resistances, for long;
- Loss of effective authority and capacity to rule by the incumbent government to stage a committed fight against public corruption, particularly kelptocracy (rule by corruption as a tolerated state value and practice), to the extent that it interrupts growth in structural terms;
- Resort by the alienated government leaders to naked use of force, attempt to build mass base among their ethnic groups by discriminately favoring them against constitutional formula and so on;
- A fast growing popular sense of losing national pride and experiencing international humiliation and shame by foreign states and communities due to state inability, failure and deepened crises as a result of defeat in war, aggravated poverty, and loss of hope, etc;
- Open alienation of the military as an institution from national all-rounded life in a way it could share both the benefits and hardships of the people, poor and inconsistent engagements of preparing the army and its members in all aspects,

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mainly academic education, moral and civic training, advanced military knowledge and the like.

According to these scholars, military intervention in politics more often than not, never happens for simply power’s sake unless there exist the above general crisis situations. When these conditions prevail for long, the conscious elites of the military tend to elevate themselves from functional duty to structural control of the state. Now, let us turn to our current case and study what Meles Zenawi did in this respect. Did Meles adequately cultivate a national army and commanders who are convinced to secularize themselves from political interventions?

One may appreciate the eyewitness words given by one of the early day’s comrade-in-arms of Meles (later deflecting or purged out) Aregawai Behreh. Aregawi associated the roles and ascendancy of Meles Zenawi to leadership across TPLF since 1984 with his effective effort to place the army under political leadership.39 Addisu Legese, the former Deputy Prime Minister under Melese before 2010, repeated these words in his condoling speech at the funeral of the former Prime Minister, Meles. He reminded that it was Meles who came boldly up with the strange idea at the time: Meles argued that the military was inherently an institution created primarily and ultimately for solely serving political goals under the party in the field and under the FDRE Constitution since 1995.40

These arguments of Meles were proven to be the unfolding institutional realities in Ethiopia as seen against two difficult events in Ethiopia’s national politics. Both Meles and leaders of the TPLF faction splintered after a heated inner-party dispute in 2002 assured the people of Ethiopia in different words that the national Defense Forces were never involved in the political crises. Meles said in April 2003 that the chances for the army to intervene not only in the then crises but also in any political matters were confidently below zero. It was also tipped at the same period by the existing Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Samora Yenus, that the Army’s loyalty is to nobody personally but to the Constitution. The message is clear: we are soldiers, and not politicians.

The commanders and officers of the Ethiopian armed forces again showed absolute obedience to political order when they decisively defeated the Eritrean army in 2000. It was the interest among many urban dwellers even top political officials to see the Eritrean government crushed by Ethiopia’s troops at the time. However, the army, as per political order from the Commander-in-Chief stopped its triumphant march at the 25th kilometer of the Eritrean territory, which is almost 1/4th of Eritrea’s land. at the time, General Samora Yenus informed the Ethiopian people the restraint from quick advance to Asmara was never a military issue but a political order.


40 The EFDRE Constitution, 1995. provides for the Ethiopian government t be a civilian institution and that power could not be seized by any manner other than provided in the constitution.
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalain has two obvious advantages as a constitutional commander-in-chief of the Ethiopian armed forces. Firstly, there is no any obvious source of threat to his power from the army for the above structural reasons; secondly, Hailemariam ascended to office at the very time where there was no any imminent danger to the stability of the country and his regime. Whatever appears to his stability disadvantages is only that which require a secondary police action. He could therefore avail himself of these advantages to teach himself and learn from other experienced guerrilla time commanders about military science if the need arises to give strategic orders.

Structurally, what is discussed at the point of ‘Post-Meles EPRDF Legitimacy’ above sufficiently shows that there are no national crack points that could justify any military intervention in politics at all.

6. Post-Meles International Relations and Diplomacy

The early 2000s, many witnesses across international donors and financial institutions with IMF and the World Bank being the major ones, were trying times for Ethiopia and Meles. Meles during this period was seen as extremely odd, obstinate and guerrilla-day minded leader in the eyes of specifically international bureaucrats who invaded the IMF. His image loomed so large simply for his insistence on the unusual policies he advanced amidst the fast blowing wind of neo-liberalism. Public ownership of land, the national financial sector, telecommunications, electricity and other corporations were the immediate and frequently cited references by IMF officials accusing Meles of poor commitment for structural reform, which was in vogue until he heroically pushed it to the age of their tables.

Let us have a brief look at how Joseph. E. Stieglitz41, who was the Vice President of the World Bank explained the harsh times Meles Zenawi passed in a bitter diplomatic fight with the IMF officials starting from conceptual intricacies and distortions posed by the latter:

*Ethiopia resisted the IMF’s demand that it “open” its banking system, for good reason. It had been what happened when one of its East African neighbors gave in to IMF demands. The IMF had insisted on financial market liberalization, believing that competitions among banks would lead to lower interest rates. The results were disastrous: the move was followed by very rapid growth of international and local banks, at a time when the banking legislation and banking supervision were in adequate, with predictable results—fourteen banking failures in Kenya in 1993 and 1994 alone. In the end interest rates increased, not decreased. Understandably, the government of Ethiopia was wary. Committed to improve the living standards of its citizens in the rural sector, it feared that liberalization will have a devastating effect on its economy. Those farmers have managed to get credit, would find themselves unable to buy seed or fertilizer because they would be unable to obtain cheap*

credit or would be forced higher interest rates which they could ill-afford. This is a country racked by droughts which result in massive starvation, it leaders did not want to make matters worse. The Ethiopians worried that the IMF’s advice would cause farmers’ incomes to fall, exasperating an already dismal situation (pp.24—34).

Stiglitz finally states how this diplomatic showdown was resolved by the forceful and determined struggle of Meles Zenawi who defeated first the economists at the World Bank, the, those of the IMF as an institution:

Faced with Ethiopia’s reluctance to accede to its demands, the IMF suggested the government was not serious about reform, and as I have said suspended the program. Happily, other economists in the World Bank and I managed to persuade the bank management the lending more money to Ethiopia made good sense: it was a country desperately in need, with a first rate economic framework and a government committed to improving the plight of it poor. World Bank lending tripled, even though it took months before the IMF finally relented it position (pp.33.).

This front of Ethiopia’s diplomacy, which is the specific point of worry for many Ethiopians in the absence of Meles has already been closed with Meles’s supremacy insured. This, of course, does not mean that there are not other more serious difficulties in the future. However, any student of diplomacy could judge that no future battle could be as a turning point as this one for no reasons but for ideological cleavage.

Under present circumstances, data show that Ethiopia’s sources for international fund have undergone tremendous transformations at two levels. Firstly, as Ministry of Foreign Affairs 42 reported in 2011, Ethiopia’s 60% of foreign loan shifted from the West to the East; namely, China; India is also a growing significant partner of Ethiopia in generously making available Capital Loan and Assistances and promised for further commitment. That Meles defeated the IMF helped the Ethiopian government further to amass very needed experience in insuring macroeconomic stability, which has continued to characterize Ethiopian international trade in the previous eight years.

As independent data show, Ethiopia has started earning a fast growing popularity for its distinct and perfectly Ethiopic path of development among members of the G8, G20 and other global partnerships. Ethiopia won the attractions of European investment particularly the Turkish, Italian, and French companies, which consistently keeps Ethiopian Africa’s rank at the list of one of the top ten. This is the legacy in short Meles bequeathed to his successors at his death. The future duty of these successors is to speed up the tempo as they are, from the study we saw above, least likely, faced with compelling domestic or international developments in the foreseeable future.

7. Post-Meles Challenges

Challenges will undoubtedly accompany the post-Meles politics of Ethiopia amidst all these opportunities including the following.

42 Former Deputy Prime Minster and Minister for Foreign Affairs Hailemariam Desalgn presented annual work report to the House of Peoples’ Representatives.
1. The most difficult and formidable predicament to challenge the new post-Meles leaders lies more vividly in the **theoretical front** than in the practical one. Bringing Meles-launched development projects are probably of the least weight of worry, unlike the fears of many Ethiopians. The real challenge is the theoretical part because this front demands deep insights at the individual level which any body scarcely can copy outright from Meles. Every step Meles walked obviously had abstract theoretical roots. Meles was as much a practitioner as he was a theorizer with proven quality of reducing diverse, complicated and too dynamic phenomena in the social environment to a comprehensible perspective.

The key challenges of this category posed to the new leaders could be demonstrated in some concrete examples:

- By how much speed is such transitional theoretical guidelines like Revolutionary Democracy and the Developmental State thesis are wearing out to be replaced by neo-liberal versions of policy foundations?
- What are the precise Alignments of national, regional, international and global social forces during the possible occurrence of this crisis or that opportunity?
- What are the implications of a global turbulence like interstate war, terrorist act, revolutionary upheaval or similar occurrences to Ethiopia’s peace and development?
- What will be the most likely cost-benefit balance-shit, if for instance, Eritrea or Southern Sudan, for some reason, undertakes sudden government changes or, hypothetically speaking, they request for incorporation into the Ethiopian Federation? And similar other questions

The new leaders may not be required to become as laborious as Meles was or to be smart theoreticians as much of the assignments were done by him. However, the challenge could never be ruled out especially when crises situations suddenly erupt requiring demanding them applying quick mental interpretations and theoretical reconfigurations of facts before soliciting the advice of other comrades. Meles’s absence with his **keen economics insights** may also create a missing link in the management of specifically macro-economic processes, which in its turn affects microeconomic coordination.

2. Possible confusions, as the result of the above, of **slow and long learning period** may adversely affect the speed by the new leaders to swiftly fill the gap. This is determined by their views how they understand imperatives of collective leadership versus efficient and rapid decision making capacities. If they permanently hold the principle of ‘collective leadership’ more as a philosophy than as a political expediency of a transition period, they should remember that Ethiopia’s development need requires heavily a fast deciding Executive;

3. Possible tendencies in the aggravation of **corrupt practices**, reversals in the speed and commitments of public reform projects across the public sector may also occur. Until the specific ways Meles was following to deal with these challenges were fully rediscovered, reinstated and exercised, the new leaders might suffer information breakages, data
insufficiency and slow analytic tempos over regulating the behaviors of the public sector, even the members of the ruling party;

4. Exaggerated sense of **heightened responsibility** to public expectations will also be another psychological predicament of the post-Meles politics of Ethiopia. The new leaders very well know that the people tend to rush to blame an appreciable degree of failure on them by qualifying them as ‘mediocre’ as compared to Meles. On the other hand, the new leaders understand that any good achievement recorded will be going to Meles by most people until Meles-initiated development plans and his dominant image in their minds gradually fade for the coming, at least, five years.

5. The new leaders may also encounter coordinated and consciously **calculated domestic and external counter-ideological and political pressures** by circles. These circles may make moves to exploit the absence of Meles to their advantages. Meles’s supremacy over these circles should be viewed against dynamic and new developments. The most notable are a few private newspapers waving minor conflicts, Conservative Opposition Parties (of course with fast declining influence) civil societies enjoying generous external support due to their role of crisis reporting to foreign agents, some countries in the developed part and the global media and so on.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

Almost all the Descriptions post-Meles political, social and economic realities of Ethiopia reasonably fit the Evolutionary Adaptive approach. That implies to the fact that Meles’s legacies are most likely to persist in Ethiopia for the coming decade as he left, precisely speaking, dynamic Ethiopia behind him. By these, one may safely conclude that almost all Meles-engineered principles, values, and views which were once seen as heresies by a lot of critics in the 1980s and early 1990s, have now become perfect prophecies. Thus, if Meles Zenawi was the builder of the new Ethiopian statecraft over the last 21 years, it is logically consistent to believe that Halemariam Desalign will be its pilot.

As we saw from or study, socio-economic growth will most likely continue with slight variations against set goals in the remaining three years of the GTP period. Almost all development projects will definitely see successful completions still with some natural variations in time and space. As the result, Ethiopia’s expected growth rate of, at least, 11% could reasonably met. Despite some irregularities, no significant adverse changes will likely to occur in climate conditions, accessing financial sources, employment rate and wealth distribution.

In the security domain, post-Meles Ethiopia is least vulnerable to external security threats as much as domestic ones. There might be possibilities for sectarian clashes but within police capabilities to control. The deadlocked peace process with Eritrea appears to continue with no change in its momentum but Eritreans may renew diplomatic efforts to exert influences. Eritrea as a security threat however almost died a natural death. Possible pressure may come from Egypt for increased surveillance privileges over the Renaissance
Dam. The politicians may attempt to use a blend of tactics to win outright attentions but the possibility for armed conformations will almost likely be dim.

Thus, the key point of recommendation is that the new leaders must give the highest most priority for maintaining *unstoppable dynamism* at all levels as the center dynamo of Ethiopia’s internal and external peace. As was the case during Meles’s presence, the state will continue to be the major stakeholder in supplying the engines of top-down dynamism to be sustained by bottom-up responses. The leaders are expected to pay at most attentions for initiating and reenergizing the Public Sector Reform afresh by exploiting the prevailing majority mind set-up following Meles’s death.

The new leaders are also expected to be sure about insuring general dynamism not only in the socio-economic front but also in the policy regime established by Meles. Meles’s theoretical themes enshrined in the document should not be seen as either technicality issues or as biblical underpinnings. They need be subject to timely appraisal and examinations. They should also be tested against new challenges and opportunities. In a nutshell, the new leaders should always give a new lease of life into them.

As usual, a maximum restraint by the new leadership in the use of force will be expected to continue as one strategy devised by Meles Zenawi in cases of possible sectional crisis. Any citizen, as the empirically emerging trends in Ethiopia have held now, must feel a growing sense of confidence about governments’ loyalty to his/her self-emancipation. Civic trust should be given chances specifically about the fact that the armed forces and the security personnel across the street are never threats to anyone’s safety and peace.