Following return from my recent trip to Ethiopia (1 January to 6 February 2006) I reviewed this assessment of the situation in light of approx. 4,500 km. of travel in several regions of the country and a week of conversations in Addis Ababa with a wide range of people, including high officials. I see no reason to make any significant changes I made in this assessment.
Paul B. Henze
6 March 2006
CONTRA CLAPHAM
by Paul B. Henze
Introduction: I consider Christopher Clapham's judgment of the current Ethiopian post-electoral crisis too categorical, too negative a review of EPRDF history and performance, and too charitable in its assessment of opposition motivation and behavior. The fact the EPRDF has been 14 years in power does not justify an attempt to replace it by resort to extra-legal methods or incitement to violence. Major opposition groups' long record of refusal to participate in the political process raises serious questions about their leaders' intentions. The comments which follow summarize the most important factors I raised with Christopher in a message to him on 10 November 2005:
TPLF/EPRDF Performance
Having been in close and almost continual contact with the TPLF leadership since 1990, I find it difficult to regard these men as dishonest and inclined toward fraud. They started out as student rebels infected with Marxism-Leninism, it is true. They did not find it easy to shed the illusions that Soviet propaganda among students in the 1960s had left with them. But the best of them--Meles, Seyoum, Berhane Gebre Christos and others--were mentally sharp and had the independence of mind, in spite of their isolation in Tigray, to realize what was happening in the world of the 1980s. They had avoided dependence on Soviet or Chinese support during their guerrilla struggle. (It is true that the Soviets underestimated and ignored them; but I know of no evidence that they ever seriously sought support from Soviets, East Europeans or Chinese, let alone radical Arabs.) By 1990 they had evolved from Tigrayan particularists to Ethiopian patriots, just as I speculated in the mid-1980s that they were likely to do. They did this on their own. But they still came to power with almost no experience in governing. Forming the EPRDF, they led the final phase of the anti-Derg offensive and, on defeating the Derg's armies, proceeded to set up a new kind of government in Ethiopia. Their recognition of the need to adjust to the realities of the world of the end of the 20th century was combined with a set of attitudes deriving from the traditional culture of town of Adwa, not a bad foundation on which to build.
Some early decisions have resulted in difficulty: (1) adherence to ethnic structuralism; (2) Reliance on PDOs; (3) dogma on land ownership. They initially moved too slowly on the economy. They failed to open their own internal political structure. But they took a number of steps that a group eager to establish a permanent dictatorship would have avoided: (1) they opened the society to creation of free institutions--political parties and other kinds of organizations; (2) they encouraged exiles to return and be active politically; (3) they removed restrictions on internal movement of citizens and granted passports freely; (4) they adopted a completely neutral, but not hostile, stance toward religion; (5) they permitted an independent press; (6) they committed themselves to establishing a system of rule of law and set in motion a process for drafting a liberal constitution; (6) they restored relations with the outside world.
Facing up to economic problems, they embarked on a program for expansion of infrastructure--roads, dams, electric lines and telecommunications. Thus they laid a sound basis for economic and social progress. They committed themselves to overcoming the famine problem. Some EPRDF approaches worked well and some less so; some had unintended consequences (Removing restrictions on internal movement has resulted in doubling of the population of Addis Ababa, creating the urban proletariat which the CUD has mobilized against them.) Compared to the experience of most ex-communist countries they merit a positive score. Economically they have gradually abandoned restrictive practices and broadened competition, a process not yet complete, but the trends all have been in positive directions. They have achieved respectable levels of economic growth, avoided collapse of the currency (in contrast to the experience of every other post-communist government.) In recent years they have begun to attract Ethiopians from the diaspora to return and invest.
I believe, based on frequent conversations with them in 1990-91, that EPRDF leaders came to power committed to creating a workable multi-party system. They expected exiles to contribute to this process as well as internal groups. The national conference of 1-5 July 1991 is evidence of this commitment. The hasty 1992 elections created an administrative structure but failed to advance opposition party formation. Kifle Wodajo oversaw the creation of the new constitution. Meanwhile, however, major opposition groups had evolved in a negative direction. The OLF, which had only partially and reluctantly agreed to cooperate with the EPRDF during the last stages of its southward advance, broke and returned--albeit ineptly--to armed conflict, occasional terrorism and more recently to opportunistic collaboration with hostile Eritrea. Other major groups agitated for roles in government without demonstrating capacity to perform and fell into a pattern of rejectionism and non-participation. Avoiding serious policy prescriptions, they concentrated instead on appealing to all-too-willing, well-intentioned but naive foreign governments and sympathizers to force the EPRDF to share power with them. This led to a steadily down-spiralling syndrome which has brought the country to the current crisis.
Opposition Evolution
Opposition groups displayed little creativity and no skill in taking advantage of the openings the constitution offered for gaining influence and participating in the political process. Friendly foreign governments and private organizations failed to insist that opposition parties recognize the most basic requirement of democratic practice: that participation is necessary for political effectiveness. The EPRDF commitment to regionalization offered openings for political activity on local and regional levels which were never exploited by urban-oriented opposition leaders focussed exclusively on the capital. Persistent rejectionism, combined in recent years with reduced response from foreign governments and private organizations, frustrated opposition parties and led them to think in terms of action outside the electoral framework. The EPRDF became increasingly disinclined to regard opposition leaders as partners for negotiation. Both government and opposition thus encouraged the worst tendencies of each other.
The decision of CUD and UEDF, along with a few minor parties, to participate in the May 2005 elections seemed to demonstrate that they had at last abandoned rejectionism and were ready to compete wholeheartedly in the political process. The EPRDF committed itself to open elections and invited significant groups of foreign observers. Preparations were elaborate and met the approval of foreign governments and international organizations. The final phase of the campaign saw brought opposition demonstrations with an excess of demagogic rhetoric--calls for reversal of Eritrean independence, takeover of Assab and unrealistic economic and social promises. CUD let the impression spread that it championed the interests of the Amhara and of Orthodox Christians. Its vocal diaspora support reinforced this perception. Extreme rhetoric was dismissed by many Ethiopians and foreign observers as electioneering excess of the kind that occurs in most mature democratic systems. (I was in Addis Ababa in early May and heard concern from serious people about unrealistic promises, as well as the pernicious effect of Negede Gobeze's book and the radical behavior of Lidetu Ayalew.) The government was alerted to existence of urban dissatisfaction, but did not realize its extent. The remarkably peaceful conditions under which voting proceeded and the huge turnout are a tribute to the political seriousness and maturity of the overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian population, but did not necessarily indicate political alienation throughout the rest of the country.)
If the government unwisely let some election results be announced prematurely, the opposition (particularly CUD) equally unwisely rushed to announce that it had been the victim of fraud almost before voting was finished. Observers nevertheless pronounced the voting process fair and orderly. Was there government-instigated fraud on a massive scale? We have only the allegations of the opposition, no other proof. Complaints which could be taken seriously (made both by the government and opposition) resulted in repeat elections in some constituencies which met observers' approval. Fraud allegations nevertheless continued and intensified, centered on the performance of the National Electoral Board.
Early opposition allegations of fraud brought demonstrations in the capital in June which resulted in destruction of property, looting and attacks on police. Police and security forces responded quickly and killings (both of demonstrators and police) occurred which shocked everybody. Violence ceased. Opposition leaders insisted that they had called only for peaceful demonstrations. (The claim has become hypocritical in light of opposition calls for demonstrations and strikes in October which, given the experience in June, had to entail the risk of provoking large-scale violence and, in turn, stern countermeasures by the government.) Opposition claims of massive fraud and cover-up by the NEB persisted and became journalistic conventional wisdom. Meanwhile the government gave evidence that Ana Gomes, head of the EU electoral observer mission had favored the opposition from the beginning.
After the government announced results which gave it a majority in parliament but recognized significant gains for opposition groups, opposition leaders wavered in deciding whether to take seats. Some opposition leaders went through the motions of consultation with constituents. UEDF moved toward a decision to take parliamentary seats against the objections of some of its members and defection of a major component of its coalition. As the emotional temperature of the situation rose during October, CUD showed little concern about violence and encouraged planning for demonstrations, strikes and other forms of ostensible passive resistance. While the aim of some opposition elements may have been to alarm the EPRDF into negotiations for a "government of national unity", this objective, if it was a ever serious possibility, faded into the background. It is not a normal result of close outcomes of democratic elections.
Meanwhile CUD leaders had flown to the United States and campaigned among diaspora elements who have been chronically opposed to EPRDF rule. Diaspora funds were collected to support CUD. Ex-Derg and Amhara-Centrist groups, of which there are many in the US, have been actively propagandizing for CUD and pressuring the US Government and the World Bank to terminate aid to Ethiopia. Declarations made by Mesfin Wolde Mariam and Hailu Shawel in diaspora meetings in Washington justified violence as a means of forcing the EPRDF government to surrender power. Talk of a "Rose Revolution" of the type which occurred in Georgia in 2003 and later in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan became current among diaspora activists.
Did CUD leaders enter the May elections with the intention of taking the seats they might win? Or did they plan from the beginning to return to rejectionism and provoke violence? Was the aim of some of them, following Negede Gobeze's urging, to raise the tactic of rejectionism to a higher level of political sophistication--consciously using allegations of fraud to foment disorder that would force EPRDF leadership to flee? If this was the hope or intention of some, it was a miscalculation. Instead the disorders of late October and early November provoked another violent response from the government and led to incarceration of CUD leaders. EPRDF positions hardened.
There are constructive tendencies evident. 407 of 547 members elected to parliament took their seats when it met. These included most UEDF members elected, but only six from CUD. Minor parties have been unsure and no doubt under pressure from both EPRDF and CUD. Whether parliament has yet engaged in any serious business is doubtful. Most serious is CUD's refusal to take responsibility for governing Addis Ababa--which it clearly won. This has forced the EPRDF to appoint a makeshift administration for a strife-torn capital. The country-wide general strike which CUD called fizzled with the arrest of CUD leaders. Meanwhile splits and shifts among members of both coalitions are evident. There is still too little information available to gauge the extent of dissatisfaction in major regional centers, though in most of them EPRDF appears to have consolidated effective control.
What is to be Done?
An internationally recognized government which maintains violence has been consciously perpetrated against it with the aim of effecting a coup d'etat should be respected. Its 14-year record of responsible leadership should be taken into account. At the same time, if CUD leaders are to be brought to trial, the government must provide concrete evidence of illegal actions by CUD leaders. Trials must meet acceptable international standards. The government also has an obligation to provide proof of tendentious actions by the EU or other observer missions or other groups--including efforts by diaspora elements--to aid and abet nefarious opposition purposes.
Efforts are under way by the international community to achieve amelioration of the situation in all respects. It is not too late to return to multi-party politics and possibly early future elections, but these must entail a commitment by parties which participate that their candidates will take office if elected.
EPRDF-led Ethiopia has been the only comparatively stable country in the Horn of Africa and the only country with untroubled relations with the United States, Canada and major countries of Europe. Its record for cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in serving other international purposes is excellent. It has continually cooperated in efforts to improve the situation in Somalia, unsuccessful as these efforts have been.
Eritrea remains a threat. Isaias might be tempted to generate a border fracas and blame it on Ethiopia. His international reputation is in a shambles and he must know his army is in doubtful condition. The most recent information is that almost 10,000 young Eritreans have crossed into Ethiopia already this year to avoid military service. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Ethiopia has been unfairly dealt with by the UN-appointed border commission.
There will be pressures for release of incarcerated opposition leaders and followers. Conditions for their release should be negotiated, but the EPRDF will not easily abandon the judicial approach it has already embarked upon.
The situation calls for carefully considered action and creativity on the part of everyone, Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia.
If Ethiopia cannot be steered back onto a stable course, can much be done for most of the rest of Africa? The Economist boldly poses these questions this week but provides no answers. Order is being reimposed in the country. Meles and his colleagues will no doubt continue to keep the army and security forces on the alert. Force alone cannot, however, be the permanent answer.
Washington, Virginia
14 November 2005