The following article that has a hallmark of the OLF sheds light to the current thinking of the OLF. It is amazing to see the OLF after so many years of its existence is still measuring and evaluating the political landscape that is shaped and molded by other actors. OLF admits yesterday’s child CUD is doing much better than the senior OLF. OLF seems no to learn from its past mistakes. It is still hallucinating in coupdetaa and street demonstrations to bring change. The article has been edited for clarity.
[Z Dagne]
OLF ANSWERING “THE REAL QUESTIONS THAT CAME
TO THE FORE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MAY ELECTIONS”
OLF on the possibility of TPLF/EPRDF relinquishing power?
It should be apparent to anyone by now that the TPLF/EPRDF is not ready and will
not relinquish power at this moment. It has never been and never will be. The
CUD is likely to continue to claim victory or complain about election irregularities
but TPLF/EPRDF is unlikely to budge. However if the CUD continues on the current
course and if the international community does not pressure the two sides to
accept the result, physical confrontation might be inevitable down the line.
Talk of civil war is premature now and an exaggeration but at least a public
disturbance of limited duration sounds plausible and to be expected.
OLF on the possibility of TPLF/EPRDF Sharing power?
There are some on both sides of the divide as well as in the
international community who are worried enough about the situation as to
suggest a dialogue perhaps leading to the formation of some kind of a unity
government composed of the ruling party and the opposition. The UEDF has openly
called for it to solve the gridlock. However, neither the TPLF/EPRDF nor the
CUD has shown any interest in the proposal. UEDF is less important and may
even indicate a possible rapture within the opposition camp. The TPLF/EPRDF is
not likely to accept this proposal at all. In fact, some contend that it is
likely to continue to govern as if nothing has changed. The nature of TPLF
lends credence to this conclusion. This is more so given that the international
community will not put real pressure until the situation deteriorates.
OLF on any possibility of civil disturbance?
People power is becoming a potent weapon throughout the world. Copycat examples
are spreading throughout the world as a wild fire and it appears that this
fever has also reached Addis. The CUD is threatening to use this potent force.
The sense is that Meles is weak. The vulnerability of this regime is already
exposed. Whatever the desire, plan or inclination of the CUD to pressure the
government through popular action, it is now preempted by the regime’s drastic
action. The CUD seems agitated for action but now that the element of surprise
is lost, it is difficult to imagine how their urban constituency, who are
traditionally risk-averse when it takes to physically confronting a government
whose security structures are in tact, would react. The Amhara are unlikely to
risk chaos as it works against them. Chaos favors the Oromo, their
nemesis, because the latter could use the opportunity to reorganize, take
center-stage and become a force that can dictate the future political course in
Ethiopia.
If the Amhara goes ahead with the threat of popular action, the first
victim will be the Tigrean community in Addis, especially the business class.
Given the insecurity felt by Tigreans and the possible repercussion of a riot
in Addis on Tigrean businesses, the TPLF will act decisively to prevent the repeat
of what happened in 2001 where many Tigrean businesses were ransacked and
looted.
Currently the loyalty of the security forces is not in question-it is firmly in TPLF’s hands. However, it will be important to investigate if the CUD has done its homework within the security forces, especially through ANDM and disgruntled Tigrean officers. The CUD will stage protests only if its leaders are assured of the neutrality or support of the security forces and/or if they have assurance from global powers such as the US. Currently neither is on the horizon.
OLF asking could there be trouble within the
TPLF/EPRDF itself?
The big shots of the TPLF/EPRDF are ousted by the election. Strangely
enough there is nothing in the constitution to prevent them from retaining
their cabinet posts. Although severely racked by internal tension and shaken by
the public’s rejections of its policies, OPDO still has the largest number of seats
in the parliament. ANDM is clearly decimated by the election, loosing almost half
of its seats with almost all of its top leadership having been thrown out. But,
it will continue to use its influence within the bureaucracy to wield more power
than it deserves even if the OPDO may accuse it of allowing a right-wing Amhara
take over. There has always been tension between OPDO and ANDM. The latter had
a higher position next to TPLF in the TPLF/EPRDF hierarchy.
The top echelon of OPDO is seemingly worried about the prospect
of loosing power to the CUD and is not thinking much
about readjusting its position within the ruling alliance. Since
the OPDO does not have an Oromo chain of command, chances are those advocating
a more nationalist agenda will soon be silenced. Others will be debilitated
with the fear of
further purges and loosing their personal amenities and will fall in line as they
have always done.
Logic suggests a serious trouble within TPLF/EPRDF. But logic and the
facts tell a different story. It is important to note that the real force
behind EPRDF is really TPLF. TPLF is still strong and firmly in charge. The
uneasiness of the Tigreans will add to this strength. So long as it has sole
control of the security forces, its dominant position will remain unchallenged.
Thus the
question of a trouble within TPLF/EPRDF is not a real one. This does not
however mean that we[OLF] should relent from expanding our clandestine efforts
to won members of the OPDO away from the TPLF and into the Oromo camp.
OLF asking is the CUD an election phenomenon or
real thing?
The old dictum is that whoever rules Addis/Finfinne also rules Ethiopia. Not only has the capital, the CUD won a majority in many of the major
cities. The question is does winning the mayor’s seat or the council amount to
governing a
city? This is an interesting question. Despite the fact that many of its leaders
are advanced in age, the organization is still too young and untested in many
respects. It is only six months old. It brings together strong-minded
individuals who see themselves as defacto leaders. Power struggle is a distinct
possibility. Although it won only
in the capital and the Amhara region, it will be foolish to underestimate this force.
However one may find their message retrograde, it has struck a chord with most
of the sectors of the urban Amhara and Gurage population. It is true that its
agenda arouses the most vocal opposition from Tigray to Oromia to the South and
all the way to Eritrea. If the CUD continues to face on serious opposition from
others, their profile is likely to rise even higher. OLF should be concerned
about this development and
should act to meet this emerging threat before it’s become even more entrenched
along with the immediate task of weakening TPLF.
OLF answering what TPLF likely to do to deal
with the paralysis?
There are many options to control the situation. TPLF
has not really run out of its reservoir of tricks. One is for Meles to openly
assume dictatorial Powers. He is unlikely to do that for fear of angering the
international community, which he has been carefully courting for years. It has
always been a dictatorship but the international community has been too willing
to ignore this
aspect on the pretext that there is no alternative political force or leader. The
second option is to take the opposition off guard. One extreme formula is for
Tigrai to declare its independence. The other formula is to go to the model of
1991-a transitional government of sorts. For this too TPLF does not see
the rationale. It says it has won the elections fair and square.
The other possibility is for TPLF to welcome back
organization s like the OLF into the political process to balance the rising
influence of the Amhara and heralding the demise of the OPDO. The international
community could press it on this issue but how hard depends on the situation on
the ground. If the TPLF/EPRDF really feels vulnerable against the CUD, it may
offer an olive branch to OLF. However, this needs to be known for what it is: a
tactical move. The interesting thing is that this tactical move is also in our best
interest. The OLF could really use the opportunity of sustained instability to
organize itself and rally the population around a clear agenda. For this to happen,
OLF has to forgo its idea of all or none. It has to welcome any opportunity to
be among its people and offer leadership at this most trying of times. Nothing
in politics is indivisible.
OLF thinking out loud on what did really occur in this
election?
We have to admit that there is a new situation on the
ground. The watershed even is not the election per se but the opposition rally
on May 14. The assumption has been that Meles will not allow any political
activity with the potential to endanger his power. In a way the fate of Meles,
at least in the long run, looks like that of Gorbachev. He allowed a level of
openness to demonstrate that he is secure enough to be lenient but the events
quickly spun out of his control and overtook him. What will actually happen
depends on what we decide to do. One thing that needs to be clear though is
that Meles has an amazing ability at crisis management, Unless the OLF takes
full advantage of this small window of opportunity to organize the Oromo
people, it is impossible to rule out the possibility of Meles coming out even
stronger having eclipsed any possible rival within his coalition.
What is the state of the Oromo camp?
The Oromo camp is currently very confused, to say the
least, many fear not only the rise of the Amhara but also
the possibility of being marginalized in the ensuing power struggle. Oromo forces
are scattered. There is even a handful in the dreaded CUD. The ONC is a member
of the UEDF and there are some Oromos who feel uncomfortable with its position
on article 39. On this question Merara is said to have indicated: he will not
go to war to revoke it; he will also not go to war to keep it. OPDO is too
beholden to TPLF. It is only playing the fear of an Amhara takeover to recover
its balance. Wafido won only a few seats and it is currently standing on its
own. It cannot ally with OPDO because the latter has been bleeding the Oromo for
the last 14 years and associating with it is very risky at present; it cannot
ally with Merara because of tension between the two; it could not ally with the
CUD because the CUD is not in a mood to talk to anyone and it harbors a
basically anti-Oromo agenda. OLF is not there to bring our house to order.
Under the circumstances advocating a coherent Oromo agenda that can mobilize
the population to defend its rights against both enemies may be easier said
than done.
OLF asking itself is the OLF ready for the
situation?
Having concluded its National Congress successfully, the OLF
had put down a serious plan to transform itself into the most important
political force in Ethiopia as well as the Horn region in a few years. Recent
events have changed this calculation. Militarily, we are still far from
becoming the force we have to be. With regard to creating the necessary conditions
for the use of "peoples power" in Oromia, the fact that we are operating
in a clandestine manner and cannot use the opening in the political
process to our advantage puts us at a disadvantage. But the conclusion that the
election was generally "free and fair" will have serious consequences
on our ability to argue that the system is not free enough to pursue our cause
through a different means. This all means that OLF is not ready for the
situation and it is still far from where it has to be: at the very center of
the game.
OLF looking further down on what are the issues
out of this election that OLF needs to be concerned about?
This election raises two issues for OLF. It is no more the only Oromo organization.
Grated it is the most important one but there are also other actors on the
field. If the political process becomes the main field of play and if OLF is
not part of it, the Possibility of being marginalized is a real possibility. When
the door was swung open, OLF was not there to take advantage of it. The CUD and
others were able to harvest what OLF had sown. Thus, given the changed
landscape, it has to plan not just how to make it relevant but also how to take
center-stage.
OLF on the issues that could marginalize OLF?
1) There are other organizations who could now claim to speak on behalf of the Oromo people and who can legitimately claim that they have the popular mandate of the people as expressed by the votes cast for them in this election;
2) The fact that OLF is not part of the political process where the action is situated prevents it from displaying the level of support it has among the population;
3) People had patiently waited for OLF for almost 12 years and they could become even more disillusioned with the rising influence of the CUD and give up on OLF and transfer their loyalty to another organization, even OPDO;
4) Other Oromo organizations may soon be created
and multiply the complication. Even QC may decide to take advantage of the
situation by going inside and claiming to be the real OLF. This may not mean much
but the confusion it would create among the confused populace can never be
overemphasized;
5) It may become impossible to
justify continued armed struggle after this election, especially in the eyes of
the international community whose understanding is crucial. Not only the international
community but also the Oromo people may find staying outside for too long not a
wise decision and may shift its allegiance.
OLF asking are there factors that make OLF even
more relevant?
1) Outside of the country, the only important
Oromo organization is OLF. The issue of the Oromo is synonymous with OLF;
2) Being the only important
political force with an armed presence in the country however ineffective this
might have been thus far;
3) The fact that OLF has a vested interest
in preserving the key elements of the current Ethiopian constitution, particularly
article 39, may give an added impetus for the TPLF to seek rapprochement with
OLF;
4) The close relation with Eritrea and the
possibility of another war, this time out limited to the border.
OLF strategy: Preparing for the unthinkable.
In Ethiopia it is the unthinkable usually happens. So getting ready for the unthinkable might
be the best way to face the
current situation.
1) The CUD succumbs, blesses TPLF
rule for five years and get focused on its plan for 2010.
2) The TPLF is really weak, has become a house of cards and that it may melt away suddenly as the Dergue did;
3) A change of government -possibility
led by a Tigrean officer-to topple Meles, bring in the dissidents and create a
unity government in collaboration with the opposition;
4) The TPLF and Meles may become
ever more legitimate in the eyes of the international community for holding a
hotly contested election;
5) Nothing changed and Meles will
continue to rule as if nothing happened and all the talk about a new political
landscape is just a fantasy;
What is to be done by OLF under the
circumstances?
Diplomatically:
1) Come up with a more
comprehensive alternative program that will give it not only a moral upper hand
but also show the contours of how the intractable regional problems could be
solved and boldly stand behind the program and sell
it;
2) Explore the possibility of
sending feelers to the TPLF/EPRDF regime to see if it is interested in
resolving the conflict through a peaceful political means;
3) Explore the possibility of also
sending feelers to the CUD to see if there is a desire of force the regime out
through combined popular action. This requires prior agreement on respect for
the right of self-determination. “Given their rhetoric and constituency this
may be a non-starter for them and also for Oromos" But it is worth considering
since a weak TPLF/EPRDF is in our common interest;
4) If convinced that the political
landscape in Ethiopia remains unchanged and does not necessitate a reassessment
of our positions, conduct a systematic campaign to discredit the myth that the
election has indeed brought real change in Ethiopia.
Organizationally:
1) Identify individuals who are
ideologues from those who are conscious of power politics. It is important to bring
the ideologues along while mobilizing the latter to be able to compete effectively
against the CUD and the EPRDF;
2) Take inventory of individuals
who are needed for their competence and technical know-how regardless of
whether they are in the organization or not;
3) Call an Oromo and Southern
conference to explore the possibility of devising a minimum agenda not only to
weaken TPLF/EPRDF but also prepare for the threats posed by the CUD and its
retrograde Amahara-centric agenda;
4) Send key people to go
inside the country and start organizing the Oromo population inside the
country. This will have the effect of dynamite and may obviously require
knowingly giving up some individuals for sacrifice.
5) Preparing the ground ahead
of time and using the current confusion as a perfect occasion to prepare one of
the largest rallies by the Oromo in its entire history;
6) Sending lead cadres of substantial
numbers and dispatching them to all corners of Oromia. These are basically
trainers who will multiply themselves rapidly and prepare the population for
the arrival of top leaders in preparation for a massive peoples action to
create a new dynamics in the country;
7) The lead cadres will
establish different committees and task forces in every region, zone, wereda
and kebele. The will use all formal and traditional levers of
authority/influence to mobilize the population and empower them to defend their
interests and rights by all means possible;
8) Convene emergency meetings first at the
executive level to analyze the situation and devise clear strategies and
stands. Then organize conferences for the national council, members, the
intelligentsia and the public to create awareness and consensus on what needs
to be done to take full advantage of the opportunity and consensus on what
needs to be done to take full advantage of the opportunity and protect against
the threats posed by the situation;
10) Raise the funds necessary to meet the challenge
from both internal and external sources using creative approaches;
11) Stay in conversation with the people by
giving periodic updates. Recruit, train and develop spokespersons at each and
every level to disseminate pertinent and timely information both to the Oromo
public and other
stakeholders;