R O C K-S O L I D AS E V E R!


Fr o m B a d e m e T o K i s m a y o
GENENEW ASSEFA
With the support of the spectacularly swift counteroffensive jointly launched by the TFG and Ethiopian armies, the people of Somali have freed themselves from the tenacious tyrannical grip of the UIC-Jihadists. As lightening has been the campaign, it must be noted that the decision to commence the campaign was preceded by a patient and repeated diplomatic effort to diffuse the mounting tension through dialogue and negotiations. Emboldened by the presence of Eritrean battalions within its turf, the arrival of veteran Mujahdins ‘without-boarders’ and the steady flow of generous Al Qaeda financial subsidy, the bellicose UIC leaders rebuffed all diplomatic overtures. Instead, bloated by a false sense of invincibility, the Jihadists vowed to wage a holy war against Ethiopia and liberate the Ogaden from a Christian hegemon. They pinned their unexamined certainty in victory on: 1) wishful thinking that when war erupts Ethiopian-Somalis would shift allegiance to Mogadishu, and 2) a naive trust in Issayas’ hoax that Eritrea would join the fray, forcing Ethiopia to defend itself on two fronts. What, however, sealed UIC's intransigency was their other equally paltry assessment and presumption that Ethiopia has been enfeebled by: I) the divisive post-election political crisis, II) defections in its army’s officer corps, III) widespread urban political disgruntlement, IV) slackened donor support, and V) increased frontier insurgency incursions. By adding all these up in their franticly swirling brains, the Jihadists ruled out from their skewed calculations Ethiopia’s capability to launch the kind of counteroffensive that dissolved them into thin air.  

Foreign experts, think-tanks and media pundits also reinforced the Jihadists’ self-deluding assessment of Ethiopia’s putative weakness. Many warned that any military action against the Jihadists would end in Ethiopia’s humiliating defeat and a possible Horn-wide military entanglement. A commonly shared prognosis among these so called experts run: given the recent internal disunity, war with Jihadist would risk Ethiopia’s very survival. Others based their bleak premonition on the October gruesome Jimma incident believed to have been sparked by militant Islamist stirrings in the area. Citing this isolated incident, some opined that war with the Jihadists would trigger a local Islamic backlash that could plunge the country into a religious civil war. In a slightly different vain there were also those, contrary to the known facts, who dismissed Ethiopia’s decision to defend itself as a vengeful US proxy war against Somalia. Unfamiliar with its history and its formative ideological background, these ‘experts’ believe that the EPRDF would, like any foreign stooge, put Ethiopian soldiers in harms way to do Washington’s bidding. At any rate, every self-proclaimed Horn analyst waxed eloquent on the grim reality that awaited Ethiopia if its leadership were reckless enough to opt for a non-diplomatic tactic to thwart the Jihadist threat. Ironically none of theses pundits had anything to offer by way of an alternative suggestion to deescalate the crisis that Ethiopia had not tried and failed. Like all UN, AU, EU, and IGAD member states, Ethiopia backed the TFG. But alone among these nations it was only Ethiopia that the Jihadists attacked using surrogate outfits such as the ONLF and OLF.

Despite UIC’s open, repeated and highly publicized declarations of war, the Ethiopian leadership insisted on dialogue and negotiation and initiated several face-to-face discussions with the saber-rattling Mogadishu authorities. Determined not to be distracted from its single most important agenda of ending dependency on food aid , the Ethiopian government continued, albeit unsuccessfully, with its peace effort. In a last-minute shuttle diplomacy the Ethiopian government even went further and held two additional rounds of secret meetings with the UIC in two separate nearby states. But for the colored-beard pseudo-sheikhs, Ethiopia’s successive gestures of goodwill were nothing but signs of weakness and lack of resolve. Egged on by Issayas whose chief strategy since Eritrea’s humiliating defeat at Bademe has been destabilizing Ethiopia by a proxy, the Jihadist geared for war. They even set a precise date for what they openly described as a religious war which sadly for them turned to be Moai’d al Mott (rendezvous with death). Alas! The die was cast. On the fateful day of December 22, they launched an ill-advised double- pronged offensive in the hope of a quick victory. Ignorant of the Ethiopian army’s combat skills and the experience of its commanders, the ragtag Jihadist army and its OLF/ONLF auxiliary tried to simultaneously overrun the TFG’s stronghold at Baidowa and Ethiopian positions near the Ogaden boarder.

On both fronts the offensive ended in a debacle with heavy Eritrean and Mujahdin causalities not to mention the huge toll suffered by the local clan-militia rank and file. Worst still, the breathtaking counteroffensive sent the remnants of the routed army reeling back as far as the Somali-Kenyan boarder, abandoning along the way town after town in the desperate hope of finding respite from Ethiopia’s relentless onslaught. Fast in the fleeing heels of what was left of the Jihadist army and---- in less than 11 days of the war---- the legitimate TFG reentered Mogadishu to a tumultuous welcome of the residents of the city who were tired of the abuses and double standards of the neo-Talibanist regime. News Mogadishu’s liberation was also greeted by a huge sigh of relief in Ethiopia amid great admiration for the bravery of the Ethiopian army. For many were apprehensive that were would drag beyond Ethiopia’s capacity to endure. The anxiety was also reflected in parliament where some MPs cast a dissenting vote against the operation. Regardless of the wisdom of their stance, the mere fact that there was no unanimity on such a very important issue shows that the Ethiopian House of Representative is no rubberstamp parliament. In this regard, given the EPRDF’s commitment to a robust legislative body, it may not be advisable to characterize those that failed to endorse its national self-defense motion as anti-constitutional. Theses dissenters may not have lived up to their responsibilities, but to characterize their failing as an act beyond the pail of the constitution neither jives with spirit of tolerance that the ruling party seeks to inculcate nor with magnanimity.

To return to our main story, so far, the nightmarish predictions of the so-called experts have not come true. Jugging by the Somali people’s jubilant reception of the Ethiopian army, on the one hand, and given the promising signs of a quickened deployment of an international peacekeeping force, on the other, the forecasted widespread anti-Ethiopian violent outburst is even less likely. If truth be told, not many military operations have in recent years gone as smoothly, effectively and expeditiously as has Ethiopia’s counteroffensive with minimal Ethiopian causality. By any standards, it was indeed a clinically executed operation with none of the tragic and messy civilian causalities that certain states nonchalantly brush aside as ‘collateral damage’ No one in the right frame of mind can therefore attribute this spectacular success to accident or a stroke of lack. Not even the most superficial observer can deny that behind this superbly conducted counteroffensive went meticulous planning. Planning that undoubtedly reflects the high mental caliber of the Ethiopian political and military leadership. Certainly the whole dramatic episode underscores that Ethiopia’s is not a leadership that is easily provoked into taking premature action. But one that has the cerebral agility and acumen capable of carefully weighing a dangerous situation from every possible angle and exhausting all peaceful avenues before embarking on a military course. This is not the first time that this leadership has demonstrated its capability to masterfully conduct both war and diplomacy. Recall how during the Ethio-Eritrean war with what dexterity it isolated the Eritrean government from the diplomatic arena; build an army almost from a scratch and delivered a crushing blow to Issayas’ war machine. On the domestic front, recall too how in the face of a potentially explosive post-election political countdown, the EPRDF leadership, despite being mistaken for weakness, displayed calm, restraint and patience. And, when the crisis reached an unacceptable threshold, how it cut off the leaders responsible for the crisis from their urban riotous fans and decisively dealt with both at, though tragic, but manageable cost to state and society. Instead of heeding Issayas’ self-serving but perilous advice, the Jihadist therefore should have studied how the EPRDF deal with those that conspire to deliver it a mortal blow. They would have been much better off today had they taken a good stock of EPRDF’s consistent record of catching unawares and crushing any foe foolish and arrogant enough to underestimate its uncanny ability in this department.

The leadership’s ability to outflank hostile adversaries alone cannot explain why the EPRDF succeeds where others fail. What most fly-by-night foreign journalists, pundits, commentators and now the Jihadists overlook is that the government has a solid social base that steadily grows as the party’s equally impressive development strategy bears fruit. Overwhelmed by the prevailing rumor-based urban political culture, many tend to underrate EPRDF’s strength. Clueless are such gullible expert-analysts’ as are certain domestic opposition leaders and their shrill diaspora counterparts that the EPRDF has a vast reservoir of rural support. A redoubtable rear on whose backing the EPRDF not only won its last election battles but also foiled successive foolhardy political and military threats. It is precisely because of this solid social base why, for instance, in the last two years alone the EPRDF accomplished much and overcame a series of unanticipated daunting obstacles.

As we all saw, in May 2005 the EPRDF organized a huge national election where more that twenty-five million people voted, including those who live in remote areas that foreign travelers describe as ‘logistical nightmare’. The same year it had to quell a massive urban upheaval that could have escalated into an intractable political turmoil. Even before completely restoring full normalcy to the country, the government had to cope with a major natural disaster and provide urgent relief to hundreds of thousands of flood victims. And, today without pushing the flood-related rehabilitative work to a backburner, the EPRDF government had to dispatch its army as far as the shores of the Indian Ocean with one clearly announced mission. To disband those who posed what Meles described as a ‘clear and present danger’.

What is important to note here is that the EPRDF effectively met all these successive challenges without a slack in the implementation of its development strategy. Indeed the increasing number of farmers that are receiving prize awards for enriching themselves through hard work and application of the government’s improved agricultural techniques bears testimony that there is no slacking on the development front. The hundreds of farmers who, at Ethiopia fist ‘Farmers Festival’, were honored for earning more than half-a-million Birr by Meles himself signify a great deal. For instance the coincidental timing of the Festival and the launching of Ethiopia’s counteroffensive alone is ample proof that nothing can derail the EPRDF from its anti-poverty agenda. Surly, had the government been as weak as its detractors have in recent months come to believe, it could never have overcome as it successfully did the snags cited above. Short of internal discord, the EPRDF will remain as solid as ever for there is no external or internal hostile adversary that can, by muscular fiat, prevail against it. Hence, the myth that the EPRF has lost its luster must be buried in the graveyards of Mogadishu side by side with the Jihadists who swore to put all Ethiopians to the sword.

Though many will disagree, Ethiopia’s successful intervention could be a unique opportunity to reconstruct a united states of Somali--- one nation under one federal government--- where every clan and region has equal stake. This might well turnout to be the golden moment that most Somalis haven waiting for. A rare opportunity, one must hasten to add, for the Somali citizens to collectively reflect hard on their condition and abandon the beaten path of clan animosity and rebuild their country. The world expects the Somali political elites to seize the times, turn their back on the legacy of clan-based warfare, and open a new peaceful leaf in their history. If the Somali people are resolved to take on this challenge, they can rest assured that they have a dependable partner in the Ethiopian government. As in the past, it will gladly oblige in providing whatever assistance it could. But the best that the EPRDF can offer its troubled neighbor is share its rich experience in forging a durable and free federal order in a war-torn, multiethnic and multilingual society. Whatever the immediate future holds for Somalia, one thing is certain. Now that its job is almost done, the Ethiopian army will return home for the leadership knows that a prolonged stay will neither serve Ethiopia’s or Somali’s interest. If by some unfortunate turn of events the process of nation re-building is derailed, a corresponding delay in Ethiopian’s withdrawal timetable could augment the risk of being sucked into the quicksand failed-state politics. No one knows better than Meles the forebodingly hazardous scenario of being bogged down in a country which as recently as yesterday was a virtual labyrinth of violently shifting alliances akin to a Hobssian world of all against all. Hopefully, now that there is a palpably improved environment, Somalia will never return to such a discredited fratricidal past and, with
African solidarity and generous donor support, she could sooner than later regain her rightful place in the international system of nation-states.

December 31, 2006